Why Xi Jinping’s iron grip on power is intact
TIT IS PERHAPS MUCH MORE USEFUL TO THINK OF REPORTS OF FACTIONAL CONTESTATION AS POLITICAL JOSTLING FOR CRUCIAL PARTY POSITIONS AND INFLUENCE OVER POLICY DIRECTION
he past two months have seen intense speculation about the political churn within China. There have been reports of unhappiness and factional contestation around Xi Jinping’s policies on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Covid-19 containment, and the direction of economic policy. This has fuelled rumours of a pushback against Xi, heading into the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC). While there is evidence of policy contestation and frustration, there is little to suggest that Xi’s political authority is diminished.
The day before Russia invaded Ukraine, a commentary in the People’s Daily made an emphatic pitch for Xi’s continued rule. It argued that Xi was a “blessing to the party and the country” and had “won the heartfelt love of the whole party, armed forces and all ethnic groups in China.” The invasion, however, showed the limits of the leader’s foresight. The war came soon after the unprecedented joint statement of Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 4. It left Beijing in an awkward position of balancing competing economic and political interests amid western suspicion of China’s complicity with the Russian decision to wage war. Scholarly articles questioning China’s pro-Russian neutrality in the aftermath of the war indicated elite disaffection.
March also witnessed fresh Covid-19 outbreaks across major Chinese cities. This led to intense policy debates. There was evidence of pushback against the central leadership’s dynamic zero-Covid-19 policy, which entailed strict lockdowns. With the economic costs of this policy rising, many voices called for adopting an approach of coexisting with the virus. Xi’s reported comments at Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) meetings in lateMarch and early-May acknowledged this pushback, as he stressed the need to persevere and demanded alignment with the decisions and plans of the CPC central committee. Commentaries in official media framed this as a test of cadres’ political quality. “Lying flat”, a euphemism for the policy of coexisting with the virus, was termed a helpless choice.
At the same time, on economic policy, there has been evidence of a shift away from the narrative of common prosperity, which Xi has championed, towards greater stability. After December’s Central Economic Work Conference, stability was the buzzword for economic policy. In addition, Li Keqiang’s annual Government Work Report in March merely had one reference to shared prosperity.
Reports have also suggested tremendous back and forth over economic policy. For instance, The Wall Street Journal recently reported that Li has been influential in easing tough regulatory measures. However, while Li and vice-premier Liu He have signalled greater support for enterprises, the property market, and the platform economy, others like Han Zheng, a PSC member, and Hu Chunhua reportedly want to maintain pressure on developers. Another example of the policy push and pull was the publication of an article by Xi in the most recent edition of the party journal, Qiushi. The article reiterated the goal of common prosperity and regulating the “savage growth” and “disorderly expansion” of capital.
Despite all this, Xi continues to enjoy unparalleled authority and remains on track to retain his position at the helm of Chinese politics after the 20th Party Congress. There are three broad factors for this. First, over the past 10 years, Xi has structurally concentrated power. This has been done through the anti-corruption campaign, by taking charge of key policy groups, having key party and State institutions personally report to him annually and revising inner-party regulations.
At least, 70% of the current effective central party regulations have been issued during Xi’s reign. This is a measure of the expansion of the central leadership’s authority over the past decade. More critically, it is worth noting that these revisions have taken place within the framework of the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, which emerged as the party’s guiding ideology following the 19th party Congress in 2017. The “Two Establishments” outlined in the resolution adopted at the 6th Plenum in November 2021 further underscored this. It is imperative to not underestimate the significance of this ideological shift as mere rhetoric. Ideology comprises programmatic and epistemological elements, which inform governance at all levels. Outright challenges to the party’s guiding ideology, therefore, can be a recipe for systemic instability.
Second, in Leninist parties, control over the security, propaganda and organisation systems are key to power. In this regard, Xi remains in command. Also, since October last year, there have been many leadership changes at the provincial levels. A significant number of the new provincial party chiefs are reported to have ties either with Xi or are known Xi allies. Statements of public support by provincial leaders for Xi following the adoption of the history resolution in November are also indicative of his political authority.
Third, local officials have largely complied despite grumblings over the zero-Covid-19 policy and its adverse economic impact. This demonstrates either the lack of broad political will to push back against Xi or that the political cost of such pushback is believed to be extremely high and, therefore, unviable. In such an environment, it is perhaps much more useful to think of reports of factional contestation as political jostling for crucial party positions and influence over policy direction instead of a political backlash against Xi’s continued rule.