‘Researching for the book was like solving a mystery or puzzle’
father of the poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz was a munshi in the Kabul court and the only non-British allowed to keep a record of discussions. Shortly after the Durand agreement was signed, he was told by the English in Kabul that his life was in danger. So he fled to India where he was promptly arrested by the British, ostensibly on spying charges. Was he, therefore, set up by his British colleagues to flee Kabul, so that he could be trapped in Lahore and those records could be seized from him? Oddly enough, he was released within a few days and went on to serve as Afghan Ambassador in London. Isn’t that strange? Ordinarily no government would accept as an Ambassador a person whom they had arrested as a spy!
Everything suggested that the manner in which the Durand agreement was signed was a dark chapter in Afghan history. Was the Amir in his right senses or was he ill or drugged when he signed away his territory? Why was Salter Pyne knighted for his role in the signing of the agreement? All the previous books are silent on how and why it happened. That’s why Durand’s Curse was necessary.
Which of the many books on Afghan history do you admire — if any at all and why?
Let me surprise you. I would pitch for Khalid Husseini’s The Kite Runner because it is a faithful reflection of the recent history and it is a warning that similar misfortunes could visit Afghanistan again. It is a painful narrative, but that’s how terrible things were. It may not qualify as a history book, but it mirrors faithfully what had happened.
What in your opinion is the reason for Pundit Nehru’s lack of desire to make the Durand Line an issue at the time of Partition? Did he fear that not accepting a treaty would undermine India’s position on many fronts as well? Or was it something else?
I suspect Nehru accepted the Durand Line for two reasons. Firstly, he had had a disastrous trip to the frontier areas where he was booed and stoned by Pathan tribesmen. Perhaps he also did not know quite what to do with the Pathan issue and felt he could postpone it to deal with it at a later time. This was a grave miscalculation. Jinnah, on the other hand, achieved a double: not only did he annex the Pathan lands but also sent Afridi and Mehsud tribals to attack Kashmir.
Do you believe that today there are a significant Pusthun speaking population within Pakistan that really opposes the Durand Line? We will be making a mistake if we say that map making is no longer possible. Kurds have been a part of Iraq for long years. Yet, over 90 per cent of them have recently voted for independence. Look at what happened to Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
In a different context could Brexit have been considered a serious outcome a few years ago. So public mood can swing to extremes. All it takes is a spark and a sense of injustice. Sadly, Pathans in Pakistan do not occupy the same pedestal as Punjabis do.
Towards the end of your book, you speculate on the possible implications of the conflict along the Durand Line on India. On the whole, your prognosis is pessimistic. Does it remain so even after you have finished writing the book?
The prognosis remains fraught because Pakistan feels it is about to achieve the strategic depth it has long sought in Afghanistan. This may or may not happen. But either way Afghanistan will be balanced on a razor’s edge. And that is no ground for optimism.
Do you really feel a ChinaRussia understanding on controlling Afghanistan is real or viable? Some believe that Russia is posturing on Afghanistan on order to gain more concessions from the United States for concessions in other parts of the world? What grand interest does China have in Afghanistan?
There are no simple answers to the game that is currently underway. Pakistan, China and Russia all have their own reasons for having a regime they can control in Kabul. China realises that if Afghanistan comes under hostile control then its mining interests in Afghanistan and two main projects the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and OBOR could be insecure. Russia wants Afghanistan to be stabilised by a “friendly” regime because it would then be a buffer that might safeguard Central Asia and therefore the Russian heartland. Pakistan wants to control Afghanistan as a first step towards its greater ambitions in Central Asia.
What is not appreciated enough in public debate is that if Afghanistan falls into the hands of the Pakistan-ChinaRussia axis or their proxies, then a huge arc stretching up to Syria would turn negative for US interests.