Don’t give the military total freedom
effort should be to ensure that China remains committed to these important agreements and see how they can be strengthened.
Even in the present case, it is not clear why the skirmishes which took place at various points were not raised to the diplomatic and higher political level. The series of incidents at multiple points and the earlier violence witnessed at the Pangong Lake area should have been a warning enough that the country was dealing with a new situation on the border. As a result of the violence in some of these encounters, we should have been aware of heightened emotions and anger among the Indian forces as also among the Chinese. The possibility of such anger leading to more violent clashes should have been anticipated and diplomatic engagement should have been intensified. It should have been raised to the level of the national security adviser and the external affairs minister. This would have also been helpful in reading Chinese calculations. If this was done, then it has not been put out in the public domain.
The agreements arrived at in 1996 and 2005 committed the two sides to engage in a clarification of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). We know where LAC lies and India’s activities are confined to the area within LAC. China contests this alignment at some locations but we do not know how China perceives LAC in its entire length. Both sides have agreed that clarifying LAC is essential to assuring peace and tranquillity at the border, pending the settlement of the border question. The Galwan incident offers an opportunity for us to engage China on this agreed exercise and implement it expeditiously. China’s reaction will also demonstrate whether it is really interested in maintaining peace on the border or whether it prefers to keep it ambiguous so that it can unilaterally advance its territorial claims at points and time of its choosing. This will enable us to draw the necessary conclusions and respond accordingly.
There is no doubt that India’s relations with China have become more adversarial. The string of incidents at the border is a symptom of that, as is the mounting evidence of Chinese activism in India’s subcontinental neighbourhood. The Indian government’s response has to be a careful mix of political, diplomatic, economic and military measures. Engagement with China must continue but its terms must reflect the changed context. Now, more than ever, we need to step back and reconsider our national strategy in all its dimensions. India has left that on the shelf for far too long.