Will Trump visit catalyse a composite review of India’s defence preparedness
Apropos the Trump visit, two Chinarelated strands provide the larger context to locate the Indian Navy’s predicament. China is the primary referent for the USIndia partnership in the emerging strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific. Admiral Singh made a nuanced but import-laden statement specific to the relative growth profiles of the Chinese and Indian navies: “They are doing what they have to do and moving at the pace they are capable of
US President Donald Trump’s first visit to India February 24-25 followed in the wake of his predecessors in the White House, from Bill Clinton to George W Bush and, most recently, Barack Obama, who made two visits, including one for the Republic Day celebrations. A US Presidential visit to India has a certain politico-diplomatic symbolism and strategic significance and officials on both sides burn the proverbial midnight candle to have some major takeaways that are formalized during the visit.
The truly big ticket item in the till recently troubled bilateral relationship was the 2008 civilian nuclear agreement. This was steered by the political perspicacity and quiet resolve of the BushManmohan Singh combine, with little or no flamboyance.
The Trump visit was very different and the public diplomacy element was very visible. On the more substantive side, the boxes have been ticked, but there was no major trade deal or breakthrough in the impasse over tariffs and India’s unhappiness at being brought into the grouping of developed nations.
It is in the security and strategic domain that the bilateral remains robust and the emphasis on the maritime dimension is evident. It may be recalled that the 2005 rapprochement in the bilateral was driven by strategic considerations within the US security establishment over the rise of China and enabling India was seen as the more viable option.
This orientation continues in the bilateral and, just before the American President set course for India, a senior US official noted that the US wants an India that is strong with a capable military that supports peace, stability, and a rulesbased order in the Indo-Pacific region. He added : “Indeed, India is a pillar of our Indo-Pacific strategy.”
To that extent, one of the arms sales that was announced was a USD 3 billion worth helicopter deal – 24 anti-submarine choppers for the Indian Navy (IN) and six attack helicopters for the army. The induction of the Sea King helicopters will be a shot in the arm for the IN where there has been an acute shortage of such platforms, thereby affecting the operational profile of the navy.
This draws attention to a structural element of India’s ability to be a truly credible ‘pillar’ in the Indo-Pacific and the constraints on the tangibles that New Delhi brings to the table. Given its maritime connotation, military credibility in the Indo-Pacific expanse would be derived from inherent naval and spacebased surveillance capability. Some recent developments merit notice.
Last December, the Indian naval chief Admiral Karambir Singh made some thought-provoking observations in relation to budget allocation and the need to re-evaluate platform numbers as envisioned in the Navy’s Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCPP) for 2012-27. The plan to field 200 warships, he noted, would have to be trimmed given that the navy’s share of the defence budget has steadily shrunk from 18% in 2012 to approximately 13% in the FY 201920. In a pithy response to media queries about whether 175 warships could ‘realistically’ be expected to be in service by 2027, Admiral Singh termed the figure “optimistic.” Clearly the current budgetary allocation of under 14% is grossly inadequate to sustain the growth in platforms that the IN is seeking.
Apropos the Trump visit, two Chinarelated strands provide the larger context to locate the Indian Navy’s predicament. China is the primary referent for the USIndia partnership in the emerging strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific. Admiral Singh made a nuanced but import-laden statement specific to the relative growth profiles of the Chinese and Indian navies: “They are doing what they have to do and moving at the pace they are capable of. We will move at the pace that we are capable of.”
The first strand referred to pertains to the Chinese foot-print in the IOR (Indian Ocean region) and the growth profile of the PLAN (Peoples Liberation Army Navy) over the last decade. These include the
historic anti-piracy operations of the PLAN in December 2008 when PLAN ships first entered the Indian Ocean, in the modern period, to creation of the first overseas Chinese military base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa and supplying two submarines to Bangladesh.
The active Chinese naval presence in the IOR and the political-economicmilitary engagement with the IOR littoral states is steadily increasing. This is further embedded in the more ambitious BRI (Belt & Road Initiative) that has the personal imprimatur of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Thus the Indian Navy will have to arrive at the most optimum modus to ensure that this visible and steadily increasing PLAN presence in the IOR does not adversely impact core national interests. Reports about a Chinese research vessel possibly gathering oceanographic data in the waters off the Andaman & Nicobar Islands and having to be encouraged to leave by the IN are illustrative of such exigencies that could arise in the years ahead.
Specific to the ‘pace’ at which China is seeking to enhance its naval capability, a recent US estimate avers that as of 2018, the principal combatants of the PLAN exceeded 400 – 330 plus surface ships and 66 submarines. The corresponding US Navy figure was 283 – comprising 211 surface ships and 72 submarines. This estimate adds that, at the current Chinese shipbuilding rate, the PLAN will, by 2030, field 550 major platforms – 450 plus ships and 99 submarines. This study also avers that the USN may at best reach a figure of 355 ships and submarines in the same time-frame – but that is still a work in progress.
The second strand that merits attention is the larger objective of the transformation that the PLA is currently pursuing. The Chinese White Paper on defence (issued mid 2019) stated that “the PLA is striving to transform from a quantity-and-scale model to that of quality and efficiency, as well as from being personnel-intensive to one that is S&T-intensive.”
China has acquired a ‘pace’ that could well be described as blistering and resolute even as Beijing pits itself against the USA. India needs to define what is the most optimum and sustainable ‘pace’ it needs to acquire to be able to maintain credible presence in the IOR in the first instance; and the manner in which the US can enable this pursuit.
The Trump visit could provide the trigger-pulse for an ontological review of fiscal allocation and India’s composite military capability that will be the ‘pillar’ which has been envisioned.
China has acquired a ‘pace’ that could well be described as blistering and resolute even as Beijing pits itself against the USA. India needs to define what is the most optimum and sustainable ‘pace’ it needs to acquire to be able to maintain credible presence in the IOR in the first instance; and the manner in which the US can enable this pursuit