NEW DELHI’S MYANMAR TEST

The February 1 military takeover in Myanmar over what was essentially an election dispute marks yet another fateful intervention against the popular will in the country. Peaceful protests and civil disobedience movements have erupted across Myanmar against the military action that came on the day the new parliament was to convene following a third landslide victory (after 1990 and 2015) for the incumbent National League for Democracy (NLD), headed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (now in detention), in the November 2020 national election.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, on February 8, promised a return to multi-party democracy—once the poll results could be rectified by a new Election Commission during the one-year emergency period. So far, the military has refrained from use of force and relied on telecom/ internet/ social media bans and partial curfews, but it may just be a matter of time before tensions spill over into violence.

The coup has widespread implications for the region and the world. In 2016, as the US was transiting from President Barack Obama to Donald Trump, Suu Kyi’s resounding victory in the November 2015 election stood out as a vindication of democracy. Now, after the US’s own brush with a near-right-wing ‘coup’, it is logical that President Joe Biden makes the struggle for democracy a major plank of his foreign policy—Myanmar being its first test. Yet, first indications are that Biden is likely to continue a firm line with China on security issues, and given his appointment of veteran diplomat Kurt

Campbell as point man for the Indo-Pacific, the US is unlikely to determine its ‘Burma’ policy on a single event or rely on blunt sanctions.

China, which had been managing relations with Suu Kyi quite well, seems to have been caught off-guard, although it will take advantage of any international censure or sanctions against Myanmar. The Tatmadaw’s relationship with Russia, a major defence partner, has grown under Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who last July chose a Russian media channel for a veiled criticism of China’s support to Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups.

Europe and Australia have openly criticised the coup. Japan has been more circumspect, but Kirin Beer terminated its partnership with the military enterprise, Myanmar Economic Holdings, on its flagship ‘Myanmar’ beer. Thailand, which faces its own public movement against the military, will be watching carefully. Both ASEAN and the UN Security Council have expressed “deep concern” at the declaration of emergency and called for the release of all those detained, and respect for the popular will, stopping short of outright condemnation to reconcile differences among their members. Bangladesh will be monitoring the regime’s promise on repatriation of the Rohingyas.

India, too, will be conflicted. Since its pragmatic engagement with the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military administration) around the turn of the millennium, India has developed trust with both the military and the NLD, by keeping its defence training, supply and security ties with the military separate from its political support for the popular will in Myanmar. This will be put to test.

The view in some quarters that India will be forced to do business with the Tatmadaw to keep China in check is flawed. While China enjoys greater leverage over Myanmar through its strategic investments, influence over ethnic armed groups and veto power in the UNSC, it lacks the trust India has acquired. India’s current term in the UNSC will give it added weight. India’s response should keep in mind not just China but its own long-term interest in nurturing ties with the people and economy of Myanmar. The unusual joint visit by India’s foreign secretary and army chief last October may have been crafted with this in mind.

In the tussle between military and people’s power, India should stand clearly with the people. But it should preserve its trust and rely on quiet diplomacy. It could curb economic ties, if any, with the Tatmadaw while building on investments in connectivity infrastructure and capacity-building, with a focus on the neglected agro-economy on which most people in Myanmar depend. It could also take a lead in working with ASEAN and Japan in bringing civilian rule back in Myanmar. ■

So far, India has kept its military ties separate from its political support for the popular will in Myanmar. This now faces a test

Gautam Mukhopadhaya is a former ambassador to Syria, Afghanistan and Myanmar and currently Senior Visiting Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi