TRUMP’S CHINA WALL

Rising tensions between Trump’s America and Xi’s China present opportunities and risks for India

INthe weeks leading up to Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration, the different departments of China’s government began a unique stocktaking exercise. Each was asked to assess the possible consequences of the Trump administration’s policies—such as Trump’s threat to be “tough on China”—and to come up with countermeasures. For instance, if Trump went ahead with his campaign promise to impose a 45 per cent tariff on Chinese imports, how could Beijing respond?

The government finally concluded that the entire exercise was pointless given Trump’s frequently changing pronouncements, which often ended up contradicting one another. “The only certainty now is uncertainty,” said Gao Zhikai, a leading foreign policy expert in Beijing who was once the interpreter to former leader Deng Xiaoping. That was underlined in the first two weeks of the Trump presidency. If “hoping for the best, preparing for the worst” was the mantra Beijing followed till January 20, the focus now shifted to preparation, not hope.

On February 10, Trump finally spoke with China’s president, Xi Jinping, but only after having done so with more than a dozen other world leaders, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This was a striking reflection of the strained Sino-American relationship. And, besides already being displeased with Trump’s tough talk on trade, crucial to his ‘Make America Great Again’ agenda, Beijing was incensed with Trump’s administration cosying up to Taiwan. By speaking in his official capacity as President of America to Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen, Trump became the first US president to do so since the normalisation of Sino-American ties in 1979, when the US recognised China’s ‘One China’ policy.

Xi was apparently reluctant to speak with Trump after he had threatened to review the ‘One China policy’ and use it as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations. The clear message from China was there would be no call unless Trump publicly endorsed the ‘One China policy’. So, just weeks after threatening to overhaul it, Trump was forced to do a U-turn. He “agreed at the request of President Xi to honour the ‘One China policy’”, the White House said in a readout of the call, with Trump realising that “the art of the deal” in diplomacy was perhaps a little more complicated than in real estate.

Uncharted Waters

These events have only underscored the uncertainty that surrounds relations between the world’s two biggest powers. Trump, both as candidate and as president-elect, has pledged a much tougher approach to China, on both trade and security issues. His first week in office, which saw him issuing executive orders to fulfill campaign promises—such as withdrawing from the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal and imposing a travel ban on seven Muslim-majority countries—has only deepened perceptions in China that fiery campaign rhetoric could well become policy in the Trump White House. Seven days into the Trump presidency, the PLA

Daily went so far as to say that the likelihood of war had become more “real”, as the US indicated it would mount a more robust response to curtail Chinese activities in the South China Sea. “A ‘war within the president’s term’ or ‘war breaking out tonight’ are not just slogans, they are becoming a practical reality,” warned the commentary, authored by an official of the PLA’s defence mobilisation department.

Many in Beijing, like Gao, were alarmed when Henry Kissinger, the US National Security Advisor under Richard Nixon who is widely respected in China for his role in the normalisation of ties, declared he had told Trump “war is not an option”. “For him to say that,” Gao notes, “someone must have asked him first if it indeed was an option to consider!”

Huang Jing, a leading expert on Chinese foreign policy at the National University of Singapore, says China’s “most rational choice for now is to wait and see”. He echoes the sentiment in Beijing that describes Trump as “very immature on international affairs”, and expresses the hope that “no matter how unpredictable” he would not be able to overturn “international systems and institutions established for decades”.

Few people in Beijing or Washington expect relations between the world’s two biggest economies to descend into conflict. But just the fact that they are even contemplating such an outcome underlines

the deep uncertainty into which Trump has plunged the relationship. Officials and analysts in Beijing expect greater tensions in ties and a more robust US security policy toward Asia, even if Trump’s America withdraws economically from regional trading agreements.

These changes are certain to have significant ramifications for India’s security and economic interests in the region. Over the past decade, Beijing has seen its military and economic dominance in Asia expand rapidly. It has emerged as the biggest trading partner for most countries in the region, and built a blue water navy strong enough to change the status quo in the South China Sea. A worried India has begun to more vocally express its concerns on an issue it earlier preferred to avoid.

A New American Posture

Beijing has, in the past few years, built seven artificial islands and set up military infrastructure in the Spratly Islands that could enable it to police navigation across the South China Sea. The US, under Barack Obama, belatedly pushed a “pivot” to Asia to counter China, which ultimately failed to back intent with actions, with once indispensable allies such as the Philippines now, remarkably, seeking China’s embrace.

When China, in December, seized an American unmanned underwater vehicle in waters off the Philippines, Trump slammed the move as “unprecedented”; foreign policy advisors close to him have been scathing at the Obama administration’s failure to deter Chinese activities. Peter Navarro, a Trump advisor now appointed to head his National Trade Council—whose book

Death by China leaves little doubt about his views— in an article for Foreign Policy suggested that Trump would focus on rebuilding the navy and deepening ties with countries such as Japan, South Korea, India and those who “view Beijing as a bully that must be balanced against”. Trump’s appointee as Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, told a congressional committee that the US would “send China a clear signal” that island-building had to stop and that its “access to those islands is not going to be allowed”. Some interpreted his statement to suggest the US may even consider a blockade against China to deny access to the seven islands. Jeff Smith, director of Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council, notes that few experts have advocated such a strategy and given that the remarks were delivered several hours into the hearing in response to a question, “it is safe to assume Secretary Tillerson misspoke or was misinterpreted”. A later clarification from the press secretary appeared “to suggest the administration would act to prevent China from seizing additional unoccupied rocks and underwater shoals”. “While far less ambitious than a policy of ‘blockading’ China,” Smith notes, “even this would signal a bold new posture from the United States.”

India’s Options

Expanding maritime security cooperation with India is “entirely congruent” with the policies Trump and his advisors have espoused, adds Smith, noting that in the past, the greatest resistance had come from Delhi, not Washington. The head of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, said in Delhi in January that the US wanted India to sign two other agreements following October’s landmark Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) that provides mutual access to bases. These involve communication interoperability, which Harris said was currently a big obstacle in deepening maritime cooperation, and on geo-spatial mapping.

Beijing is warily watching this growing closeness. “If China or India want to sign up on the bandwagon of Trump against the other country,” says Gao, “it will be a lose-lose catastrophe for all three countries. Can you imagine the two largest economies in the world, and the two largest populations in the world, engaging with each other for conflict?”

Contrasting this robust security approach, the Trump administration has signalled its intent to withdraw from the region’s trading deals, including the TPP, seen by many countries in the region as a counterweight to China’s growing economic dominance. Chinese experts see this as a boon to Beijing, which is likely to now push with greater urgency the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that includes India.

Arvind Virmani, chairman, Policy Foundation and formerly chief economic advisor and representative at the IMF, expects RCEP negotiations to be sped up, but says “the key issue is how to deal with a non-market economy like China”. India, he adds, should use this moment to accelerate its own trading arrangements, such as BIMSTEC (involving Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand) and IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association). For India, navigating this new regional landscape means balancing the opportunities offered by a deeper American security embrace with its already sensitive relations and growing trade ties with China. As Trump builds his China wall, uncertainty seems the only certainty.

INDIA NEEDS TO BALANCE AMERICA’S GREATER SECURITY EMBRACE WITH ITS GROWING TRADE WITH CHINA