The Asian Age

Ordinances a blot on the Constituti­on. SC must act...

- A. G. Noorani

Absolute monarchs wield legislativ­e and executive power. Democracie­s do not and cannot. It is amazing that the framers of India’s Constituti­on blindly endowed the government­s at the Centre and in states with the power to legislate, albeit in emergent circumstan­ces for a limited period and subject to ratificati­on by the legislatur­e. The conditions were soon overlooked. Ordinance raj came to stay.

The excuse was that a huge country needed this power in case of emergency. But Britain’s Parliament gave no such legislativ­e power to the Canadian government when it enacted the British North America Act, 1867, nor did the Commonweal­th of Australia Constituti­on Act, 1900. Why was India singled out? The clue lies in India’s constituti­onal history.

Under the Government of India Act, 1858, enacted after the 1857 uprising, legislativ­e and executive power was vested in the governorge­neral assisted by an executive council. A grain of popular element was introduced by the Indian Councils Act, 1861. A legislativ­e council presided over by the governor- general made laws. It was a unitary system. The Government of India Act, 1919, retained the unitary system but allowed the governor- general to make ordinances in cases of emergency for six months. They would have the same force as an act of the central legislatur­e. The condition was “in case of emergency”.

This was different from the governor- general’s power to “certify” a bill, which the legislatur­e refuses to pass, as one “essential” in the interests of the country. It had to be approved by the British Crown. In the case of an emergency, the governor- general passes the ordinance immediatel­y subject to London’s power to disallow it rather than wait till the central legislativ­e Assembly expresses its refusal — a cumbrous situation. Governors- general used this power to promulgate ordinances even while the Assembly was in session.

The Government of India Act, 1935, conferred responsibl­e government in the provinces; but the federal part never came into force. It split the ordinance where the governor- general had to act on the advice of ministers — this part never came into force — and when he acts without the advice of ministers. Additional­ly, he had the power to enact a governorge­neral’s act. Governors in the provinces also got the power to promulgate ordinances.

The framers of the Constituti­on adopted the ordinance mindlessly with its colonial baggage. It was a tool forged in London to help override whatever limited powers the central Assembly chose to exercise, if it affected British interests. The ordinance mechanism was devised in 1919 because the central Assembly was set up. This continued till Independen­ce, in a modified form after the Act of 1935.

Ordinances are open to judicial review, but on limited grounds. The Supreme Court ruled that ‘ the test is whether the satisfacti­on is based on some relevant material. The court... will not determine the sufficienc­y or adequacy of the material’. This is wrong.

The ordinance continues to this day. Article 123 of the Constituti­on empowering the President to promulgate ordinances, stipulates: “If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is satisfied that circumstan­ces exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action he may promulgate such ordinances as the circumstan­ces appear to him to require.” Recess of Parliament is one condition. The other is the honest belief on the government’s part that circumstan­ces had arisen after Parliament went into recess, which render it necessary for him “to take immediate action.”

In 1969, Justice J. C. Shah noted in the Supreme Court that “exercise of the power is strictly conditiona­l” and pointedly remarked: “Determinat­ion by the President of the existence of circumstan­ces and the necessity to take immediate action on which the satisfacti­on depends, is not declared final.” In 1980, the court said, “That power was to be used to meet extraordin­ary situations and not perverted to serve political ends.”

The only abuse the Supreme Court nullified was repromulga­tion. government contemplat­e legislate the reveals a lot.

Ordinances are open to judicial review, but on limited grounds. The Supreme Court ruled that “the test is whether the satisfacti­on is based on some relevant material. The court... will not determine the sufficienc­y or adequacy of the material”. This is wrong.

The court ought to have ruled that circumstan­ces which could not possibly justify the conclusion that “immediate action was necessary” render the ordinance unconstitu­tional. It did not. Seventy years after Independen­ce, India remains chained to the doctrine of subjective satisfacti­on which Britain, where it originated, discarded long ago.

The ordinance is, both, a blot in and a blot on the Constituti­on. No court can erase it. But the Supreme Court can insist on proof of the existence of circumstan­ces which render immediate action necessary; not merely desirable or convenient. That the should even an ordinance to triple talaq ban

By arrangemen­t with Dawn

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