Why India must rethink its stance on Ukraine
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has thrust India into the international spotlight. As the war rages on, what first appeared awkward for neutral New Delhi now appears almost enviable. A series of international suitors — the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Russia, and the European Union (EU) — arrived hat in hand, beseeching India to take their side on Ukraine. During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent travels to Europe and Asia, he found himself assiduously courted by world leaders.
India’s pursuit of maximum options with minimum restrictions hasn’t endeared it to everyone, but so far, a careful and calculating Ukraine diplomacy has paid dividends. As global oil prices soar, energystarved India has consumed about five times as much Russian oil this year as in all of 2021 — much of it heavily discounted. During his April visit to Delhi, Russia’s foreign minister expressed gratitude for India’s forbearance. The Kremlin’s role in ongoing India-China contention looms large, as India manages strained relations and a simmering border dispute with Beijing. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping famously declared a “no limits” partnership on the eve of Russia’s invasion, but Indian policymakers expect Moscow to treat their country as off-limits, based on India’s steadfast refusal to abandon Russia and a legacy of strategic cooperation.
India’s unsentimental pursuit of its national interest hasn’t yet come at the expense of its relationships with western democracies. Strategic partnership with India is so valued that nations are ultimately willing to overlook Delhi’s lukewarm support of the rules-based international order.
In Tokyo last month, Joe Biden declared his commitment “to making the US-India partnership among the closest we have on earth.” His administration remains reluctant to sanction India under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) for purchasing Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile defence system. To decrease Indian reliance on Russian arms supplies, Washington appears poised to accelerate defence sales and enable indigenisation, reportedly preparing a $500-million package in military financing to India.
Taken together, these developments suggest India has played its cards skillfully. But can the surprising results last?
Whether or not India can continue to reap the benefits of studied neutrality hinges on several critical assumptions. First, a shared preoccupation with China will continue to smoothen relations with the West, engendering empathy for Delhi’s Ukraine policy. Second, post-war Russia will remain a major power with agency in India-related security matters that touch on Chinese interests. Third, relatedly, Delhi’s accommodation of Ukraine can arrest Moscow’s increasing tilt toward Beijing.
While the first assumption is on solid ground, the last two are less so.
Successive US administrations now view India as central to balancing China’s power and shaping Beijing’s external environment. India earned more mentions than any country in the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy released this February. A bipartisan consensus favours a tough-minded approach to China with Congress consistently urging a harder edge.
Europe is increasingly aligned with the US on China — a shift aided by Beijing’s wartime backing of Moscow. The EU’s foreign policy chief dismissed a contentious EU-China summit this spring as a “dialogue of the deaf.” Despite India’s differences with the EU over the bloodiest fighting in Europe since 1945, Modi’s travel to Germany, Denmark, and France was nevertheless regarded as the building on pre-existing momentum.
The problem is that Russia’s utility in helping India deal with China (or Pakistan) is diminishing daily. The war increasingly appears headed towards an enervating stalemate. The fighting will likely continue for now, with neither Russia nor Ukraine satisfied with the current facts on the ground. Biden is intent on ensuring Russia pays “a heavy price for its actions.” Meanwhile, influential western voices are calling for Russia’s outright defeat to produce “a weak, isolated country.”
Already, Putin’s war has resulted in ruinous economic consequences for Russia: Soaring inflation, economic contraction, and a mass exodus of technology workers. Even accounting for its improved showing in Ukraine’s east, Russia’s military has struggled mightily. Before Moscow resumes being a reliable military supplier to Delhi, it will probably need to replace thousands of destroyed pieces of battlefield equipment. Last month, India halted talks with Russia to acquire early warning helicopters due to supply uncertainties. The bad news for Russia — and India — is that export controls are just beginning to bite. As long as Putin stays in power, Moscow will likely face restrictions on high technology trade and investment.
As the war grinds on, the likelihood of a diminished Russia consigned to being China’s junior partner grows. Even if the conflict is somehow brought to a swift conclusion, Moscow will desperately need Beijing to brighten a bleak strategic and economic outlook. That will come with conditions attached that should give Delhi pause. Despite their fraught history, Russia may conclude only China is capable of stepping in to meet its growing needs. In a future IndiaChina crisis, Russia’s ability to exert a positive influence on China will be limited.
India’s cold-eyed diplomacy on Ukraine has arguably served its interests until now, but Russia’s deteriorating condition and growing reliance on China point to it soon outliving its usefulness.