MONEY, THE MOTHER’S MILK OF POLITICS

re-electing the dons?

The book’s central thesis is that there is a market logic of demand and supply of criminality. The approach goes beyond

(poor ignorant voter) hypothesis. For instance, the voters could be looking for extra-legal tactics for their community’s protection or for a smooth delivery of benefits. The book theorizes the crime-politics nexus in the framework of Francis Fukuyama’s moral and practical requirement ie of a system which balances between an effective state, norms of accountability and the rule of law. India’s main weakness, the writer argues, could lie in the (mediocre) quality of the state and its eroding institutions.

The lack of inner democracy in India’s political parties, or no culture of holding primaries, helps perpetuate the anomalies. Vaishnav upholds the US democrat Jesse Unruh’s view that money is the mother’s milk of politics. The ‘bad candidates’ are always handy in cross-subsidising their lesser-endowed brethren. Their presence is secretly heart-warming for the party bosses whose pockets get lined in the process. “Wealth and criminality have an interactive effect: wealth significantly magnifies the electoral success of criminal candidates,” he concludes. The writer follows the cash trail but stops short of shedding light on India’s black economy which fuels its dirty politics.

Can anything be done about stopping law breakers from being law makers? Vaishnav cites many reasons, ranging from institutional stagnation to governance deficit to cronyism and the new interplay between modernization and corruption. While there are no short cuts the remedy lies in fixing an array of regulatory, extractive and political rent-seeking activities, reining in political parties and cleaning up their finances, amending electoral laws and rethinking democratic accountability. Until then, it will be sadly business as usual.