PAKISTAN’S TIES WITH TERROR
Can Donald Trump cut the Gordian knot?
Almost 16 years to the day, the US had embarked upon its war on terrorism against the Afghan Taliban on October 7, 2001, as a reprisal for the enormity of the 9/11 terrorist attack. It appears that a White House administration is again issuing dire warnings to Rawalpindi (GHQ of the Pakistan Army), while still dangling the familiar "carrot".
At a congressional hearing of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in Washington DC, on Tuesday, October 4, General Joseph Dunford, Chairman, US Joints Chiefs of Staff, observed candidly: "I think it's clear to me that the ISI has connections with terrorist groups." This is not the first time that an incumbent in his chair has come to such a determination. US Defence Secretary, Jim Mattis, had a similar assessment, adding that while Pakistan may have come down on terrorism, "the ISI appears to run its own foreign policy." This is an unusually unambiguous assertion by a senior US official but General Mattis added the caveat too: "We need to try one more time to make this strategy work with them; by, with and through the Pakistanis. And if our best efforts fail, the President (Trump) is prepared to take whatever steps are necessary."
The war in Afghanistan, where Pakistan was accorded the status of a major NON-NATO ally, has been expensive for the US, both in terms of blood and treasure. A study by Brown University estimates that, as of 2016, the US may have spent up to $2 trillion towards the Afghan campaign, which still remains inconclusive and messy. As a benchmark, it may be relevant to note that India's GDP in 2016 was estimated to be $2.26 trillion. The total number of people killed since the Us-led war on terror began in October 2001, has crossed 370,000 and the number displaced is upwards of 800,000. The violence still continues.
Will the latest warning by the Trump team have the desired effect on the Pakistani Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) and the "deep-state" in that country? It is difficult to be optimistic. Three high-level political visits in endseptember frame the intractable nature of the Afghan war. They were dramatically illustrated by events in Kabul. Mattis arrived in Kabul from Delhi (September 26) and a few hours later, the airport was subjected to rocket fire by the local Taliban. This attack on the Kabul airport led to a delay in the visit of Abdullah Abdullah, CEO of Afghanistan, to Delhi.
It is pertinent to note that, in their public remarks, in Kabul and Delhi, the two men reiterated the imperative of closing down safe havens and sanctuaries for terror groups while also dismantling the infrastructure in the region that supports such bloodshed. The notso-subtle reference was to Pakistan and its deep-state that continues to support groups such as the Haqqani network, the Lashkar-e-taiba and its affiliates.
This brings us to the third visit – that of Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, during the end of September to the US, where he asserted that charges of Pakistan sheltering terrorists were "untrue" and that the only cross-border movement of terrorists was "from Afghanistan to Pakistan!" Abbasi further and categorically ruled out any role for India in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, adding, "Zero, we don't foresee any political or military role for India in Afghanistan."
This inflexible veto that Pakistan has accorded unto itself in relation to the internal affairs of Afghanistan and the brazen manner in which it continues to deny the role being played by Rawalpindi in supporting terror groups, lies at the core of the political and military challenge for the US, India and Afghanistan. This was reiterated during the Mattis - Nirmala Sitharaman meeting in Delhi. A highly respected US marine corps general, Mattis has a first-hand experience of the war in Afghanistan and is deeply aware of Pakistani duplicity, wherein, the US taxpayers money is being spent to attack and kill US military personnel.
The Bush and Obama administrations were aware of this fundamental contradiction – that in September 2001 – before 9/11, Pakistan was one of just three nations in the world who recognised the Afghan Taliban and their regime in Kabul, at that time. Yet, the White House chose to overlook this contradiction and allowed Pakistan to become a NON-NATO ally in the global war on terror. Further ironies followed, for in October 2001, when the US and its allies were bombing Afghanistan, the wily General Pervez Musharraf was able to strike a deal with the Pentagon and safely withdraw Pakistan army personnel in Afghanistan who were assisting the Taliban.
The metaphor hunting with the (US) hounds and running with the (Taliban) hare could not be apter. But the more relevant question that many US citizens ask in anger, is how the world's lone superpower could allow such perfidy to continue for years. This is the question that President Trump is seeking to answer for which he is introducing a much needed corrective to the US South Asia policy.
India, which is also a stakeholder in the war against terror, is a major development partner in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and has provided aid in excess of $2 billion. During the Mattis visit, Defence Minister Sitharaman confirmed that while Delhi would not send any troops to Afghanistan, it would enhance its training role for security and police personnel. The critical military equipment that the Afghan military needs, is a complex matter and India is constrained by its own military inventory gaps and the dependence on Russian-origin equipment that cannot be supplied without involving Moscow in the deliberations. The sub-text of the three visits illuminates both, the nature of the Afghan conundrum and the difficulties inherent in crafting policy options that will be more effective than what has been the cost-benefit analysis of the last 16 years. To add to the complexity, Beijing has also become an interlocutor.
Even as the Mattis-abdullah visits were taking place, the second meeting of the China-afghanistan-pakistan (CAP) Practical Cooperation Dialogue was held in Kabul, on September 26 and 27. Weaning Rawalpindi away from supporting terror groups, will not be a swift binary choice and the White House has considerable experience in the matter. Whether President Trump will be able to cut the Gordian knot, remains moot. (The author is Director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi. The article is in special arrangement with South Asia Monitor. The views expressed are
strictly personal.)
This inflexible veto that Pakistan has accorded unto itself in relation to the internal affairs of Afghanistan and the brazen manner in which it continues to deny the role being played by Rawalpindi in supporting terror groups, lies at the core of the political and military challenge for the US, India, and Afghanistan