CHINESE CHECKERS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
Japan, India and the US begin one of their largest naval exercises amid shared concerns over the deployment of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean
Three aircraft carriers sailing in formation is an awe-inspiring sight at any time. Particularly when the three flattops combined can launch over 150 fighter jets and helicopters, more than the air forces of several countries. This is likely to be the case when the USS Nimitz, INS Vikramaditya and Japan’s Izumo join several other warships to conduct joint manoeuvres in the Bay of Bengal during the annual Malabar 2017 multilateral naval exercises from July 10. But that isn’t the only reason this newest instalment of the exercise is likely to raise Beijing’s hackles, as it comes while its troops are locked in a standoff with Indian soldiers on the Doklam plateau in Bhutan. Malabar 2017 will primarily focus on anti-submarine warfare, a shared concern over the PLA navy’s rapidly growing capabilities. China today has the world’s fastest growing undersea fleet and is cranking them out at an astonishing rate of roughly two vessels a year.
A June 2017 US Congressional Service Report on China’s naval modernisation notes that between 1995 and 2016, the country placed, or was expected to press into service, 56 attack submarines of four types—Shang, Kilo, Yuan and Song classes. ‘This average commissioning rate, if sustained indefinitely, would eventually result in a steady-state submarine force of 51 to 76 boats of all kinds, assuming an average
submarine life of 20 to 30 years.’
The PLA’s submarine deployment in the Indian Ocean since 2013 has added a fresh underwater dimension to the maritime Great Game in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
Over the next few days, in the Bay of Bengal, the three navies will practise the art of detecting, tracking and ‘destroying’ two submarines—a US nuclear-powered Los Angeles class submarine and an Indian conventional Kilo class submarine. “Surface manoeuvres, missile firing and aircraft operations don’t surprise us because they have fixed parameters,” explains a senior naval official. “The only thing that can fox you is the underwater realm.” This is primarily because the warm and saline waters of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean degrade the performance of sonar, used primarily to detect submarines.
Malabar is one act in an IOR great game which began nearly a decade ago with the deployment of PLA naval warships in counter-piracy patrol, in 2008. Since December 2013, China has rotated six different submarines through long-range deployments in the IOR. A Yuan class conventional submarine recently entered the IOR after transiting over 6,000 kilometres from its base on Hainan island to begin a seventh deployment.
“China’s maritime prowess has been growing over the last decade, allowing it to shape IOR’s strategic environment,” says Dr Harsh V. Pant, head of the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation. “China is the big new variable in the IOR as its intentions remain largely unknown and it is challenging the established maritime order.” It has done so by asserting itself in the South China Sea, which it claims as its territorial waters. It has reclaimed over 3,000 acres in the sea and created a network of airstrips and surface-to-air missile batteries. Further to the west, it has been putting some steel into President Xi Jinping’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative with longrange naval deployments in the IOR and bases in Djibouti and, eventually, Gwadar in Pakistan. The most worrying aspect are the submarine patrols, thinly disguised as ‘antipiracy operations’. Surface ships are easier to track than submarines, particularly nuclear-powered vessels which are difficult to detect after they dive.
“Beijing was serious when they said this was not the China of 1962,” says Vice Admiral K.N. Sushil, former commanding-in-chief, Southern Naval Command. “For starters, they have demonstrated their conventional submarine building capability and ability to deploy far from their home ports—at our doorstep.”
In wartime, these submarines could be deployed to harass and interdict India’s sea lanes of communication. This could explain why both India and the US roped in Japan, with its vast anti-submarine capabilities, into the Malabar exercises in 2015.
On July 2, the US state department cleared the sale of 22 General Atomics’ ‘Guardian’ naval surveillance drones to India. The $2 billion deal was cleared less than a week after President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced it in Washington DC, coinciding with a recent chill in US-China ties. Naval officials say the Guardians are a cheaper option for wide-area maritime surveillance, a task now performed by the fleet of eight P-8I ‘Poseidon’ aircraft and Indian spy satellites. The Guardians, with their 20-hour endurance, maritime surveillance radars and 1,800 km-range, are a significant acquisition as they will free up the Poseidons to perform the role of submarine hunting.
Hardware is not the only area of maritime cooperation. In January 2017, US Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Harry B. Harris became the first senior official to publicly admit what was known for some years. That the US was helping India track Chinese warships and submarines from the time they slipped out of their bases and on their patrols in the IOR. “There is sharing of information regarding Chinese maritime movement in the Indian Ocean,” Adm Harris said during a visit to New Delhi.
Malabar, he said, helps us hone our ability to track what China is doing in the Indian Ocean. “Chinese submarines are clearly an issue and we know they are operating through the region.” It is not known whether India is yet a participant in ‘Fish Hook’, a network of underwater sound sensors embedded along the ocean
A DEFENCE WEBSITE IN CHINA SPECULATED IN 2015 THAT IT COULD BLOCKADE INDIA’S EASTERN AND WESTERN COASTLINES WITH JUST 10 SUBMARINES: ‘THREE TYPE 091 HAN CLASS, FOUR TYPE 093 SHANG CLASS & THREE TYPE 095 SSNS’
floor around China—a Cold War legacy helping Japan and US track Chinese submarines, which could help plug India’s vulnerabilities in anti-submarine warfare.
For several years, Indian naval planners envisaged Indian submarines as a tool for conflict termination by interdicting Chinese shipping in the Malacca Straits. Indian submarines, they believed, could even be deployed in the South China Sea to level any imbalance between the land forces. This explained the lease of a highly capable Akula-II class nuclear-powered attack submarine, the INS Chakra from Russia, a platform capable of unlimited underwater endurance and which carries torpedoes and cruise missiles to attack enemy warships and shore targets. However, there is a sharp degradation in the navy’s underwater capabilities—the submarine arm is down to just 13 platforms with an average age of over 25 years, which is very near retirement. India’s induction of six Scorpene class submarines by 2020 may be too little too late. China, which has long regarded submarines as an instrument of regional deterrence, now has the upper hand.
A 2016 US naval intelligence report says China’s submarine force is optimised for regional anti-surface missions near major sea lanes. Beijing-based defence website Sina Military Network speculated in 2015 that China could blockade India’s eastern and western coastlines with just 10 submarines—‘three Type 091 Han-class, four Type 093 Shang-class and three Type 095 SSNs’. “We should expect that China will now regularly deploy submarines in the IOR,” says Rear Admiral Sudarshan Shrikhande (retd). “The rapidity with which they have started indicates they can make these leaps in unexpected ways.”
If China’s aggressive posture continues, analysts feel Malabar has the potential to turn into a serious platform for like-minded nations that want to maintain the extant maritime order. Submarines are the currency of China’s containment strategy for India. It has, in recent years, sold two old Ming-class submarines to Bangladesh and will set up a base for them in the Kutubdia island. But of greater concern is the sale of eight Yuan submarines to Pakistan by 2023, which could be equipped to fire nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.
China’s submarine spring comes at the lowest point in India’s submarine and submarine-hunting capabilities. The ageing of the Indian navy’s fleet of 15 Russian and western helicopters has reached alarming proportions. A procurement freeze means there are no helicopters to embark on its shiny warships rolling out of shipyards. All eight Russian Kamov Ka-28 helicopters are to be shortly packed off to Russia for mid-life upgrades and will thus be unavailable for two years. Half its fleet of Seaking 42B helicopters has been grounded following a bribery cloud over Italian helicopter-maker AgustaWestland, which has discontinued supply of spares and upgrades. A 17-year quest for new Multi-Role Helicopters (MRH) received a setback when the defence ministry initiated the cancellation last month of a 2005 tender to buy 18 MRH. Beijing is unlikely to wait for India to build these capabilities as it makes its moves.