US’ Afghan withdrawal: Promise vs reality

For India, an opportunity has emerged to help set and oversee the peace agenda.

News of peace negotiations on Afghanistan from Russia, Turkey and the US bring different perspectives to the growing international concern on the situation in Afghanistan. The summit in Moscow has kick-started these efforts amidst a push towards ceasefire, formation of an interim government, followed by national elections with a power sharing formula. US efforts will follow as the 1 May deadline for its troops’ withdrawal looms.

The Trump administration had, in a meeting with the Taliban in Doha last year, set American troops withdrawal by 1 May if conditions were met. For Biden administration, this approaching deadline has prodded a review, and “jumpstarted” a peace plan that envisages the formation of a transitional government that includes Afghan government and the Taliban while providing for prevention of terror-related activities on Afghan soil. The ensuing months will thus see a major thrust in US diplomacy towards these goals.

The ongoing debate in Washington on US withdrawal reveals that Biden administration is acutely aware of how majority of Americans are tired of the “forever wars” and has strongly committed to bringing the troops home. While Biden had expressed the intention to bringing home US combat troops during his candidacy, the emphasis was on ending the wars “responsibly” and not let Afghanistan become a nesting ground for terror related activities that would harm US, its allies and partners’ interests. This nuance has led to a (leaked) US draft of “Afghanistan Peace Agreement” that followed the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s letter to President Ashraf Ghani, outlining the next steps to push the stalled peace process.

The draft sets guiding principles for a new constitution and a new state structure; provisos for a transitional government with power sharing options that allows Taliban to be part of: and stipulations for a permanent ceasefire. This would be followed by national elections. In a major shift, US also proposed a Un-led peace conference in Turkey to be attended by foreign ministers and envoys from Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, India and the US. This would strengthen the return to the multilateral process while also putting the stakeholders on the same page as the US. This new “six-party talks” in South Asia are a template familiar to Washington as such when an effort was mounted to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis in 2003.

Some elements of the peace plan can be traced to the Senior Director for South Asia at the NSC, Sumona Guha’s earlier writing on the subject. Having been Deputy Director for Afghanistan

Affairs in the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a special advisor for National Security Affairs during Biden’s Vice Presidency, she has argued that “If these longer-term peace talks are to have any chance of success, they will need support from not only the US but the entire international community, including India”. Thus, while adhering to the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw the 2,500 remaining US troops with subsequent withdrawal of the 10,000 strong NATO coalition forces; the Biden administration has made broad changes to the Afghanistan strategy. Including India in the top six has blunted Pakistani and other spoilers’ efforts to shape US strategy in the old mould.

Significantly, the letter from Blinken underscored the consultative part of bringing Ghani back into the loop, yet underlined the US expectations from him on dropping his insistence on transfer of power only through elections. Variedly described as “blunt” and “respectful”, this missive has resulted in pushback from the Afghan government, while the Taliban too are resisting, describing it as a betrayal of the previous US promise. Others fear a return of the Taliban as envisioned, would undo much of the progress made in women’s rights and civil liberties. They point to the escalating violence largely attributed to the Taliban since the Doha deal of February 2020 that has targeted journalists, activists, judges, and other civil society figures and Afghan government security forces. Though Taliban have denied any breaking of their commitment to the deal, progress in the September 2020 talks had stalled (due to the prisoners swap issue) provoking the suspicion that talks between parties so starkly divided, could be futile.

What then should one expect from such a plan?

First, guarantees for Taliban’s adherence to its commitments and Afghan government’s support for a transitional peace government, ending violence through ceasefire. Second, establishing a dialogue mechanism through which thorny issues and trust deficits can be addressed. Third, a degree of convergence between the six regional powers for boosting trade and economic growth with Afghanistan apart from security and congruence with US aims. Fourth, expansion of India’s role as a global leader in resolving complex conflicts and not just be a balancer for US China competition. Fifth, US withdrawal is contingent upon the outcome of talks and/or other contingencies such as Taliban’s abandonment of armed struggle, as alterations to the US military posture in Afghanistan is related to changes in the security environment.

There is also a broader connect to US’ South Asia policy. Over the years, American strategy suffered from characterizations of either a tilt or zero sum game in its relations with India and Pakistan, till the G.W. Bush administration de-hyphenated US policy. However, 9/11 and the war on terror constrained the US to incentivize Pakistan to help control the Taliban. Subsequently, the US poured $864 billion and 2,400 lives into Afghanistan, creating a strong domestic opinion favouring disengagement from the “forever wars”. Obama and Trump pursued strategies that traversed on this thinking. Despite disillusionment with Pakistan on many counts (presence of Bin Laden, and Haqqani network) Obama’s Af-pak strategy continued to highlight a positive Pakistan role. Trump, who had strained bilateral relations with Pakistan in the initial two years, reset it in 2019 with a transactional approach driven by Pakistan’s utility in the Afghan peace process.

Thus, US intent to disengage from its longest war has been the main driver of US approach. Trump’s announcement of withdrawal of US troops by 1 May 2021 was welcomed by Taliban and Pakistan as it would allow the former a better chance to govern all of Afghanistan while for the latter a strong, legitimate presence of Taliban would help maintain a strategic depth against India. The current plan with the many caveats and conditionality could change this dynamic both internationally and domestically. Internationally, as Biden’s team’s visits to India, South Korea Japan and China signalling a deeper pivot to Asia due to US’ extreme competition with China, including official discussions on Afghanistan as part of US Defense Secretary’s deliberations with India at this stage, sends a signal that there would be a strong Indian role in the peace negotiations.

Domestically, Biden’s reluctance to announce a timetable for withdrawal is echoed by powerful Democrats like Senator Jack Reed, Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, who says, reassuring Americans that “Afghanistan will not be a source of planning, plotting to project terrorist attacks around the globe” and he is not sure it can be done “without some presence there”. Senator Menendez, Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee too has urged a reconsideration of the 1 May deadline as Taliban’s non adherence to its commitments under the 29 February agreement raises serious questions about the future of Afghan security and governance. Prominent Republican Rep. Liz Cheney, who had been critical of Trump’s deal, also believes that Taliban cannot be trusted and decision to withdraw troops should not be based on “arbitrary deadlines”. Senator Lindsay Graham has pointed out that leaving without a conditions-based withdrawal, threats from ISIS and Al Qaeda will re-emerge. Progressive Rep. Ro Khanna, member of the House Armed Services Committee, though, perceives Taliban as unchangeable and US plan as a “wait in perpetuity” recommending withdrawal in the coming months.

For India, an opportunity has emerged to help set and oversee the peace agenda, while providing inputs for setting up complex constitutional and political frameworks in Afghanistan. It can secure the gains of its investment in Afghanistan’s development and security. Changing from a peripheral player to being in the top six, it has an opportunity to put to rest the lurking opinion amongst some Americans, that the road to peace in Afghanistan could only be through Islamabad and entail downgrading Us-india ties.

Encouragingly, India’s advocacy of the idea that there is no military solution to this conflict, and that the political solution must be Afghanled and Afghan-owned has already become part of the emerging language from the US Department of Defense. This assumes significance as the visit by the Defense Secretary Austin from 19 to 21 March to India focuses on consolidation of defence cooperation and convergences on the Indo-pacific, Indian Ocean Region and Afghanistan. Such calibrations augur well as both India and US pursue an integrated approach towards peace amidst shifting alignments between other four countries.

Professor K.P. Vijayalakshmi is Professor of US Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.