He monsoon ession ends
E outcome: Democracy is in crisis. Caste ack. And parties are in election mode
he monsoon session of Parliament has ended, cut short by the continued standoff between the treasury and Opposition benches. There were three broad political takeaways from session. One, India’s Parliament, and, by nsion Indian democracy, is in crisis. The session disruptions on each day; unilateral passage of slations; unprecedented scenes of Opposition mbers of Parliament (MPS) snatching papers, wing the rule book at the Chair, and sitting on secretariat table; suspension of seven MPS; and, ending on who you believe, an assault on a man marshal, or the use of marshals against the osition with women MPS alleging they were cked. As Chakshu Roy pointed out in this newser, the Lok Sabha took an average of 10 minutes Rajya Sabha an average of half an hour to pass s. Despite the almost unanimous demand of the osition, the government refused to send a bill ch would enable the privatisation of general rance companies to a select committee — urprising given that only 11% of the bills in the e years of the 17th Lok Sabha have gone to liamentary committees. All of this indicates that liament is neither fulfilling its function of berative lawmaking nor of holding the executive ountable. wo, the session marked the return of caste as the damental fault line in Indian politics. With the nimous passage of a constitutional amendment estore the power of states to draw their own list ackward classes, and the overwhelming demand both a caste census and a provision to allow rvations to exceed the 50% ceiling imposed by Supreme Court, it is clear that the medium-term re of politics lies in the management of identity tics. The government will focus on the enhanced resentation of Other Backward Classes and hlight its commitment to reservations to sustain lectoral coalition. The Opposition will seek to ture the government’s multi-caste alliance by ing demands which are sure to upset the latter’s er caste base. Instead of moving towards a tical imagination which makes individual ens with rights and universal justice key ciples, India is descending further into the rass of group identity-based politics. nd finally, the Opposition in Parliament indicates despite differences over leadership and ances, there is a fundamental convergence across onal parties and the Congress about the need to le the Bharatiya Janata Party. In the House, the tical class was already fighting the 2022 Uttar desh and 2024 general elections and trying to d signals to their respective constituencies. This arisation is set to deepen. 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh. When supplemented with a reading of the relevant portions of
Jairam Ramesh’s excellent book, Intertwined Lives: PN Haksar and
Indira Gandhi, it should provide a comprehensive understanding of how the treaty came to be signed.
As Raghavan notes: “The treaty was not the product of a strategic consensus between India and the Soviet Union on the crisis in South Asia. For New Delhi and Moscow sought rather different objectives in concluding the treaty.” Discussions on the treaty had started a couple of years before it was signed, in 1969 to be precise. A draft was quickly agreed upon once India’s concerns about maintaining its non-alignment and omitting any explicit references to military cooperation were accommodated. In fact, according to Raghavan, the Indian draft of the treaty did not significantly differ from the Russian version.
However, the then prime minister (PM), Indira Gandhi, while positive about the treaty, was hesitant to sign it too quickly. She was worried about internal political opposition to the treaty as well as possible negative reactions abroad, primarily in the United States (US) and China. The fact that she got embroiled in a conflict with the Congress party leadership in 1969, and elections were held subsequently, helped postpone the signing.
Even in the middle of the East Pakistan crisis, Indira Gandhi remained ambivalent about signing the document. But then US secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to China (via Pakistan) in July 1971, and his subsequent conversation with the Indian ambassador to the US, LK Jha, on July 17 tipped the balance. Kissinger told Jha that the US would not get involved if China intervened in a war between India and Pakistan.
Alarm bells rang in Delhi. PM Gandhi shed