COMBAT PREPAREDNESS OF THE IAF
The present state of combat preparedness of the Indian Air Force is not adequate to successfully execute air operations on two fronts simultaneously
THE ROLE OF THE Indian Air Force (IAF) is to employ military air power to achieve national objectives in war and in peace. Combat preparedness is the extent of its ability to execute assigned tasks in wartime. The peacetime deterrent it projects is a key ingredient in dissuading a potential adversary from resorting to war as an option. Combat preparedness has to be in relation to the intentions and capabilities of potential adversaries. Since the IAF will most probably not have a first strike option, the levels of combat preparedness have to cater for this disadvantage.
ADVERSARIES AND INTENTIONS
The main threat is from adversaries in the neighborhood which are Pakistan and China. Both are major military players in South Asia. Pakistan is an economic disaster with its military capabilities far in excess of its economic status. Given its hostility towards India, it will continue to be a military threat. China is an economic powerhouse with a powerful military totally controlled by the Communist Party. It has shifted from a stated policy of national defence to one of aggressive power projection well beyond its borders.
CAPABILITIES The Pakistan Air Force (PAF)
The PAF has a relatively modern core of fighters consisting of F-16 variants, Chinese JF-17 Thunder and some FC-20/J-10 variants. Possible inductions in the future could be Chinese stealth J-20 and J-31 fighters and the Russian Su-35. It has beyond visual range (BVR) missiles and capabilities of night attack, inflight refuelling and airborne warning & control (AWACS) aircraft. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assets exist with possible weaponisation in the near future. Surface-to-air missile (SAM) modernisation includes induction of the Chinese version of the Russian S-300 system. The combat force could increase to close to 400 in the future. Pakistan has a sizeable inventory of short range and some medium range surface-tosurface ballistic and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. A first use option appears to be part of their doctrine.
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE (PLAAF)
After the reorganisation of Chinese Military Theatre Commands early in 2016, a single command, the Southern Military Command, now has control over all forces deployed on the southern border with India. It is an economic superpower with valuable assets vital to national survival concentrated along the south-east coast, where they are most vulnerable.
Modern fighter assets of the PLAAF include the Su-30 MKK, Su-27, Shenyang J-16, Shenyang J-11, Chengdu J-10 and Shenyang J-8/F-8. Stealth fighters include the J-20 due for induction in 2018 and the J-31. BVR and night attack capabilities exist. Bombers include the Xian JH-7 and 7A and the Xian H-6K nuclear capable cruise missile carrier. The PLAAF is also ramping up further its air refuelling, AWACS and electronic intelligence (ELINT) capabilities. In the UAV realm, it has inducted both medium and
high altitude long endurance UAVs as well as weaponised ones. Attack helicopters include the WZ-10. SAMs include Chinese variants of Russian S-300 and the new S-400 systems, with some units deployed opposite the Indian border in Tibet.
The Chinese surface-to-surface nuclear capable cruise and ballistic missiles inventory far exceeds anything India has in terms of payload, range and numbers. Interceptor and attack fighters total upwards of 2,300. More than numbers which have always been large, the PLAAF combat aircraft now include late third- and fourth-generation types that are much more potent than fighters in service 15 years ago. China also has extensive cyber warfare capabilities.
THE INDIAN AIR FORCE Available Assets
The combat aircraft fleet of the IAF is in a period of transition with a large segment of fighter assets such as MiG-21 variants and MiG-27s, overdue for phasing out. The rate of replacement is lagging far behind the rate of retirement from service. Combat aircraft levels are at 35 squadrons, likely to reduce to 25 by 2022. If all procurement plans fructify, the required 42 squadron strength may only be achieved by 2032. Can it be ensured that there will be no war till then?
The bulk of the newer generation fighter fleet of the IAF consists of 272 plus Su-30MKIs. Mirage 2000s, MiG-29 UPGs and Jaguars make up the rest. The Tejas Mk-1 with a sub-optimal capability has just made a symbolic debut and induction rates of this type will not match the phasing out rates of the older aircraft when their withdrawal accelerates in 2018.
The situation with regard to SAM systems is not satisfactory with the older Pechora and OSA systems obsolete. However induction of the Akash SAM system is in progress and the Russian S-300 and S-400 systems may also become available. Attack helicopter availability is a problem area. A handful of AH-64 Apache helicopters will not meet our requirements. A lighter platform with better high altitude capabilities is urgently needed to support the Army in the mountains. Air refuelling and AWACS assets are not sufficient to support extensive fighter operations. Replacements of obsolete transports and helicopters are long overdue.
COMPARISON OF CAPABILITIES
The numerical superiority and technological edge the IAF has over the PAF is rapidly evaporating with near parity in terms of combat aircraft. The technological edge over the PLAAF has disappeared. Numerical inferiority has always existed. Considering the threat scenario, the ideal requirement is for the IAF to be able to handle simultaneous short duration conflicts with a major conflict against Pakistan in the west and a containment action against China in the north and north-east. In another scenario, the IAF should at least be capable of deterring one adversary while containing the other. It has been assessed by the IAF that a two-front conflict is currently beyond its capabilities.
POSSIBLE REMEDIES
Possible options are to increase the strength of the Su-30MKI fleet or procure platforms from Western sources with possible licence manufacture. There is also a danger associated with overdependence on one platform. Improving Aircraft Serviceability. The serviceability rates of the Su-30MKI fleet is at an unacceptable 50 per cent with problems in major areas such as engines and control systems. Drastic action is required to correct this situation with all stakeholders working in unison.
Precision Guided Weapons (PGMs). These smart weapons are essential in modern warfare. High altitude, high speed attacks using PGMs proved their worth in Kargil even though it took a lot of improvisation. The IAF needs to equip and train for such attacks. PGMs have been in short supply and more need to be procured. Induction of Weaponised UAVs. This process of weaponised version of UAVs needs to be accelerated. The United States seems to have already agreed to supply Predator class systems. Local development has to be prioritised so as to avoid sanctions on supplies in the future.
OTHER ISSUES
Training. Realistic training and use of mission simulators has fortunately caught on with the IAF. This momentum needs to be maintained. With low aircraft availability, this becomes vital.
Manning Levels. The combat aircraft to pilot ratio is 1:0.81, lower than the sanctioned 1:1.25. Considering the long gestation period of training, this could become a problem if steps are not taken to address the issue. Infrastructure and Aircraft Security. Using ill-equipped personnel to guard vital assets is an invitation to disaster. Induction of electronic surveillance, strict access control and deployment of a effective force needs to be done.
SUMMARY
The present state of combat preparedness is not adequate to successfully execute air operations on two fronts sumltaneously. The main problem is lack of sufficient numbers of modern combat aircraft. Compounding it is the prospect of further depletion of assets in the near future. In addition, poor serviceability rates of the most potent type in the combat fleet has further degraded combat preparedness. The problem has become a crisis mainly because of delayed and at times faulty decision making, often by those who are unable to grasp the requirements of modern air warfare.