Talking to the Taliban
India’s engagement reflects new regional realities. The onus is now on the Taliban
For more than two years, in the backdrop of the United States (US)’S plans to draw down its military presence in Afghanistan, there has been an intense debate in India’s strategic community about the utility of engaging with some elements of the Afghan Taliban. When the debate gained currency in 2019, there was hesitation about engaging with a force which had been so hostile to Indian interests. But the reluctance was also linked to domestic constraints. Engagement could well have triggered questions about the government’s anti-pakistan, anti-terror, hardline security stance and its unwillingness to engage with Kashmir’s local formations when it was willing to talk to the Taliban. The Kabul-kashmir link played out in a different way. One reason the government pushed ahead with its constitutional changes in Jammu and Kashmir was to pre-empt the possible impact of radicalised militants shifting focus to the Valley. India also wanted to see how far the US would go with its plans.
As it became clear that the US intended to push ahead with the withdrawal plans, there was a renewed debate. As this newspaper reported, New Delhi has begun reaching out to Afghan Taliban factions and leaders, especially those outside Pakistan’s sphere of influence. There have also been positive feelers seeking engagement from within the Afghan Taliban leadership. The move is a reflection of the realisation in capitals around the world that the Taliban will be part of the next ruling dispensation in Kabul. Retired diplomats and experts also point to the heterogeneity within the Taliban, and that the Afghanistan of today is not the same country of the mid-1990s. Despite the precarious position of the elected government of President Ashraf Ghani, there are elements in Kabul which strongly believe the post-2001 generation won’t be willing to accept an authoritarian regime and that even the Taliban apparently realises this.
For India, an outreach to the Taliban will be an intense game of catch-up as other players such as China, Russia and Iran have already started formal dialogue with the group. Despite the delay, the move is well-considered. It is an opportunity for India to make it clear, directly to the Taliban, that the gains of the past two decades cannot be squandered away, and convey its core security red lines. It is also a signal that Pakistan cannot be the sole arbiter of Afghanistan’s future. India must continue to engage, cautiously, while the onus rests on the Taliban to prove it is not the same inimical force of the past, beholden to Rawalpindi.