The Need to Embrace New-Age Technologies
With a new chief in the saddle, the Indian Air Force, which turned 89 on October 8, faces a plethora of challenges that demand great tact and strategic vision to surmount. Embracing the concept of parallel operations in its doctrine almost a decade ago to impact the tactical, operational and strategic domains simultaneously through the application of air power, this time around, the IAF confronts a situation wherein it must adapt to manoeuvring on parallel fronts during a period of transformational change. Of these fronts, five merit serious reflection by the IAF and the policy-makers within India’s national security establishment.
First, the IAF must step up efforts to sensitise the political establishment and the joint war-fighting leadership of the value that air power, particularly offensive air power, offers as a first-mover in the business of inflicting combat attrition on adversaries. When this impact is felt across the spectrum of conflict before engaging in friction on the ground or on maritime spaces, there is a distinct possibility of causing temporal shock and psychological dislocation, all of which offer potential for speedy conflict termination and favourable political outcomes. The coercive impact of air power in the realm of no-war-no-peace situations was effectively validated by the IAF in the Balakot strike, albeit with some capability gaps to address. However, the broader lesson is that unless a rising power such as India is willing to take risks, adversaries will always have a first-mover advantage in this genre of conflict. Whether it is in a stand-alone offensive mode, or by enabling
instruments such as Special Forces to execute similar missions, or in maintaining the tempo of its robust non-kinetic capabilities as instruments of statecraft, the IAF offers tremendous value in less-than-war situations.
Second, the depleting strength of offensive combat assets in the form of 4th Gen and 4th Gen + multi-role combat aircraft is exerting enormous pressure on both the capacity and the capability of the IAF to train and prepare for combat against collusive adversaries across the spectrum of conflict. While the IAF enjoyed a competitive advantage over the PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) in several realms, including air combat, air-to-ground weapon delivery and other enabling functions, this advantage is fast eroding. When this asymmetry is seen both qualitatively and quantitatively, there is cause for serious concern. While the emphasis on indigenisation and the boost given to the various variants of the LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) and AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) programmes is laudable and must be fully supported by all stakeholders, the yawning gap in current capability must be speedily plugged. It is in this context that the pending acquisition of 114 MRFA (Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft) must be expedited along with the possibility of giving a meaningful mid-course correction through the various offset clauses of leapfrogging the Kaveri fighter engine quagmire that India finds itself in. Plugging both these gaps even as frontline combat aircraft such as the MiG-21 Bison are being phased out is essential for the IAF.
Third, the stellar performance of the IAF in all its roles over Eastern Ladakh following the Galwan clashes indicates that if unshackled and allowed to operate with flexibility, the IAF has significant coercive potential. However, this capability will be severely stretched if the IAF is expected to impact several sectors over a prolonged period and across extended combat zones that could be separated by over a thousand kilometres. In such diffused scenarios, the IAF must plan to embrace a philosophy of centralised command and distributed control that empowers lower levels of IAF leadership with greater operational decision-making, particularly in sudden escalation during no-war-no-peace situations.
Fourth, there is little doubt that the IAF is the ‘odd man’ out in the bitter debate on jointmanship and integration. This was bound to happen as air power enabled by space straddles across all domains of war-fighting and is hence coveted by all without the necessary technologically enabled core competencies that are so essential for the optimum exploitation of platforms and weapons with a mind-boggling range of capabilities in the span of one mission. Amongst the several issues that merit resolution before parcelling out aerial assets across the proposed theatres, two stand out for their complexity. The first is the absence of a common communication and data transfer network to support seamless operations. The second is the operational orchestration of scarce resources, particularly when it comes to switching resources and the long decision chain that would involve competing theatre commanders and the current apex operational decision-making authority in Delhi comprising the three chiefs and the CDS as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Instead of shrinking the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop, the timesensitive and first-responder capabilities of air power will take a hit. On its part, the IAF must shed its ‘siege mentality’ that often forces it into rigid positions such as pitching for the ‘primacy of air power’ in an era where only a combined manoeuvre and firepower approach can offer a winning proposition. The need of the hour for the IAF is to create joint narratives that stress on the core competencies and ‘decisive impact of air power’ in multiple domains; and exploiting scarce resources under centralised command and distributed control for optimum effectiveness.
The last area of concern is in the realm of embracing new-age technologies such as AI, miniaturisation, hypersonic weapons, and drone swarms in a hotly contested aerial environment unlike the testing grounds of the West where all these have been developed in uncontested aerial spaces. Consequently, the IAF must not lose focus on traditional instruments such as better Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability for its entire range of weapons; better capabilities to punch a hole in robust adversarial air defence networks, and increased focus on how to inflict serious combat attrition against adversaries who seek more to ‘win without fighting’.
Tackling the present set of challenges requires more skillful manoeuvring by the IAF in the cognitive and intellectual domain. The power of persuasive but simple arguments regarding the current force levels, the coercive impact of air power and the debilitating impact of splitting scarce resources would serve the IAF well in these trying times.
Whether in standalone offensive mode or by enabling instruments such as special forces, the IAF is crucial in less than war situations