LEAKAGE: BEFORE AND AFTER

The leakage of highly classified data about the on-going Scorpene project may have jeopardised the submarines’ viability to the Indian navy. Even if no confirmed information is available as to whether the all-important operational data is part of the leaked cache of documents such doubts will persist. The navy cannot operate in fear of ‘what if’ in combat situations, hoping against hope that the real meat escaped leakage. Ideally, the Rs. 20,000-crore project should be fully repurposed to dodge the leakage of all details, including sensitive operational details. Given that the original cost of the project had ballooned by the time the Government signed the deal with the French firm, DCNA, in 2005, and that the first of the six contracted submarines is yet a few months away from being commissioned, there is percentage for the work on the project to be stopped till all the repercussions of data leakage are fully examined by an expert committee. Apparently, 22,400 pages of data containing secret stealth capabilities of the submarines under construction, the frequencies they will use to gather intelligence, noise levels at various speeds, their diving depths, range and endurance, etc., have been stolen. The Australian newspaper on Wednesday broke the story. Interestingly, the Australian Government contracted DCNA for its own submarine programme. Rival suppliers who failed to get the contract could well be behind the leakage. The Indian contract is being implemented by the French firm in close cooperation with the Mumbai-based Mazagon Dock Ltd. Dirty tricks in the high-stakes defence deals are the norm and not the exception. In fact, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar on Wednesday virtually absolved anyone associated with the project in this country when he said that the leakage occurred at the French end. Surely if that is the case, and if it is confirmed after a thorough probe, it will be a fit case for the Indian Government to impose costs on the French firm, in which the French government has a substantial stake, for compromising the capabilities of the submarines being built for the Indian Navy. Once the operational data of the submarines falls in the hands of the enemy their utility is vastly nullified. Parrikar would like us to believe that more than 22,000 pages of leaked data do not contain the vital operational details. How does he know? Also, it would be dumb for anyone in possession of the leaked data to reveal the operational details, presuming he has them, because in that case it would oblige the Indians to abandon the project. Suppressing the operational details while disclosing the rest of the secret papers was a clever gambit to keep the Indians bewildered till the crunch time. Should they abandon the project altogether or merely tinker with the superficial parameters to get round the presumed leak are questions which cannot be answered with any degree of finality. Given that the French had beaten intense competition from Germany, Japan, etc., to bag the Indian order, nothing can be ruled out. It is not hard to understand that in an over Rs.20,000-deal stakes for the winners and the losers are bound to be very high.

Meanwhile, there can be no denying that India has been rather amateurish when it comes to defence procurement. Despite the official ban on middlemen, highly-placed dalals with access to top politicians and defence personnel have all along operated freely in New Delhi. From the Swedish Bofors to the Italian helicopters, the Congress Party has been particularly vulnerable to the influence of commission agents. Indeed, since the submarine leak is said to have taken place sometime in 2011, even though the word about the leak was let out after the DCNA clinched the Australian order a few months ago, the Congress Party lamenting the compromise of our defence preparedness is a case of the pot calling the kettle black. It is due to the follies of successive Congress governments that the country has to rely on imports for even basic defence equipments. Indigenous businesses were shut out from the defence manufacturing sector because purchases, essentially from Soviet Union-Russia, kept the commission-takers in clover. As for manufacturing in the public sector, the less said the better, with the DRDO proving to be a white elephant. The Modi Government has opened up the defence sector to Indian business and allowed collaboration with foreign suppliers so that eventually the best equipment can be made in the country. Yet, it is a painfully slow process and for the results to be visible might take several years. At least, a beginning at the beginning is being made with a number of reputed Indian private firms entering the defence sector.