What to expect from Biden’s walk back to JCPOA with Iran
The differences between US and Iran over retaining additional sanctions related to Iranian acts of terrorism, its ballistic missile programme, human rights abuses or cybercrimes that Trump and even Biden had imposed need resolution.
The last two months have highlighted Joe Biden’s multiple challenges in US foreign policy, the important one being how to deal with a post Trump United States and the world. Biden promised to approach US foreign policy by “restoring, revising, repealing and reversing” Trump’s decisions that would help US to emerge from its isolationist tendencies and reengage with the world. Outlining major threats to the US as emanating from China and Russia and issues like climate change among others, Biden pushed for a return to principled diplomacy through an alliance and partnership based multilateral approach to tackle them. He began by rejoining the Paris Agreement and indicated he would review other decisions. While recent weeks saw the Indopacific strategy and the China policy take centre stage, along with the issue of troops withdrawal from Afghanistan, US diplomatic thrust equally focused on the issue of US return to the “Iran nuclear deal”. Biden had indicated that re-entering the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) completed during President Obama (under which Iran accepted curbs on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of international sanctions) would be his priority albeit with conditions. The fact that he chose to do it through the Europeans has lent credibility to promise of alliance based approach.
US Iranian relations altered dramatically after the 1979 Iranian/islamic Revolution that ruptured the relationship. The subsequent enduring estrangement presents a central paradox for the US policy as it tries to balance the end of the Cold War, fight against terrorism, Israel’s and other allies’ security and regional stability. Changes within the internal revolutionary politics of Iran from time to time (as during the 1997 election of Mohammad Khatami) had raised expectations of rapprochement and abatement of comprehensive sanctions. Nevertheless, legislations and presidential directives severed most remaining economic ties with Iran in the mid-1990s as the primary US concerns about Iranian foreign policy—support for terrorism and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, dogmatic commitment to the destruction of Israel and intransigence on the Arab Israeli peace process remained undiminished. The impasse continued as Iran consistently rejected direct diplomatic contacts with Washington while sanctions remained in place and pre-revolutionary financial claims were outstanding. Its vigorous opposition to the US military presence in the Gulf and a host of American policies toward the region, past and present too made the task harder. It was the JCPOA that presented an opportunity to convince Iran to forgo the nuclear option by laying out a roadmap that nudged the US from “containment to coexistence” with Iran.
WHAT WAS THE JCPOA?
The JCPOA or the Iran Deal was concluded in July 2015 by the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council— China, France, Russia, United Kingdom United States—plus Germany)and Iran. Given the rigorous domestic opposition, international concerns and regional anxieties of allies and partners, Obama promised that it: “Cuts off all of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon, including a covert pathway. Puts in place vigorous, intrusive, and unprecedented transparency measures that are necessary to verify that Iran cannot pursue a weapon. Ensures sanctions can be snapped back into place if Iran violates the deal.” Assuring that under JCPOA, the President of the United States would certify, every 90 days, among other things, that Iran was adhering to the terms of the agreement, Obama put in place continuous monitoring by the US apart from the IAEA ones.
The agreement signalled that this deal would only lift nuclear related sanctions while the unilateral sanctions that relate to non-nuclear issues, such as Iran’s support for terrorism and human rights abuses would remain. The deal also envisaged a new UN Security Council resolution that would “re-establish important sanctions restricting the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies and keep in place sanctions on ballistic missiles for 8 years and conventional arms for 5 years”. The emphasis was on reducing Iran’s uranium stockpile by 98%: to 300 kg (660 lbs) for 15 years. The level of enrichment would remain at 3.67%. Specifically, Iran would not retain more than 6,104 out of almost 20,000 centrifuges it possesses.
Spelling out the intricate deal publicly both for domestic and international purposes, Obama assured the world that the “US would retain the authority to sanction Iran’s destabilizing activities in Syria and Yemen while also maintaining sanctions on the IRGC, the Qods Force, its leadership, and its entire network of front companies”. Further, these sanctions would also target third party entities, such as foreign banks that conduct business for or on behalf of the Qods Force or Suleimani with a risk of being cut off from the US financial system. In addition to US sanctions, the EU would continue to list Suleimani and the IRGC-QF under other, nonnuclear sanctions authorities. US motivation was simple: avoid military escalation and reiterate its “ironclad” commitment to Israel’s security via this deal that would ensure a non emergence of a nuclear Iran that threatens Israel. However, as State Department officials have since noted, this was essentially a political agreement between the P5+1 and EU that was not an executive agreement or a treaty for the US.
Even as many in the US and elsewhere welcomed the deal, Trump, who was elected after Obama, announced that he was withdrawing the US from the deal on 8 May 2018. Citing how the agreement was a total disaster for US interests, the Trump administration, which had provided certification in April and July 2017, withheld it in October 2017, citing Iranian failure to curb its ballistic missile program and backing for regional proxies and non compliance with inspections of all its nuclear facilities. In a swift reaction, the EU foreign minister repudiated the US decision to withdraw, stating that the JCPOA was not a treaty but an agreement between several countries.
While lobbying by Israel and UAE were reported to have influenced the US withdrawal, domestically, Bolton’s (the NSA at that time) staunch opposition aided the Trump administration’s determination to quit the deal. Supported by Republicans, Trump declared the Obama policy as a failure, and announced a new policy of applying “maximum pressure” by extending the arms embargo on Iran through the UN with reimposition of additional sanctions on Iran. Reports of Iran responding by breaching the deal, e.g. enriching uranium to 20%— above a 3.67% cap but below the 90% needed for weapons, expanding its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, and using advanced centrifuges for enrichment further complicated matters.
As it became evident that Russia and China would veto US moves in the UN for multilateral sanctions on Iran to continue, the resignation of Brian Hook, the State Department’s Representative for Iran in August 2020 before the vote was a tacit admission that the US policy failed to convince others. There was backlash from the Democrats and some experts as well who viewed this as a strategic mistake of immense consequence for US. The Trump Administration however vowed to continue despite several allies and partners expressing regret and calls for dialogue. In a measured response, India too advised “All parties should engage constructively to address and resolve issues that have arisen with respect to the JCPOA”.
US WALKS BACK: CONSTRAINTS VS IMPERATIVES
Biden thus faced a complex set of domestic and international developments in order to re-enter the agreement. His thinking on the issue was revealed in the February speech at the State Department, then at the Munich Security Conference, and the March “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” document. In his speech at State Department he did not mention Iran, unlike Pompeo who railed at “Iran as root of all evil in the Middle East” but at Munich (while he stressed on collective security, the enduring value of NATO and the Transatlantic Alliance with a focus on China), he announced that the US was prepared to reengage in negotiations with the P5+1 on Iran’s nuclear program while addressing Iran’s destabilizing activities across the Middle East, working closely with European and other partners. The interim guidance document went further. It pointed to how Iran, despite its continued pursuit of “game-changing capabilities and technologies, while threatening US allies and partners and challenging regional stability” would be engaged by US’ “principled diplomacy”. Mention was also made of working with regional partners and rightsizing US military in the Middle East to deter Iranian aggression.
What then is happening at the latest (April) Vienna based talks on reopening the negotiations?
Europeans have begun a shuttle diplomacy between US and Iran as the Joint Commission for JCPOA met at the Grand Hotel in Vienna with Americans at another hotel nearby. Thus, while there were no direct negotiations, key constraints were: need to agree on a full inventory of US sanctions that should be lifted to be compliant with UN resolutions on the nuclear deal. Second, a need to compile a full list of the constraints that Iran must readopt to return to compliance.
This has meant that the differences between US and Iran over retaining additional sanctions related to Iranian acts of terrorism, its ballistic missile programme, human rights abuses or cybercrimes that Trump and even Biden had imposed need resolution. Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, insists that all sanctions imposed since January 2016, the date the 2015 agreement came into force, should be lifted. The US disagrees, claiming that these are non nuclear related and had been imposed after the signing of the deal. Thus, agreeing to a common list of post-2016 sanctions that both sides regard as nuclear related is a key imperative for the talks to go forward. At the time of writing, Commission officials point to progress from a couple of months ago as there is agreement on the goal that the deal must be revived. The agreement to meet again has kindled hopes of a successful dialogue. Secondly, both have carefully avoided any deadline imposition despite looming June elections in Iran. Third, a need for revising maximalist strategies of who should act first, or whether it should be step by step strategy has also been discussed.
Finally, the erosion of trust from the Iranians remains significant issue for Biden. Given that the deal was a non-binding political agreement with incentives for both sides to comply, to turn this deal into an international treaty Biden would need two thirds support of the US Congress; an unlikely contingency. An alternative would be a congressional-executive agreement requiring approval by a simple majority vote by both houses of Congress. Whatever the future of the deal, the US would remain constrained by Iran’s missile programme and its regional behaviour and whether these could be addressed in a treaty or through “deal diplomacy”. Biden would also have to answer the Republicans’ claim that US would have no leverage to get Iran to the negotiating table on these issues once the sanctions weapon would be discarded. These talks are thus crucial to not only set the terms of the return of US to the JCPOA and that of Iran to compliance, but also reshape the terms of engagement between the two.
Prof. K.P. Vijayalakshmi is Professor, US Studies Centre for Canadian, US & Latin American Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.