He fall of fghanistan
E Taliban is back. The US has lost. The has won. And India stares at a crisis
wenty years after the United States (US) militarily invaded Afghanistan and ousted the Taliban from power, the Taliban is back in Kabul as the US fled in scenes reminiscent of xit from Vietnam. Notwithstanding the spin from shington, this is a strategic defeat. The US exit understandable. But the way it was managed is ardonable. The US misread the Taliban’s ntions and capabilities, didn’t act against istan enough to deter support for the Taliban, carried out a farcical peace process where the ban walked away with international legitimacy hout giving up on its ideological agenda and rcive machinery. The Taliban is much stronger n it was in the 1990s, and the US has left ocratic Afghans, women, and minorities in peril. his is also Pakistan’s win. Notwithstanding the erences that exist between Inter-services lligence (ISI) and the Taliban, ISI’S strategy of ting for the US exit while supporting the Taliban paid off for now. Pakistan’s aim of securing ategic depth” is close to being met. Its objective of ding Indian presence in Afghanistan is in motion. d it will be the centre of a new arrangement ere China, Russia, and others will use Islamabad’s d offices to deal with Afghanistan. At some point, istan will have to deal with resurgent Afghan ionalism — but that’s in the future. dia, like the US, overestimated the power of the han government. It delayed contact with the ban till it was too late. There is no Northern ance to support, and cobbling together an antiban coalition will not be free of costs. India’s nectivity projects across the region will be hit. ability to covertly hurt Pakistan will diminish. d attention may well shift to Kashmir. An er-appreciated trigger for India’s decision to oke Kashmir’s constitutional status was the ulation that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan ld lead to a repeat of the early 1990s in the Valley. whether this move has cemented Indian control ashmir or created an even more fertile ground the resumption of terror is to be seen. Delhi must t evolve a short-term policy to deal with the ue of Indians still in Afghanistan; refuge to hans seeking exile; terms of engagement with the ban; and enhanced security threats. It must also e a medium-term policy on whether to lie low recognise the Taliban regime or invest in kening the Taliban and instruments that can be d for the purpose. What is certain is that August 021, will have a profound impact on geopolitics oss South, West, and Central Asia.