Kashmir: The Unwritten History
A radical new look at the largely forgotten four million people of Azad Kashmir – the part of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan, and separated by a Line of Control from Indian territory.
The first thing that strikes a reader as he goes through the pages of this massively researched book is the sheer enormity of the gathered information. The author, Christopher Snedden is an Australian politico-strategic analyst and academic, specialising in South Asia.
For a "westerner", he is remarkably objective, His focus is largely on what India describes as "Pakistan Occupied Kashmir" of PoK, obviously because it is the most contentious of the state and the least known area of disputed Jammu & Kashmir.
Much of the disturbances the state went through since 1947 are attributed to the Maharajah Sir HAri Singh. One of the major factors that governed popular feelings must be attributed to the "communalism" observed by the ruler.
In Hyderabad, for instance, though Muslims were in a minority, power largely rested in Muslim hands. Urdu, for instance, was imposed on Telugu-speaking people. That was par for the course and Hari Singh's rule reflected the royal culture of those times.
Jammu & Kashmir with a 77.05 per cent Muslim population was ruled by a Hindu and Hindus outnumbered Muslims in top administration posts which invited subdued resentment. But - and here's the rub - when India became free, the political inclinations of the people of J&K were far more complex and uncertain.
Quite a significant segment of Muslims were not in favour of joining Pakistan, whereas some among Hindus, like Hari Singh's own Prime Minister Ramachandra Kak were in favour of it! Hindus formed a substantial segment of the J&K Army while Muslim Kashmiris opted for jobs in the Indian Army!
The situation was confusing. Opposed to the Maharaja's rule were people in Mirpur, Poonch and Muzaffarabad areas. Then there was another factor, known by the term Kashmiriat. Prior to 1947, as a leading Kashmiri Pandit has been quoted as saying: "Racially, culturally and linguistically, the Hindus and Muslims living in Kashmir were practically one" and were not influenced or afflicted by the "Majority-Minority Complex". All this, sadly, was to change in the decades that followed.
Matters came to head when, following the partition of India there was a Muslim uprising in the Poonch area of western Jammu Province against the unpopular Hindu ruler, Hari Singh.
The author's contention is that the armed rising was first started not by the Pakistan instigated Pakhtuns but by native Kashmiris themselves, and that it all began with the creation of 'Azad' Jammu & Kashmir in the area of western Jammu Province, that the 'rebels' had 'freed' and that the Pakhtuns came much later.
The Azad Kahmir Muslims, according to the author, had many grouses, not the least some dozen taxes they alone were forced to pay - and neither the Hindus nor Sikhs. Dogra rule also denied them important land reform granted in other states. The Dogra rule was "oppressive". But what, in the long run, mattered was disunity among Muslims. To read this book is to get an entirely new picture of the J&K situation.
This book is divided into two parts: the first part provides an overview of how "Azad Kashmir" came to be established, using primary source material. The second part has cashed in on Muslim anger. Two points are raised by Snedden. One, that J&K is now a "imagined entity" and the former princely state "is never likely to be reunified".
Since 1947 the five regions of J&K have become heavily inte- grated with and are dependent on their respective metropolitan powers, namely India and Pakistan. Actually, says the author, the famed Kashmir Valley is the only region of contestation.
And this India is never going to give up under any circumstances, on the sound basis that there is a place in secular India for people of all religions. The stress in this book is so clearly on 'Azad Kashmir' that the rest of J&K like Ladakh or even Jammu with a large Hindu population gets hardly any mention.
The role and place of China, too does not get the attention it deserves. The author does relate the anti-regime activity that took place in 1947 in the 'Frontier Districts Province', otherwise known as the "Northern Area", consisting of Astore, a small area of Baramulla district, Gilgit, the Gilgit Agency (consisting of seven 'ilaqas") and Baltistan, a previously undefined region comprising Skardu tehsil and the uprising that followed.
We now learn that on November 16, 1947 Karachi sent a political agent in response to the 'provisional government' formed there. What is significant is that there was no obvious co-ordination between the Gilgit and Azad Kashmir regimes, as a result of which, says Snedden "Azad Kashmir never comprised - nor did it appear to comprise - a realistic alternative for all of J&K.
Against this background of a wholly divided J&K, can there be any prospect of breaking the Indo-Pakistan deadlock? There is no reference to Gen. Musharraf's alleged proposal for an amicable settlement. If India and Pakistan cannot, between themselves, break the deadlock, who else can? Not the United Nations Security Council, Snedden agrees, considering India's strong resentment to 'outside' interference.
As Snedden puts it, the only 'third party' which would - or is it 'could'? - be acceptable to both India and Pakistan are the people themselves of the state.
That, one may add, is not the only solution. A better solution would be the creation of a South Asian Confederation in which a united J&K could be 'autonomous', but not independent, member.
But Snedden, obviously has not though of it. A vast and thoroughly researched book such as this should have been enriched with maps and more relevantly, a history of Kashmir down the centuries, even before the Muslims came on the scene. But Snedden had stuck to his limitations, which is just as well.