Ambiguous jurisdiction

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Enforcement Directorate (ED) have long been at the centre of controversies involving allegations of their (mis)use by the Central Government. These allegations, persisting through decades, are not devoid of merit. The present ruling dispensation at the Centre, in particular, has gone an extra mile in targeting its political opponents in certain states through the alleged deployment of these agencies. Quite safely, it can be said that these allegations bear the semblance of truth.

Against such a murky background, the legal battle between the State of West Bengal and the Union government holds great relevance. The case pertains to the jurisdiction and authority of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and has brought to light significant questions about the spirit of federalism, the role of the investigative agency, and the source from where it derives authority to act in particular cases. In essence, the basic nature of questions raised by the Supreme Court during the hearing highlight the glaring ambiguities under which the agency has been functioning to date.

The Centre’s persistent claim that it has no control over the CBI, and the Supreme Court’s refusal to accept the same, leaves out a wide gap — waiting to be filled by comprehensive answers and assessments. The court rightly questioned who else, if not the Central government, could authorise the CBI to conduct investigations in States. It is pertinent to mention here that Centre’s claim was aimed to push its request of quashing the original suit filed by the State of West Bengal under Article 131 of the Indian Constitution. Article 131, which provides the Supreme Court with the original jurisdiction to deal with matters concerning Centre-State disputes, forms the cornerstone of India’s Constitutional federalism. The court aptly highlighted the legislative framework governing the CBI, particularly Section 5(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, which grants the Central government the power to extend the jurisdiction of the CBI into any area of the States.

The West Bengal government strongly asserted that despite the state withdrawing its general consent for CBI investigations within its territory in 2018, the CBI continues to operate within its jurisdiction. This, certainly, raises fundamental questions about the autonomy of States in matters of law enforcement and the extent of the Centre’s authority over investigative agencies. Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal, appearing for the West Bengal government, argued that the consent to the CBI is a privilege granted by the State. This apt assertion underscores the importance of State sovereignty in maintaining law and order. By withdrawing its consent, West Bengal sought to assert its autonomy and limit the intrusion of central agencies into its affairs—a stance that aligns with the principles of federalism. It was a decision that must have been respected. Sibal further contended that Article 131 of the Indian Constitution should be widely interpreted to advance remedies in federal disputes.

To sum up, the Supreme Court’s judgment on the maintainability of West Bengal’s suit will have farreaching implications for the relationship between the Centre and the States, as well as the autonomy of investigative agencies.