Don’t look for ‘silver bullet’ solutions
There is no one ‘Kashmir problem’, but many, and each requires redress by different means
Aflurry of commentary has followed the appointment of former directoroftheIntelligenceBureau Dineshwar Sharma, as the Centre’s representative (the title ‘interlocutor’wasstudiouslyavoided) to “initiateandcarryforwardadialogue”inJammu & Kashmir (J&K). Detractors have seized upon this as an admission that the Centre’s ‘muscular’ policy, or ‘Doval doctrine’ has failed. Othersinsist that theappointmentofa former DIB will be counterproductive, as a ‘political initiative’ is what was needed. It is arguedthat givenSharma’sbackground,his appointment suggests a continuation of an enforcement-dominated approach; or, further, that unless Sharma also talks to Pakistan, the process will be infructuous.
The broad contours of the conflict in J&K findlittlespaceinthiscommentary.Sharma’s appointment,itwouldseem,standsaloneand is to be judged on its potential to ‘solve’ the Kashmirproblem–onwhichimpossiblecriterion we cansafely declare it a failure at once.
There is, in this commentary, a habitual muddling of issues, and an extraordinary neglectofcontextandtrends.Crucially,there
PRESENT TENSE
is not just one Kashmir problem, but many, andeachrequiresredressbydivergentmeans andatdifferentstages.Themosturgentisthe problem of terrorism and the bloodshed and disruption it generates. Thishasperiodically been compounded by organised street violence.Thentherearethemoreenduringand manifold problems of governance and of a communal,polarisinganddisruptivepolitics; and, of course, underlyingallthese is thecanker of Pakistan .
No regime in India, including the present one, has ever suggested that the military approach alone is to be applied to J&K. Had that been the case, the state would simply havebeenbroughtunderPresident’sruleand handedovertotheArmy.Toborrowthestock clichés of the bureaucracy, the solutions proposedarealwaysintendedtobe‘holistic’ and ‘multi-pronged’. Indeed, for those whoargue that Pakistan must be brought into the dialogue process for anyconcreteprogresstobe made, it is useful to recall not only the numberless cycles of past talks with Islamabad. Now,the PrimeMinisterhasdeclared that it wasnot‘goli yagali’ (the bullet or abuse), but ‘embracingallKashmiris’thatwouldproduce a solution.
Advocates of ‘dialogue’ glibly ignore the manyfailuresoftheirfavouredpolicy,butare eagertoseizeuponpurportedfailuresof‘muscular’ responses. It is useful, consequently, to reviewthetrajectoryofviolenceinJ&Ktosee how this has worked. First, the long term trend:J&Kexperienced17yearsofhighintensity conflict (over 1,000 fatalities a year) n between1990and2006(alldatafromtheSouth AsiaTerrorismPortal),peakingat4,507killed in 2001. From this peak, the trajectory was consistentlydownwardstill2012,whenfatalities fell to 117. No dramatic shifts in India’s policy or strategy are noticeable during this period of sustained improvement. It was principallygrowinginternationalanddomesticpressureonPakistan,andashiftinIslamabad’s priorities towards its mischief in Afghanistan that resulted in a de-escalation in J&K. Pakistan’s willingness to enter into a ceasefire agreement with India in 2003, and to maintain its terms almost without violation through the Pervez Musharraf regime till 2008, contributed significantly to this downtrend.
Significantly,theuptrendinviolencecom- mencedin2013(181fatalities),beforetheModi regime was established in Delhi, or the PDPBJPcombineinJ&K.Thepresent‘muscular’ policy dates back to the Burhan Wani killing in July 2016, and the ensuing stone pelting campaign, taking terrorism-linked fatalities upto267in2016and290in2017(tillOctober22).
Around 61% of all fatalities in 2017 are terrorists, and among these are top field commanders of all active terrorist formations in the state. The distribution of this violence is crucial: 14 of J&K’s 22 districts accountforall the fatalities; on a further breakdown to the tehsil level, just 32of82tehsilsrecordedfatalities. Crucially, the worst five tehsils accounted for 48% of all fatalities.
Terrorist and separatist violence in J&K hasbeenseverelycircumscribed,andisoverwhelminglylocalisedto small andshrinking extremist-dominatedconstituencies, principallyalongtheLineofControl(LoC).Abulkof terrorist fatalities is recorded along the LoC, andprincipally comprises fresh infiltrators. It is the success of kinetic measures that has openedupspacesfortherevivalofadialogue process. Memories are short, and most commentators appear to have forgotten that an all-partydelegationofmembersofParliament toJ&KinSeptember2016sawseparatistleaders slamming their doors in their faces.
Sharma’s task is to create grounds for the resumption of dialogue at the political level, and it cannot be bound by irrational timelines and expectations. As kinetic pressures mount, he will engage with those who show themselves willing to abjure violence. He offers a window of escape, not a magical solution.