Will China be Modi’s diplomatic coup?
It’s blow hot blow cold for Sino-Indian relations. If Narendra Modi is to be complimented for bold new initiatives, he must also be cautioned against long-term concessions for the sake of dazzling instant publicity. A rapprochement is far more in India’s interest than China’s. As virtual president for life, Xi Jinping does not need diplomatic success abroad to bolster his domestic authority. With attention turning towards the next general election, Mr Modi does.
It is also relevant to point out that Mr Modi’s unprecedented courtesy in inviting all the South Asian heads of government to his swearing-in as prime minister seemed like a stroke of genius at the time. So did his decision to drop in unexpectedly on Nawaz Sharif’s birthday party in Islamabad. But in the cold light of retrospective assessment, neither initiative can be said to have at all improved or even stabilised India-Pakistan relations.
Contrary to many assessments, there can be no comparison between Mr Modi’s current visit to Wuhan and the late Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 trip to Beijing to meet China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Gandhi’s visit was the first by an Indian leader since the 1962 war. Not only did it help to break the ice that had been frozen for nearly 30 years, but it introduced India to an altogether new China. The 1962 war was fought by a megalomaniacal Mao Zedong who was the absolute ruler of an austere Marxist dictatorship. Rajiv made peace with Deng’s dynamic market economy in which a cat’s colour no longer mattered if it caught mice.
No imitative gesture can capture the uniqueness of an action that drew its importance from the context of history. Having only recently returned from Sweden, Britain and Germany, Mr Modi – who has obviously become very fond of globe-trotting — is now on his fourth visit to China in four years as prime minister. He will be there again early in June for the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation which India, like Pakistan, joined last year. Such back-to-back trips to the same country by a head of government are unheard of. Nor is the plea that the June summit of eight SCO members would not have allowed sufficient scope for a lengthy interaction with Mr Xi very convincing.
Prime ministers are not expected to deal with nitty-gritty issues. It’s the job of responsible and knowledgeable functionaries like Sushma Swaraj and China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, the national security adviser, Ajit Doval, and his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, and the foreign secretary, Vijay Gokhale, to attend to details during unobtrusive behind-the-scenes negotiations. High-profile leaders like Mr Modi and Mr Xi, whose every move attracts the world’s attention, need not and should not meet until substantive problems have been dealt with.
Of course, there is no denying that a plethora of such problems do cloud the Sino-Indian horizon. China opposes India’s permanent membership of the Security Council. It has blocked India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and vetoed the UN sanctions India seeks against the Pakistani terrorist, Masood Azhar.
The major long-term challenge is the undefined border between the two countries, with China not only firmly in control of Aksai Chin in the west but also vocal in its claim to Arunachal Pradesh in the east. There is the question of Pakistani-occupied Kashmir, a slice of which the Pakistanis transferred to the Chinese and which might partly explain Indian opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative of transport and energy links as violating India’s sovereignty. Last year’s 73-day military standoff in Doklam in the Chumbi Valley could be described as a feature of this dispute. It is also a feature of the rivalry between India and China for influence in the Himalayas, especially in Nepal and Bhutan.
Beyond such tangible disputes is the existential dilemma. India needs to solve Sino-Indian problems for its own stability and development. Whether China is similarly motivated is another matter. The American statesman, Henry Kissinger, once wrote that it is part of China’s strategy to keep India in a permanent state of uncertainty. Indian analysts have argued that one reason for Chinese patronage of Pakistan – especially in the fields of nuclear and missile weaponry – is to tie India down in the subcontinent.
China is way ahead of India in economic resources, trained propagandists, and the ability to project military power. It is a far more assertive player on the global stage, making its presence felt not only in the South China Sea but also unhesitatingly taking on the United States on the trade front. Donald Trump’s threat of tariffs on Chinese imports worth about $150 billion in an attempt to make Beijing comply with global trade rules and end alleged intellectual property theft has only produced a Chinese warning of retaliation in kind.
Meanwhile, the Chinese are happy to welcome plans by Steven Mnuchin, the US treasury secretary, who wants to visit Beijing to defuse tensions between the world’s two largest economies and stave off a full-scale trade war. It’s the kind of pragmatism the Chinese understand because it mirrors their own practical approach. Perhaps that is why Mr Mnuchin says he is “cautiously optimistic” of resolving the dispute. If Mr Trump had announced instead that he was dashing to Beijing for talks with Mr Xi, China would have seen it as over-reaction that could indicate nervousness, naiveté, or a readiness to capitulate.
To be fair to New Delhi, preliminary interaction at lower levels have not been neglected altogether. Mrs Swaraj’s current tour is preparatory to participation in the SCO foreign ministers’ conference. High-level interactions include two meetings between Mr Doval and Mr Yang, a trip to Beijing by Mr Gokhale, a joint economic group meeting, the recent fifth strategic economic dialogue, as well as meetings on border affairs, cross-border rivers, disarmament and India’s possible entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
It might be more productive to continue these efforts until there is a measure of agreement on several fronts when Mr Modi and Mr Xi can emerge into the footlights to claim the credit that is their due. Some small gains may be mentioned in this context. Mrs Swaraj and Mr Wang agreed last Sunday on allowing the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra by Hindus, Jains and Buddhists to resume through the Natha La route in Sikkim 10 months after it was stopped following the Doklam stand-off. Military exchanges, also suspended after Doklam, might be resumed. Mr Wang and the Nepalese foreign minister, Pradeep Kumar Gyawali, have mooted the idea of a trilateral economic corridor involving China, India and Nepal.
Mr Modi’s initiative may yield more substantive gains. Whether or not it does, there are signs already that the exiled Dalai Lama and his community of about 100,000 Tibetans might find their welcome in this country slightly less warm.
Mr Modi’s initiative may yield more substantive gains. Whether or not it does, there are signs already that the exiled Dalai Lama and his community of about 100,000 Tibetans might find their welcome in this country slightly less warm.