Bring J&K into national mainstream
In effect, security forces have been asked not to initiate combat operations, but not let down vigil.
The Ministry of Home Affairs’ unilateral direction to the security forces in Jammu & Kashmir to “cease fire” during the holy month of Ramzan has not been welcomed by the Pakistan- backed outfits, but has come as a relief to the common people of this disturbed part of India. It has been welcomed with caution. Markets have started functioning, with people being empowered to shop for essentials needed for the month of fasting. Students have been attending classes even in the hotbed town of Shopian, which has been a flashpoint since the slaying of the Hizbul Mujahdeen commander Burhan Wani in July 2016.
The ceasefire, which was announced on the eve of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the state, has ignited hope amidst despair. The interactions which Centre’s interlocutor, former Intelligence Bureau chief Dineshwar Sharma has had with a cross-section of the state’s populace has indicated that if the government reaches out, there are enough people who are willing to grab the hand of peace and development. Experts on the state’s security situation like A. S. Dullat, Arun Chaudhary and former Army commanders have welcomed the move. Dissenting voices have been heard from some former Army personnel and surprisingly some tweets by serving officers have made their rounds on social media. Myopic vision of the complexities of Jammu & Kashmir tends to mire strategic thought.
Ceasefire is a bilateral concept. Terrorist groups have not reciprocated; separatist leaders have pooh- poohed the gesture. In effect, the Army and security forces have been asked not to initiate combat operations, but not let down vigil. They shall not commence any action, but retaliate if attacked. There have been provocations soon after the Centre’s announcement. And going by the experience of the similar exercise attempted during Atal Behari Vajpayee’s regime 18 years ago, the ceasefire is likely to see continuation of provocation from Pakistanbacked terror groups.
The ceasefire opens an opportunity for initiating confidence building measures with the civil population, especially the youth. This exercise has to be carried out in the state as well as in the rest of the country. Effort should be made politically to win over hearts and alienate the alienation of the people of J&K. Separatist leaders who have never tried to contest elections should be bypassed in order to reach out to the youth who are being misguided. The protesting youth must get a fair chance to vent their frustration through dialogue. Administration must become responsive.
Two recent happenings in the state highlight the malignancy. After his family was questioned by an Army commander for acquiring land and building a house close to the ammunition depot in Nagrota in Jammu region in violation of secu- rity rules, the Speaker of the State Assembly, Nirmal Singh, who till the other day was the Deputy Chief Minister, alleged that the Indian Army was “harassing people of the state”. BJP, the party to which this notable belongs, was quick to distance itself from his astonishing pronouncement. But the damage was done. If a leader belonging to the nation’s ruling party casts aspersions on the Indian Army then it adds grist to the propaganda mill of the separatists.
Another astounding development was an order passed by a government official, K. S. Sidha, that Kashmiri Pandits who had migrated from the valley as victims of terrorism needed to register themselves with the government if they wished to visit the Hindu shrine of Kheerbhawani in Tulmul near Ganderbal. The same applied to pilgrimage to the shrines in Tikkar (Kupwara), Manzgam (Kulgam) and Mattan (Anantnag). Furore in the local media drew the political leadership’s attention and the Mehbooba Mufti government rescinded the order asserting that Kashmiri Pandits are “sons of the soil” and thus need no permission to travel within the state. Such instances of harassment of citizens by acts of omission and commission of the civilian administration in the disturbed state add to the alienation of the populace, cutting across religions.
Since the 1972 Shimla agreement, India has treated J&K as a bilateral issue with Pakistan. Yet, Srinagar continues to host an office of the United Nations Military Observation Group for India & Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which was tasked with maintaining status quo on the 1949 Ceasefire Line, which ceased to exist post Shimla and now is known as Line of Control (LOC). Since 1965, the UN Security Council has not discussed J&K. Post 1972, India wanted UNMOGIP wound up, but Pakistan did not relent. For the summer months, UNMOGIP functions from Srinagar and during the winters its base is shifted to Islamabad. The presence of UNMOGIP in Kashmir is misused by propagandists who alienate the youth. The recent interaction between External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, who corrected a Kashmiri youth who sought her help from Manila on Twitter and referred to “Indian Occupied Kashmir”, is a case in point. If Pakistan’s resistance comes in the way of winding up, India could insist that like Islamabad, the head office of this infructuous organisation is stationed in New Delhi (where a liaison office functions), so that this symbol of “J&K dispute” is removed from the valley.
A retired J&K cadre IAS officer, Sonali Kumar, in her recent book, Unmasking Kashmir has made startling revelations on corruption in the state administration, which she and her IAS officer husband witnessed during their tenure. She records an incident of stone throwing at Baramulla in 1980. Stone throwing has been part of Kashmiri protests since the Mughal era, the protestors are termed “Sanghbash” in the Kashmiri language. Incidents of stone pelting thus should not merely be treated with alarm, but viewed in the historical perspective. No stone should be left unturned in the effort to build confidence and bring the citizens of J&K into the national mainstream. Tibet’s tempestuous political history and upheavals of its past are well recorded and archived. The 14th (present) Dalai Lama arrived in India on a yak by crossing the border at Khenzimane on 31 March 1959, travelling a fortnight after leaving Lhasa perhaps during the darkest phase of his last night spent in his homeland. Upon arrival in India, the first Indian post was at Chuthangmu, north of Tawang (then part of Kameng Frontier Division). Once past the Indo-Tibetan border, the Assam Rifles accorded him a guard of honour in Tawang and escorted the Dalai Lama. Following a stay in Bomdila, the Dalai Lama travelled to the hills of northern India and set up the Tibetan Government-in-exile on 29 April 1959. It is 60 years since his passage to India, and over a century of India’s deeply rooted relationship with Tibet.
Prior to the present Dalai Lama, his predecessor, the 13th Dalai Lama (1876-1933) fled first to Mongolia in 1904 and thereafter to China. Upon his arrival in Peking, the Chinese did not accord him the same honour that his antecedents had received by the previous Mongol emperors. From the earliest times, the political relations existing between Tibet and China were based primarily on the special personal equation shared by the Dalai Lamas with the Mongol emperors. With the collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1912 following the Chinese rebellion, the relationship ceased to exist.
Sensing that its position inside Tibet was getting stronger China planned to conquer and control Tibet. To deflect attention, Peking conveyed to the Tibetans that the approaching Chinese troops intended to protect the Tibetans against the British. By 1909 the new Chinese military administrator Chao Erh-feng was actively pushing troops towards Lhasa launching attacks in three Tibetan provinces.
Upon the 13th Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet from China, Chao—appointed “Resident of Tibet”—was known to be committing excesses through his troops, including destroying monasteries, looting monastic properties and tearing up sacred books. It was during this stint that the 13th Dalai Lama met Charles Bell, whose work Portrait of The Dalai Lama published in 1946 is amongst the finest accounts on Tibet and its chequered history.
Bell chronicles personal conversations with the 13th Dalai Lama, in which the latter described how the Chinese military converted leaves from holy Tibetan scriptures as soles for soldiers’ boots. In wake of the growing Chinese aggression and atrocities, which he later described as a breach of the peaceful arrangement between him and the Chinese in Peking, the 13th Dalai Lama was compelled to flee to Darjeeling in India.
Subsequently, the Chinese Revolution of 1912 overthrew the Qing (Manchu) dynasty and created a republic with a provisional Constitution promulgated by the Nanjing Parliament, and the government transferred to Peking. This was also the time when the 13th Dalai Lama returned from India to Tibet. The Chinese Revolution directly impacted Chinese authority in Tibet. The strains started becoming visible when in 1913-14, during a conference held in Delhi, the Chinese, Tibetan, and British envoys (Henry McMahon, assisted by Charles Bell) discussed three major points.
These included that the frontier between China and Tibet should be drawn approximately along the upper waters of the Yangtse; that a frontier should be defined between India and Tibet running along the main range of the Himalayas; and that the Tibetans were to have greater self-determination. Although the agreement was initialled, the Chinese refused to proceed with the full signature. Nonetheless, it was agreed to maintain three Trade Agencies in Tibet—at Gyantse, which lay between the Himalayas and Lhasa; at Yatung, north of the Himalayas; and also at Gartok in western Tibet.
The 12 August 1912 agreement between the Chinese and Tibetan representatives in presence of Gorkha witnesses discussed a “three-point” proposal, which stated that all arms and equipment including field guns and Maxim guns in the possession of the Chinese at Dabshi and Tseling in Lhasa shall be sealed; bullets and gunpowder shall be collected and deposited in the Doring house; and the Chinese officials and soldiers shall leave Tibet within 15 days. As he drew nearer to Lhasa in 1912, the 13th Dalai Lama uncovered that the government of China had broken its pledges of not interfering with Tibet or his position.
Describing the life and times of Tibet, Basil Gould, a British trade agent in Gyantse from 1912-13 narrates in his notes published in November 1949 that the problem of Tibet’s future was whether China would continue to seek to dominate and destroy Tibetan national identity, religion, and its distinct culture. Suffice for me to conclude that Gould’s notes on Tibet’s history have become its present-day destiny, in a fateful paradox. Dr Monika Chansoria is a Tokyo-based Senior Visiting Fellow at The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA).
The ceasefire opens an opportunity for initiating confidence building measures with the civil population.This has to be done in the state as well as in the rest of the country. Effort should be made politically to win over hearts and alienate the alienation of the people of J&K.