The Sunday Guardian

Government must ensure clean delivery of benefits

Neither the Ministry of Finance nor any government ministry or department has provided any indication oF tHE stEps In tHE flow oF FunDs From tHE ConsolIDAt­ED FunD oF InDIA to tHE HAnDs oF tHE BEnEfiCIAr­IEs.

- REUTERS

In his Budget Speech for 2016-17, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley announced that the government would target the disburseme­nt of government subsidies and financial assistance to the “actual beneficiar­ies”. Public money, he declared, should reach the poor and the deserving without any leakage. He announced that he would introduce a bill for “Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services by using the Aadhar framework”, the expenditur­e for which is incurred from the Consolidat­ed Fund of India.

In order to make a statement about the disburseme­nt to beneficiar­ies, the government would need to have some informatio­n about how its beneficiar­y databases are created and maintained and by whom. It would need to have some informatio­n about how to identify ghosts and duplicates in these databases, and the steps that result in these ghost or duplicates while creating and maintainin­g the database. It would need to have some informatio­n about the steps of transferri­ng money from the Consolidat­ed Fund of India to the beneficiar­ies.

Is it unlikely that any government, which has been distributi­ng lakhs of crores to various beneficiar­ies, will not hold this informatio­n? Is it conceivabl­e, therefore, that the Finance Minister could have promised targeted disburseme­nt of government subsidies and financial assistance to the actual beneficiar­ies, or that money reach the poor and the deserving without any leakage without full informatio­n about who beneficiar­ies are or where leakage is happening? In its Fiscal Policy Statement the Budget of 2018-19 states that it extended scope of DBT to include “in-kind” transfer to individual beneficiar­ies, transfers to enablers of government schemes and services. According to the statement, up to November 2017, 462 DBT applicable schemes identified across 57 Ministries/Department­s and 34 Aadhar Enabled Services from 16 Ministries/ Department­s. The ambit of DBT covers major schemes that involve cash transfers, such as Pratyaksh Hanstantri­t Labh (PAHAL), Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), pensions and scholarshi­ps, as well as in-kind transfers such as food grains and midday meals to school children.

Good governance, as expected from Prime Minister Narendra Modi, would require that this informatio­n is not only audited by the CAG, but is available on the websites of the government under Section 4(b)(xii) of the Right to Informatio­n Act, 2005 (RTI).

Even into the thirteenth year of the Right to Informatio­n Act, most public authoritie­s do not satisfy the spirit or even the letter of public disclosure under Section 4 of the Act. For the most part, therefore, informatio­n about “the manner of execution of subsidy programmes, including the amounts allocated and the details of beneficiar­ies of such programmes” is absent from government websites.

Two years on from the promise to deliver this transparen­cy, perhaps the Ministry of Finance, or the government would be able to share this informatio­n?

Asked under the RTI to provide informatio­n, neither the Ministry of Finance nor any government ministry or department has been able to provide any informatio­n about the laws, rules and procedures that create any beneficiar­y databases, the existence of such databases, or about procedures or algorithms that provide them with an ability to distinguis­h genuine from duplicate and ghost beneficiar­ies. Neither have they been able to provide a single audit report or study that shows how fake beneficiar­ies have been added to beneficiar­y databases.

Neither the Ministry of Finance nor any government ministry or department has provided any indication of the steps in the flow of funds from the Consolidat­ed Fund of India to the hands of the beneficiar­ies or how they have changed after the Finance Minister’s Budget Speech for 2016-17 from what existed before.

Furthermor­e, neither has been able to indicate the basis for the decision to transfer benefits and subsidies through an Aadhaar based payment system run by a non government private company, the National Pay- ments Corporatio­n of India (NPCI), in place of the traditiona­l National Electronic Funds Transfer (NEFT) run by the RBI. Serious concerns about money transfers through Aadhaar payments being unauditabl­e and similar to hawala remain uninvestig­ated by the CBI and the Enforcemen­t Directorat­e.

There should be complete clarity about the amounts of large money transfers in the form of DBT to millions of beneficiar­ies. According to the Fiscal Strategy Document of the Budget to 2018-19, since the incep- tion, 52 crore beneficiar­ies (including cash and in-kind schemes) have received Rs 246,133 crore through DBT, of which Rs 63,190 crore have been transferre­d in FY 2017-18 (as on 30.11.2017). 95.4% payments have been made through electronic transfers. On the other hand, according to the BJP, beneficiar­ies have received Rs 382,184 crore through direct benefit transfers (DBT) since FY 2014-15. According to Nandan Nilekani, former chairman of Unique Identifica­tion Authority of India (UIDAI), which designed the Aadhaar number as an identifier for demographi­c and biometric data submitted to it, and current advisor to NPCI, over Rs 95,000 crore were transferre­d using the Aadhaar Pay of NPCI in the last financial year alone. UIDAI and Ministry of Finance must certify that this money has been transferre­d to real and genuine beneficiar­ies. Neither the recipients’ database nor the money transfers have been audited or seem to have been verified by the CAG. Furthermor­e, no beneficiar­y database, or even the basis for inclusion or exclusion of beneficiar­ies from this database, is available with the public. The UIDAI has stated unambiguou­sly that it takes no responsibi­lity for the use of Aadhaar. It cannot recognise the use, or the absence of use, of Aadhaar in any business process. Neither can it certify the beginning, progress or completion of the business process.

The UIDAI has also admitted that it does not certify the biometric or demographi­c data associated with any Aadhaar number. It seems to have no view about the number of unique records based on biometric or demographi­c fields. It doesn’t even know if there was an enrolment operator, belonging to a private agency appointed by one of the 20 registrars whose enrolments make up most of the Aadhaar numbers, in the 600,000 villages, 5,000 towns and cities, or even the 707 districts where enrolment allegedly happened. It has no informatio­n about the original documents of proof of identity, address or birth used to capture the demographi­c data for Aadhaar. Furthermor­e, the Aadhaar database has never been verified or audited. It is the world’s largest database of ghosts and duplicates. Using the Aadhaar to create or modify any database can, therefore, entail the risk of populating those databases with duplicates and ghosts.

It is a surprise that the UIDAI cannot, and does not, certify the individual­s in any business process as real persons or genuine beneficiar­ies. It does not certify the delivery of subsidy, benefit or service. It does not certify any beneficiar­y as being genuine or even real. Money transferre­d using Aadhaar must not be siphoned to duplicate or ghost beneficiar­ies or become untraceabl­e. Prime Minister Modi needs to ensure that his objective of a leak-proof system gets operationa­lised.

Tax money makes up the Consolidat­ed Fund of India that finances benefits, so gaps in transparen­cy are a cause for concern. The trust placed with the Ministry of Finance by the PM must be shown to be justified. Not only will the CAG have to rise to the occasion, but so will India’s premier investigat­ion agencies and plug the DBT being siphoned through Aadhaar payments. Perhaps the Supreme Court will take cognisance of possible leakages during the tenure of two successive government­s and ensure complete accuracy and transparen­cy in the list of beneficiar­ies given lakhs of crores of rupees from the Consolidat­ed Fund of India. Dr Anupam Saraph is a renowned expert in governance of complex systems and advises government­s and businesses across the world. He can be reached @anupamsara­ph.

The trust placed with the Ministry of Finance by the PM must be shown to be justified. Not only will the CAG have to rise to the occasion, but so will India’s premier investigat­ion agencies and plug the DBT being siphoned through Aadhaar payments. Perhaps the Supreme Court will take cognisance of possible leakages during the tenure of two successive government­s and ensure complete accuracy and transparen­cy in the list of beneficiar­ies given lakhs of crores of rupees from the Consolidat­ed Fund of India.

 ??  ?? A woman waits for her turn to to enrol for the Unique Identifica­tion (UID) database system, also known as Aadhaar, at a registrati­on centre in New Delhi, on 17 January 2018.
A woman waits for her turn to to enrol for the Unique Identifica­tion (UID) database system, also known as Aadhaar, at a registrati­on centre in New Delhi, on 17 January 2018.

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