RELIEF AT DOKLAM
Afew minutes after noon on August 28, India and China disengaged their troops after 72 days of an unprecedented stand-off on the Doklam plateau, a strategically important region that sits at the trijunction of the India-China-Bhutan borders.
While the ministry of external affairs (MEA) announced “an expeditious disengagement of border personnel” on both sides, Beijing emphasised that “the Indian side withdrew all its border personnel and equipment that were illegally on Chinese territory to the Indian side”. Left unsaid by Beijing was its agreement to withdraw its road construction equipment and bulldozers, which enabled India to pull back first.
How did both sides manage to defuse a volatile situation, on a scale not seen on the contested boundary since the 1986 face-off at Sumdurong Chu (which took over a year to defuse and a further six to return to status quo)? The stand-off began on June 18, when Indian troops crossed the border to stop China building a road that had entered deep into what India and Bhutan see as Bhutanese land, just over 100 metres from India’s border at Doka La. The road was seen as a significant altering of the status quo and a threat to India’s security, as it would erode India’s advantage in one of the few areas along the border where it enjoys one.
In the two-and-a-half months since, Beijing issued almost daily threats, demanding an end to India’s “trespass” and not ruling out military action. For the first time in decades, Beijing openly talked about the lessons of 1962, and publicly demanded a “precondition” of complete Indian withdrawal before any talks could take place.
China climbing down from this
precondition, even if not publicly, was key to a resolution. Throughout the standoff, diplomatic channels remained open in Beijing and Delhi. China’s willingness to talk despite its public posturing was likely moved by two concerns, analysts say. One was the September 3 BRICS summit in Xiamen, which had been framed as a major event to showcase President Xi Jinping at home as a global leader. While India never threatened a boycott—Prime Minister Narendra Modi had instructed every invited minister to attend presummit meetings in China—Beijing didn’t want the summit to fizzle out under the shadow of Doklam. Second, there was a growing fear in Beijing that the longer the standoff dragged on, the greater would be the domestic pressure at home demanding a strong response. This was a problem of Beijing’s own making: the heated official rhetoric had fanned anger at home, and led to an ever growing divide between what the government was saying and what its realistic ontheground options were.
Equally important was India’s quiet but firm diplomacy— in sharp contrast to Beijing’s bluster, the MEA put out just one statement in two months—and Delhi’s willingness to negotiate a facesaving exit for Beijing. Hence the intended ambiguity of the August 28 statements put out by both Delhi and Bei jing. Although China removed its bulldozers and construction equipment, the MEA chose not to publicly affirm this. “Given their public posturing, it’s unrealistic to expect them to publicly acknowledge doing so,” says one official. Beijing, however, did acknowledge it “will make necessary adjustments as it sees fit”, even as it underlined its right to “exercise sovereignty” over Doklam in the future. “In order to defend our needs and improve living conditions, China has long engaged in road construction in Donglang area,” foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said. “We will take into account all relevant factors including weather and will make plans in accordance with the situation on the ground.”
Former Chinese diplomat Mao Siwei, who served in India, said both governments “needed to provide an acceptable explanation for their citizens”. “Needless to say, they could not convey weakness in their statements,” he said, adding that though “both were vague”, there was a basic agreement on two key aspects. “Firstly, China will stop building roads, and India will remove the troops. Secondly, as for the sequence, India will withdraw troops first, then China will remove the PLA force.” “It is a truly wise decision,” he added, “made by the leaders of both sides under extreme pressure from domestic nationalists and chauvinists.”