2+2 TALKS: A COMPLEX EQUATION
The second India-US 2+2 joint meeting of their foreign and defence ministers in Washington, DC, on December 18, marked another milestone signalling political and strategic coordination, but parallel developments also exposed some ongoing and emerging challenges for the relationship.
In a special gesture, showing his continued personal commitment to advancing the partnership, and following his unprecedented presence at the ‘Howdy, Modi’ event with the Indian prime minister in Houston on September 22, President Donald Trump received the visiting Indian ministers, Rajnath Singh and S. Jaishankar, in a 40-minute Oval Office meeting—this despite his intense domestic preoccupations on the very day that the US House of Representatives was voting to impeach him.
The substantive joint statement, issued after the 2+2 meeting, revealed the progression in strategic consolidation. It spoke of commitment to ‘enhanced cooperation’ between the Indian Navy and the US INDOPACOM, AFRICOM AND CENTCOM—the US regional commands that cover the entire Indian Ocean and the Pacific—whereas, hitherto, the exchanges were limited to the INDOPACOM.
It specifically listed LeT, JeM, D-Company and HuM as terrorist groups and called on Pakistan to take ‘immediate, sustained and irreversible’ action to ensure that the territory under its control isn’t used for terrorism, and to arrest and prosecute those responsible for attacks, including 26/11 and Pathankot.
On defence trade and technology, there were three new framework agreements—a statement of intent to co-develop some identified projects, a standard operating procedure for implementing and finalising an industry-to-industry cooperation framework. On the margins, the two countries also signed an Industry Security Agreement, which would enable private Indian industry to join the global supply chain of US defence production.
New areas agreed upon for interaction included initiating discussions on cyber security, sharing of bilateral space situational awareness information, potential space defence cooperation in 2020 and working together for the launch of a NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar satellite in 2022.
In the joint press conference, the US showed concern for
Indian sensitivities. Responding to a question on the ongoing protests in India against the CAA and NRC, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, while reiterating the US position on support for human rights, also referred to India’s vibrant democracy and internal debates on issues.
Trade disagreements, however, remain unresolved. GSP (Generalised System of Preferences) status for India remains withdrawn, additional Trump tariffs on Indian aluminium and steel remain in place, though rhetoric on the issue has been toned down, with interlocutors projecting the near finalisation of a limited agreement on some products as a first step.
Trouble is brewing in India’s relationship with the US Congress, a co-equal branch of the US government. A resolution has been introduced in the House, with 29 co-sponsors, critical of some of the Indian government’s recent steps, particularly on J&K and the CAA. Jaishankar cancelled a meeting with the leadership of the influential House Foreign Affairs Committee as participants included Congressperson Pramila Jayapal, who had initiated the resolution and strongly criticised the Indian government in an October 22 hearing of the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, on human rights in South Asia. Jaishankar’s move did not go down well there, with Democratic presidential candidates Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren and Kamala Harris coming out in support of Jayapal. The incident also revealed challenges in diaspora engagement, with individuals and groups (sections of the Indian-origin Sikh, Muslim, Dalit and Christian communities) advocating against specific Indian government policies.
In the present multi-polar world, with shifting alignments and balance of power, a risen China, closer Russia-China engagement (including at the UN) and China’s nurturing of Pakistan, India’s growing partnership with the US is important. Despite the recent announcement of the finalisation of Phase 1 of a US-China trade deal, the US now sees itself in a generational struggle for trade and technology superiority, undoing the post-1979 strategy of economic and technological integration. This rivalry offers potential trade, technology and political advantages for India. The 2+2 process is an important bilateral framework in that direction. ■
Though the 2+2 meeting signalled progress in strategic consolidation, trade disagreements remain unresolved