WHAT THE CHINA CRISIS COULD MEAN FOR INDO-US TIES
Despite India’s commitment issues, a closer partnership with the US could be a significant counter to China
OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES, India and the US have forged a close partnership based on their shared concerns about a rising China’s behaviour. So, it is not surprising that the recent China-India crisis has sparked debates about—and calls for—a greater Indian alignment with the US, especially considering the prevailing view in Washington of China as a strategic competitor. The impact on the partnership will depend on how the border crisis plays out, Washington’s responsiveness and China’s approach, and whether or not India can overcome the hesitations of history that have dogged its relationship with the US.
One of the most consistent elements of Indian foreign policy in recent years has been the strategic logic of managing China through a closer partnership with the US, which has helped the three elements of Delhi’s approach toward Beijing: engaging China, internal balancing and external balancing. Access to US capital, technology, markets, know-how, jobs and military equipment has helped India strengthen its capabilities. And the US has been a crucial member, and even facilitator, of India’s network of partners that Delhi hopes will ensure a regional and global balance of power and deter Beijing’s bad behaviour.
Multiple Indian prime ministers have, over the years, strengthened the country’s partnership with the US. Atal Bihari Vajpayee had declared the two countries as “natural allies”, whose “partnership is important, above all, for Asia”. Manmohan
Singh put his government on the line for an agreement that transformed India-US relations and “open[ed] new doors in capitals across the world”, and Narendra Modi has called the US an “indispensable partner”.
The fruits of this cooperation are evident in the current China-India crisis—in American rhetorical support, diplomatic cooperation, the use of military equipment acquired from the US, and, reportedly, intelligence-sharing.
And yet, despite the logic, there remains a reticence in India that has slowed the pace of the partnership. This hesitation is evident in the debate on what the Sino-Indian crisis means for India-US ties, even as it has led to almost unanimous calls for a reassessment of India’s China policy.
One argument for going slow is that deepening relations with the US will provoke China. Yet the chronology does not quite reflect that. The Chinese attempt in 2013 to change the status quo came during a lull in India-US relations. The 2014 incursion occurred before Modi deepened ties with the US. China took action in Doklam at a time of Indian uncertainty about the Trump administration. Moreover, like post-2008 or in 2013, Beijing today is not just acting assertively against India; it is targeting even countries like Japan that have sought to engage China, as well as the Philippines that was about to reject an agreement with the US. Others fear that the US will use India as a frontline state. However, both countries are using each other as part of their China strategies. For instance, when Delhi needed support at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) recently, Washington was on the frontlines, facing off against Beijing.
A related argument is that the US fuels Sino-Indian strains for its own purposes. But consider India’s problems with China— the boundary dispute, concerns over the Brahmaputra waters, trade deficit, limited market access, China-Pakistan relations, China’s increased activities in India’s neighbourhood, or Beijing working against India in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or the UNSC. Which of these is due to the US?
Another hesitation has been that a closer relationship with the US will come at Russia’s expense. Moscow, for India, is a major source of military equipment, spare parts and certain military technology that others won’t provide. Delhi also considers Russia a part of its strategy to balance China. But it is important to be clear-eyed about this relationship, the prospects of a western rapprochement with Russia (especially if Moscow keeps fuelling distrust), and the likelihood and timing of a Sino-Russian split. Because, despite their differences, Russia is deepening defence and technology cooperation with China. It has allowed China to reverse engineer its military technology and eat into its space in Central Asia, promoted Chinese interests in multilateral settings, joined China in rejecting the Indo-Pacific concept and almost accepted junior partner status. This will have implications for India. Delhi will not give up on Moscow, but it should ask the same questions it would of other partnerships: Is dependence on Russia constraining India? Is it reliable? Will the close Sino-Russian partnership hinder Russia’s willingness and ability to help India?
THERE ARE MORE VALID REASONS for India’s graduated approach to the US partnership—first, it takes time to build trust and the habits and architecture of cooperation; second, Delhi wants to prevent Indian interests from becoming a geopolitical football between China and the US; third, American reliability and the consistency of Washington’s China policy is a concern. Both Barack Obama’s Sunnylands summit and
Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago summit, for instance, raised the prospect of a US willing to accommodate China—even if it adversely affected American allies and partners.
These concerns will be amplified in an election year. Delhi will be watching closely to see whether the tougher (bipartisan) American view of China persists. Will a Biden administration take a competitive approach, with greater emphasis on working with allies and partners, or will it prioritise cooperation with China to tackle issues like climate change and pandemics? Will a second Trump term see more of the same, or a dismantling of the partnership and an even more transactional approach? And how will Covid affect the US’s commitment and presence in Asia?
Finally, there is the concern about the impact on Indian strategic autonomy. Partnerships can shape countries’ decisions. US policies on Iran affect India, but then Delhi, too, expects Washington to not do certain things with Pakistan. However, India has been able to bolster its freedom of action by enhancing its capabilities and diversifying its portfolio of partners—the US partnership precludes neither and could even help both.
Delhi should think less defensively. Instead of asking what can the US partnership do to India, ask what can it do for India? How can India use this alignment to strengthen itself and even its autonomy? Given the challenge from China, the strategic logic behind a closer India-US partnership remains intact. Such an alignment won’t be unprecedented—India aligned with the US in the 1960s and the Soviet Union in the 1970s when it faced a China threat.
What would closer ties between India and the US look like? More regular and deeper operational cooperation (including with other partners), joint contingency planning, further enhancement of Indian capabilities, defence technology cooperation, economic and technological collaboration, and enhancing coordination vis-à-vis third countries and international organisations. This would require political will and resolving or managing differences on trade, investment, immigration, Russia and even China. And this will be facilitated if India bolsters the features that make it an attractive partner for the US and others: military power, a growing economy, democracy and a willingness and ability to help maintain the rules-based order and contribute to global public goods.