When domestic politics undermines strategy
There is a clash between the regime’s political objectives at home and India’s diplomatic objectives. Only the top leadership can resolve it
This week, the central paradox of India’s foreign policy story of the last eight years came to the fore. New Delhi’s strategic value in the international system has undoubtedly grown. Its bilateral ties with key States have dramatically improved. Its engagement in key global theatres has expanded. Its contribution to common global good through bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral mechanisms is widely recognised. It has played a key role in norm-setting and the global security architecture through Quad. Its footprint in the neighbourhood, despite the ups and downs that are inevitable with intimacy, remains robust. And it has found new innovative ways to deepen ties with the diaspora, including using Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s star power.
At the same time, India’s relationship with global civil society has dipped. Liberal non-governmental constituencies in the United States (US) and Europe, the entire wider human rights complex and the international media, are sceptical of India’s democratic story. In the world’s best universities, it is hard to find scholars of repute across anthropology, political science, history, law, and humanities who have a kind word about India’s current trajectory. (The exceptions include the disciplines of economics and international relations, where views are mixed).
The erosion in India’s standing extends to wider public opinion in West Asian States, where the lack of democratic expression means that these voices are controlled or mediated by the respective States — but they exist, as we saw in the response to comments by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) spokespersons about Islam. And it extends to sections of the diaspora, especially the second generation diaspora in the West which, due to its own experience, is deeply wedded to the idea of pluralism and diversity, minority rights and representation and cannot relate to India’s current political orientation.
There can be two responses to this paradox.
The first is the belligerent nationalist response, which relies on the arguments of democracy, hypocrisy and conspiracy. India is what it is. It will do what it must do. Foreign powers have always cast an evil eye on India. India’s political orientation is an outcome of its democratic processes. No foreign power can have a veto over the policy approach of an elected government. And in any case, ties with foreign governments, which really drives international relations, are on a firm footing.
There is hypocrisy all over. Isn’t the
US voicing concerns over human rights because the Democrats rely on Muslim constituencies at home for their electoral politics? Does America have any moral authority left to lecture other countries given its own dismal record on peaceful transfer of power, white supremacy, gun violence, and regressive anti-women laws? And what gives West Asia — home to arguably the most authoritarian, regressive, patriarchal, antiminority societies anywhere in the world — the right to tell India how to treat its minorities?
And then, it is suggested, there are conspiracies. External adversaries, particularly China and Pakistan, are pumping in resources and boosting a narrative to portray India as a tinpot dictatorship because they want to undermine Delhi’s ties with the West. India must fight these narratives.
The second response is more introspective.
This has to begin with a set of questions. Why is India’s domestic turn eliciting such a fierce global backlash? Is it because the world wants a weaker India or is it because even friends are concerned that current policies will actually weaken India by deepening domestic divisions? Is it because in a world where sovereignty is no longer absolute, domestically disempowered constituencies are seeking external channels to amplify their voices? Is it better to address the root of this discontent and create domestic space for minorities and dissidents, or is focusing merely on the symptoms of the problem enough?
What are the risks of being seen as a country turning towards majoritarianism? What are the external relationships that are being jeopardised due to domestic political objectives? Is it smart to burden Indian diplomacy with the task of putting a gloss over these new (and disturbing) structural features of Indian politics? Is this a battle India needs to be fighting when it has real strategic-security challenges at its border with a belligerent China? Is there a need for correction, not due to external reasons but due to internal reasons?
Narendra Modi has already carved out his domestic legacy and paid his debt to his ideological roots. To the Hindu Right, he will always be the PM who won and brought about the long promised changes to Kashmir’s constitutional status, enabled the construction of the Ram Temple, and created a political and electoral climate where old style politics of secularism (or pseudo-secularism) was buried.
This political design, which excluded Muslims, created both an ideological cover and political incentives for bigotry. It was a feature, not a bug, of the system. But that bigotry now threatens to complicate both Modi’s domestic narrative (there is a reason why the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh stepped into calm the temperature on the mandir-masjid row; the leadership wishes to consolidate achievements, not inaugurate new disputes everyday), and external legacy (there is a reason why the BJP suspended a long-time student leader turned spokesperson; ties with West Asia are critical).
Like the production of hate was a long process, calibrating it will be hard and reversing it, harder. But to prevent his governance record from being overwhelmed by new identitybased demands internally, and to maintain new friendships and win back old friends externally, it is time for Modi to tackle the bigotry at home. And given how well positioned he is for 2024, he can do so from a position of confidence and strength. What has been a recipe for electoral success is now a political and strategic albatross around India’s neck. But it needn’t be.