The significance of August 31
The US exit from Afghanistan was disgraceful. India must do all it can to secure its own interests
In history books, August 15 — the day the Taliban took over Kabul — will overshadow August 31 — the date set by United States (US) President Joe Biden for the final withdrawal of the US military presence in Afghanistan. But August 31 will have its significance. This artificially imposed deadline was the key trigger for the Taliban’s military offensive in the final phase of the war. To be sure, the original sin, in February 2020, was agreeing to the peace pact that gave the Taliban strength and legitimacy, without extracting any concessions. If the desperate scenes at the Hamid Karzai International Airport and a US drone attack that killed civilians symbolised all that was wrong with the US’S mismanaged exit, the boost to jihadi groups of all hues reflected the strategic and security threat that has been created. The US will never be able to live down the consequences of its Afghan misadventure.
For two decades, India was able to take advantage of the US security umbrella. In this period, New
Delhi did well — cementing people-to-people ties, investing in symbols of democracy, providing development aid, expanding its diplomatic presence, and staying away from establishing a military presence, which could have antagonised the civilian population. Given India’s history with the Taliban and its backers in Pakistan and its commitment to democratic values, New Delhi backed the Afghan government till the very end, when there was no government to back anymore. It is now time to make alternative arrangements.
The Taliban is making the right noises. Its senior leader, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, outlined India’s importance in the subcontinent, expressed a desire to continue cultural, economic and trade ties, and underlined the value of projects such as Chabahar. This is a signal that the Taliban may be more autonomous from Pakistan in government than it was as an insurgent force, and provides an opening for engagement. But no one in Delhi is under any illusions. The Taliban is heterogenous; its ability or even desire to crack down on its friends — including terror groups targeting India — is in doubt; the rhetoric could well be tactical to earn legitimacy; and whether it can cross any Pakistani red lines on India remains to be seen. But Delhi now has no choice but to work with the Taliban, quietly for now and openly sooner rather than later, to secure its interests. While being alert to the threats emanating from its western neighbourhood, prepare for a new relationship with a different Afghanistan.