MISSTEPS IN XI’S GRAND MARCH
China must realise that aggressive action, such as the deadly border clash with India, could draw its neighbours into a broad US-led regional coalition
AS THE US-CHINA COLD WAR continues to escalate, China appears to be adjusting its grand strategy in Asia. The broad contours of President Xi Jinping’s emerging strategy may be seen in some of its recent moves. First, Xi has shifted from the expansion of Chinese influence to the consolidation of gains made in the past decade. In terms of economic ties, China now seeks to cement its trade and investment relations with its neighbours in the context of the US-China “decoupling” so that it remains the economic centre of gravity in Asia even if Chinese trade with the US falls dramatically in the coming years. On the security front, Xi is determined to hold on to China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea in spite of escalating American measures aimed to challenge such claims (the most recent one being a naval exercise involving two carrier battle groups). Apparently, Xi is convinced that the new Sino-American cold war will last for decades, and maintaining strategic stamina will be a key factor in determining the outcome of this open-ended great power conflict.
Second, because China now encounters a more powerful adversary, its overall strategic posture has become more defensive and focused on its eastern flank, the weakest part of Chinese defence. At the moment, the US enjoys significant advantages on China’s eastern maritime frontier because it has two treaty allies, Japan and South Korea, and a de facto ally, Taiwan. China’s economic heartland, situated along its eastern seaboard, lies totally exposed to military strikes by the US and its allies should the new cold war turn hot. A more defensive posture that will allow China to effectively counter the American security threat on its eastern flank requires two complementary measures. Diplomatically, Xi has taken steps to improve ties with Japan and South Korea in the hope that the two American allies will remain neutral, or at least refrain from providing active security support to the US (the biggest test will be the basing of American medium-range missiles on their soil in the coming decade). Militarily, China is expected to significantly boost its deterrence capabilities to make it more costly and dangerous for the US to intervene.
This strategy, though pragmatic, has serious limitations. To better position itself in a drawn-out geopolitical duel with the US, Xi needs to invest far more resources and make unprecedented concessions in regaining the goodwill of China’s neighbours. For instance, he will have to resolve the dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands even though major concessions on this issue will be politically difficult. Using its leverage with North Korea to restrain its provocations is likely to help China improve ties with South Korea. However, Xi has not shown much willingness to make such moves. His outreach to Japan, for example, is lim
WHILE BEIJING IS AWARE OF THE RISK OF AN INDOUS STRATEGIC ALLIANCE, IT HAS FAILED TO TAKE STEPS TO PRE-EMPT IT
ited, so far, to warm rhetoric.
Beijing’s ability to implement a more defensive and disciplined strategy is also limited. For reasons that remain to be investigated, recent events, such as the deadly clash on the disputed Sino-Indian border and maritime intrusions by Chinese vessels into the waters around the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands, suggest that Beijing either believed it should stick to its aggressive posture in territorial disputes regardless of the changed circumstances, or that its new strategic posture has yet to be fully and clearly translated into operational directives at the lower level of its chain of command.
Another potentially fatal flaw in Xi’s new grand strategy is that he has discounted Washington’s ability to forge a broadbased regional coalition in executing its long-term containment strategy. Xi and his colleagues believe the tyranny of distance works in China’s favour—that contesting with the US in its own neighbourhood, China will enjoy a significant home advantage in waging the new cold war. Another factor China counts on heavily is the desire of most countries in East Asia to stay on the sidelines. This is a reasonable assumption since East Asian countries, including Japan, know that a full-fledged new cold war between China, the region’s largest economy, and the US, the world’s largest economy, could be disastrous for East Asia. But China can ill-afford to take their neutrality for granted. Aggressive actions in the South China Sea could turn the Philippines (an American treaty ally) and Vietnam into Washington’s coalition partners.
Xi may be right in prioritising China’s eastern flank. But strategic negligence and missteps on its western flank—mainly the Indian subcontinent—can be costly. Several contradictory impulses drive Chinese thinking about India. While Beijing is acutely aware of the danger of an Indian-American strategic alliance, it has failed to take the necessary steps to pre-empt this. It is likely that, as a result of their underestimation of India’s strengths and sensitivity, they believe that they do not need to exercise greater restraint, especially on the disputed borders, to avoid provoking New Delhi. China also believes it has a trump card against India—Pakistan. Whenever needed, China can bolster Pakistan to constrain India.
BUT WITH THE RECENT BLOODY CLASH between Chinese and Indian troops and the subsequent anti-China backlash in India, Beijing has shot itself in the foot. Regardless of whether Xi personally authorised the incursion into India’s side of the Line of Actual Control on the border, the incident is a watershed in China-India ties. Even though China appears to have realised its blunder and the dangerous consequences and has exercised restraint in the wake of the clash and Indian economic retaliations, the damage has been done. It may not be possible to return to the status quo ante for a long time.
For its part, India will need to tread carefully even though it now enjoys a highly favourable geopolitical environment. China’s strategic focus on its eastern flank will help relieve the security threat India faces from it. America’s strategy of economic decoupling with China should benefit the Indian economy while closer defence cooperation between the US and India will substantially boost Indian military capabilities.
However, Beijing may adjust its strategic focus if it thinks New Delhi has overreacted to a border incident and turned itself into an implacable foe of China. In elevating the level of the ‘India Threat’, China will conceivably increase military deployment and invest even more extensively in military infrastructures in Tibet. It will provide more support to Pakistan. To be sure, strengthening its western flank will divert considerable resources (mainly ground and air units) from elsewhere in China while continuing to fund Islamabad will be a drain on Beijing’s coffers. But Xi may believe that he cannot afford to leave China’s western flank poorly protected in the context of a real Indian-American alliance.
In weighing its future China policy, Indian leaders now must find the sweet spot in which they can assuage the domestic political pressure for a tougher approach to China, deter further Chinese aggression with military strengths, and satisfy Washington’s desire for pressuring China on its western flank without provoking China into actions that could irrevocably endanger the region’s peace so essential to India’s economic development. It may be hard, but not impossible.