MELTDOWN IN WEST ASIA?

The recent Israeli barrage against 50 Iranian targets in Syria in response to an alleged Iranian rocket attack on the Golan Heights came less than two days after US president Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear deal. The region is once again on the boil. Geography, energy and its expatriates tie India deeply to the region. What could the fallout be for India in the months ahead?

Even before Trump’s pullout, Israel had struck Iranian targets in Syria. But the US pullout from the JCPOA has given regional tensions a huge shot in the arm. A potential pathway now exists for a major regional war. However, the most likely scenario remains a multi-pronged conflict limited to the Syrian theatre, with possible spillovers to Lebanon.

The Obama team’s logic in negotiating the JCPOA was not to normalise US ties with Iran, rather to manage what was seen as the most acute threat: Tehran’s nuclear programme. The JCPOA separated the nuclear issue from non-nuclear disputes such as Iran’s missile programme and its support for the Lebanese militia, Hezbollah.

The disastrous 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the armed rebellion in 2011 against Assad’s rule in Syria, and the rise of Daesh (also known as ISIS) in 2014 provided Iran with a golden opportunity to greatly expand its footprint across the region. Iran intervened decisively in these conflicts by arming Shia militias and deploying its own military units. With the crucial support of Russian air power, the de facto Moscow-Tehran alliance helped defeat Daesh and aided Assad in effectively winning the civil war.

The deepening entrenchment of Iran in the wider region has set off alarm bells in the US, Israel and Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. And it has set the stage for a renewed attempt by the US to reverse Iranian gains. But rather than work to do this incrementally with backing from America’s European allies, Trump has chosen to walk out of the JCPOA, giving Iran all the reasons to restart its nuclear programme. Even if Iran somehow stays within the JCPOA parameters, the abandonment of engagement leaves Washington with only two policy choices to curb Tehran’s influence—militarised containment or, in theory, a full-blown war aimed at regime change.

A strategy of militarised containment could see periodic spikes in direct clashes with Iran in Syria. An extreme version of this strategy could involve US and Israeli air strikes on nuclear and military targets in Iran proper. With Hezbollah in Israel’s crosshairs there are also greater chances now of the conflict spilling over to Lebanon. But a full-blown regional war to achieve regime change in Tehran remains unlikely. The US, in particular, lacks the domestic support for the massive ground operation that would be required, and Israel and Saudi Arabia lack the capability. Another powerful constraint is Russia, with its widespread military presence in the region and its effective role as the great power guarantor of the Iranian and Syrian leaderships.

Could Europe act as a brake to accelerating tensions over Iran? Though France and Germany have opposed Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, they will struggle to resist the coming slew of US sanctions directed against European corporations that trade with Tehran. These so-called secondary sanctions are likely to be defied by China and Russia, pushing Tehran closer to Moscow and Beijing.

India will be in an even tighter spot. It values its growing relations with the Gulf Arab states and Israel. The Indian economy faces many vulnerabilities when it comes to secondary sanctions. Major Indian corporations and financial institutions are tied deeply to the US market. Moreover, in recent decades, New Delhi has made its strategic partnership with Washington the cornerstone of its foreign policy in order to aid India’s global rise. The last time the US brandished the spectre of sanctions over Iran, India eventually fell in line and drastically reduced Iranian oil imports. It is unlikely to be any different this time. The most disruptive threat to Indian interests is that of a region drifting unwittingly towards a major regional conflict with no clearly defined strategy of de-escalation on either side—a scenario that ought to give South Block some nightmares.

The most disruptive threat to Indian interests is that of a region drifting unwittingly toward a major regional conflict

Sarang Shidore is a Senior Global Analyst with Stratfor and visiting scholar at the University of Texas, Austin. The views expressed here are personal