Security forces’ leadership failing govt in checking insurgency

The then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had said way back that Maoism is the biggest internal security threat that India faces. Realising that the grievances of tribals of central India can be addressed only if the levels of violence are brought down within acceptable limits, the government inducted a large number of security forces in the area.

That the security forces have not been able to achieve this aim is a sad reflection on the leadership of these forces which mainly consists of Indian Police Service officers. The inaptitude of the leadership is apparent from repeated large-scale losses suffered by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the force designated to assist the civil administration in maintaining internal security.

Leadership’s training restricted to policing

The latest fiasco of April 3 in which 22 personnel lost their lives should be a wake-up call for the establishment to carry out an overhaul of the management policy of the Central Armed Forces. The amateurism displayed by the leadership in planning and conduct of this operation is beyond imagination. No rational leader will send out almost 2,000 personnel on a jungle-bashing mission without any back-up plan. How could they even imagine that such massive movement of troops will remain secret from insurgents? Did they plan to secure the line of communication that was imperative, especially at the time of withdrawal? The leadership has proved itself incapable of appreciating these aspects because they are not trained to think in this manner. Their training is restricted to matters of policing and investigation.

Had they visualised the likely reaction of insurgents, they would have ensured locating adequate reserves at appropriate places to tackle a contingency like the one that arose. They would have ensured that at least the routes of withdrawal of troops were adequately secured.

Defensive mindset restricts forces to periphery

That the security forces in spite of being deployed in this area for more than a decade are still unable to dominate a large portion of so-called liberated zone does not speak well of the manner in which they have been operating. The leadership instead of ensuring gradual expansion of deployment and enhancing the area of influence of security forces, has generally remained stuck around the periphery, thus leaving vast tracts of forest for Naxals to move around freely. That the security forces have not been able to penetrate deep into the area is a sad reflection of the defensive mindset of leaders. Resultantly, the initiative and moral ascendency is always with the insurgents. Extension of domination to interiors would also have enabled the administration to reach the remote areas, bring the fruits of development and assuage the tribals.

Repeated failures point towards the inability of leaders to draw lessons from insurgencies the world over, including that in Vietnam, Malaysia and Congo as also the previous setbacks.

Disconnect and low morale among troops

What further reflects adversely on leadership are the reports of troops abandoning their comrades. It points to the disconnect with troops and hence the inability to inculcate a sense of camaraderie and regimentation. Not conversant with the operational ethos of the Central Armed Forces, they have destroyed the regimentation, an extremely important attribute for any fighting force through an ill-conceived decade-old directive to rotate onethird of troops of a unit every year in CRPF and ITBP. This has resulted in lack of rapport between commanders and troops and among troops, affecting the operational efficiency and morale.

That the morale of these forces is low is apparent from the fact that almost 47,000 personnel of these forces have either resigned or gone on voluntary retirement during the five-year period from 2016 to 2020, according to a reply given in the Rajya Sabha by the minister of state for home Nityanand Rai.

Contrary to the cause, personal reasons are officially listed. The actual causes vary from bleak career prospects, disparity in pay and perks, extended duty hours and difficult working conditions, including the lack of accommodation and equipment besides prolonged separation from family. A plethora of litigation relating to personnel matters in these forces also points towards inadequacy of the leaders in ensuring proper personnel management.

NC Asthana, a retired IPS officer, has aptly concluded in one of his pieces that the “bullets (that killed the soldiers) were Naxal but the jawans were killed by the megalomania and incompetence of top officers”. Nothing can be closer to the truth. The Central Armed Forces have an important role in the security matrix of India. It is imperative that the government urgently looks into the problems of these forces, especially the leadership reforms.

THE CENTRAL ARMED FORCES HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE SECURITY MATRIX. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT URGENTLY LOOKS INTO THE PROBLEMS OF THESE FORCES, ESPECIALLY THE LEADERSHIP REFORMS