To take on China, rely on diplomacy, military and counter-measures
The agreement for mutual disengagement of troops by China and India at the friction point of Gogra in eastern Ladakh is a step forward for restoring the status quo ante of April 2020, when Chinese forces made a series of preplanned intrusions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
Including Gogra, Galwan and Pangong Tso, the two sides have now stepped back at three contested points, while the standoff continues at other strategic locations and is unlikely to be speedily resolved.
Nonetheless, there are lessons to be learnt from the three areas where China and India have disengaged. The first is that sustained diplomacy yields dividends. Thanks to several rounds of talks, the two Asian giants have avoided an intensified conflict that seemed a possibility after the Galwan clash. The joint poring over of maps of each military’s perceptional lines and claims at LAC, and interactions, have conveyed in direct terms what each side wants and prefers, and shown where the potential for mutual pullbacks lies. The subtle involvement of Russia as a creative go-between to lower the heat has also helped.
While China and India nurse long-term suspicions of each other’s intentions, goals and international alignments — and these will not dissipate anytime soon — the LAC crisis diplomacy has focused on tactical specifics at the friction points. The message is that the two neighbours will not stop competing for power and influence in Asia and beyond, but they can manage the disputed border situation from sliding into war.
The second lesson is that diplomatic parleys are necessary but not sufficient. Without a demonstration of military deterrence and resolve, an aggressive and expansive China cannot be sweet-talked into dismantling its bunkers and semi-permanent structures or driving back its tanks and armoured vehicles to pre-april 2020 positions.
China has withdrawn from three encroached portions only after witnessing India’s willingness to use countervailing force, do mirror deployment or outnumber the Chinese military at some points, and mount counter-offensives across what China
India redeemed itself after the Chinese of sive in April-may 2020 by displaying no tation to spill blood or pay China back i own coin. The concept of “offensive defe has guided India’s strategic infrastruct building and force projection at LAC thro out this crisis, and this has compelled C to recalculate the costs and benefits o expansionism.
The third lesson is that since diplom resolution of the crisis is dependent on tary operations and show of strategic d mination, India must persist on the pat “peace through strength”.
The Narendra Modi governm has to keep bringing bargai chips to the dialogue like it di 2020 by occupying the strat heights of the Kailash rang mountains, and letting the Chi know that India can neutra China’s bilateral asymmetry in tary and economic power thro other cards. This may include vating and operationalising Quad to a multilateral counterbalancing pressure in Indo-pacific; imposing greater barriers to nese goods, technology and investments; reopening the sensitive issues of the stat Tibet and Taiwan.
A difficult path lies ahead in India-c relations, especially as the India-united St (US) strategic partnership is maturing China-us ties are plumbing the depths. approximately 50,000 troops on each remaining at LAC, the potential for fresh lence cannot be ruled out. While Indian tary proactiveness has proven to be an im ative to get China to make limited con sions, this kind of equilibrium is unstable risks unwarranted escalation.
Peace through strength is a delicate ti rope walk. But the gauntlet China has thr is such that India does not have the optio shying away from matching Chinese m on the ground and in world capitals. On combination of bravery and wisdom can ceed in this long-drawn-out crisis.
Sreeram Chaulia is the author of the forthco book, Crunch Time: Narendra Modi’s Nat
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