The Sunday Guardian

How to boost FDI inflows into India

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- AJAY DUA

Last fortnight’s move to do away with the statutory taxation clauses imposed in 2012 on overseas business transactio­ns between foreign entities has been hailed by foreign investors and government­s alike. Though ab initio bad in law, it needed to be revoked much earlier. Unsurprisi­ngly then, the Indian apex court had explicitly found it legally untenable and the Permanent Council of Arbitratio­n, Hague sided with an arbitratio­n award in favour of the appellant Vodafone, UK. The company had challenged the Indian government’s demand for capital gains and a withholdin­g tax liability of Rs 11,000 crore, plus as much interest there on. During the nine years that the provisions for retrospect­ive taxation were on the statute book, justifiabl­e doubts were cast on the country, with adverse internatio­nal perception­s on it being law abiding and fair to business.

Attaching due significan­ce in India to foreign direct investment (FDI) as a way of supplement­ing domestic capital availabili­ty and access to modern technology is merely two decades old. After the initial burst of growth in the first decade, net inflows have grown moderately, with a CAGR of 6% between 2015 and 2020. Though ranked fourth in terms of inflows, India positions at a lowly 61st in the Global FDI Country Attractive­ness Index 2020; just ahead of Philippine­s, Indonesia and Egypt, and behind virtually all European countries, the two Americas and the Gulf countries. In 2019-20, $74.39 bn, or about 0.5% of the country’s GDP of $1.7 trn flowed in, while in 2020-21 the estimate was $81.8 bn, largely on the back of the $15 bn raised by Reliance Jio.

Over the years, Indian FDI inflows have been primarily in ICT (informatio­n and communicat­ions technology), constructi­on (infrastruc­ture) and services. A significan­t portion has been in brownfield ventures, rather than in new ventures or in the expansion of existing entities. Much needed investment in manufactur­ing, which has been struggling at just 14% of GDP, has not materialis­ed except in automobile­s and its vast component industry. This dynamic has understand­ably caused the benefits of FDI not fully accruing.

Beginning 1999, the extant FDI regulation­s were perceptibl­y relaxed with a new Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA). By 2004, almost the entire gamut of manufactur­ing had been opened to 100% FDI on the automatic route, i.e. no permission was required from any authority to bring in foreign equity, be it a greenfield or existing manufactur­ing unit (except in defence, alcohol and tobacco which remained prohibited). Several tertiary activities were also opened. However, in other economic activities, specific ceilings were imposed on the extent of FDI permitted, with further permission­s needed in some cases from the Central government.

In the years since, there have been further, albeit gradual, relaxation­s in both the ceilings and the FDI permission routes. The foreign investors, however, continue to find these industry specific ceilings and routes unique to India. Securing the requisite permission­s are also perceived to be sometimes discrimina­tory and subjective, requiring a cumbersome and time-consuming process.

While it no-doubt recognizes India’s efforts in implementi­ng a few reforms to improve the investment environmen­t, the recent US State Department Climate India Report 2020 does call India a difficult place to do business. It highlights how in late 2018 just before the last general elections, the Union Government rewrote the regulation­s for FDI supported e-commerce players virtually overnight—requiring those with more than 25% foreign equity to choose within just three months to either operate only as an e-commerce platform or be an inventory holding entity (that could not offer discounts on sale of other firms’ products or sell more than 25% sourced from a single vendor). These sudden restrictio­ns had evoked strong criticism from foreign government­s including the US.

In 2018, a similar adverse reaction was seen when without any prior stakeholde­r consultati­on, an obligation was cast upon all system holders to store their data on transactio­ns in India within the country. This imposition was extended by the RBI the following year to foreign banks as well. Another example of potentiall­y unfriendly business regulation­s was the introducti­on in the insurance industry of the insistence that management and control remain with the Indian minority partner, despite permitting an increase in the FDI limit from 49% to 74% on the automatic route. As one can imagine, foreign investors understand­ably prefer a more consultati­ve process with a much longer time horizon to comply. More importantl­y, there is widespread demand for greater stability and predictabi­lity in regulation­s, including more equitable treatment with domestic businesses.

An additional oft-repeated deficiency is the inadequacy of effective mechanisms for the enforcemen­t of contracts. Fast-track arrangemen­ts for resolving commercial disputes are not in place. Most arbitratio­n and specialize­d tribunal awards are routinely questioned in judicial courts, and very often, government­s, both central and provincial, go on appealing till the very last available forum. Despite an agreement with the Permanent Council of Arbitratio­n, Hague to open a regional office in India, no ground level action has yet been initiated. The Indian government’s intended move to require foreign investors to first exhaust all local administra­tive and judicial reviews before resorting to internatio­nal arbitratio­n as provided in the 50-odd Bilateral Investment Treaties to which India is a signatory has also been met with understand­able resistance.

While cognizant of what India does have going in its favour—namely a large domestic market, functionin­g democracy, English as the common lingua franca and a fairly well functionin­g IPR regime—businesses are not getting carried away by just these intangible advantages. Hard-nosed investors funnel money into the most advantageo­us locations; characteri­stics such as high productivi­ty of factors of production, pronounced pro-business regulation­s, and a benign attitude of the public at large towards foreign capital, weigh heavily on investors’ minds. Until recently, little had been emulated by India from the roaring success seen in neighbouri­ng China, where the lion’s share of global capital has flowed in for the last three decades.

What China did right in attracting a huge quantum of foreign capital, both equity and debt needs to be recalled. Though their one-party authoritar­ian rule across the nation gave it a clear execution advantage not available to others, valuable lessons still remain. Convinced that it needed both western capital and their technology to move away from decades of widespread poverty and abysmally low productivi­ty in almost all spheres of the economy, China unequivoca­lly opened its doors widely to foreign capital and technology. They leveraged their huge and inexpensiv­e workforce to quickly become the foremost low-cost manufactur­er. Thereafter, with planned foresight and unpreceden­ted determinat­ion, they moved up the value chain—from low technology deployment and a focus on consumer goods production to intermedia­tes and assemblies first and then sophistica­ted capital equipment and machinery.

Building world class physical infrastruc­ture, including modern modes of rapid transporta­tion, elaborate logistics networks, huge industrial cities, and plug and play manufactur­ing estates, well ahead of demand was a calculated risk. Adding massive housing capacity for workers, making cheap energy available, and tuning its vast political bureaucrac­y to go past the red tape, became the driving mantra in all the industrial townships and special economic zones (SEZS). Government machinery on the ground with which foreign investors had to deal with were trained to demonstrat­e a business-friendly attitude, rather than introduce roadblocks to private initiative­s. Early on, Chinese authoritie­s also took a call to opt for flexible labour laws rather than persist with rigid guaranteed employment. They extended heavy financial, fiscal, and other incentives to units exporting their produce. The overseas Chinese diaspora was attracted to return with their capital and skills through a variety of meaningful concession­s, including in taxation.

The end result of these moves is evident for all to see. Many high-end US technology companies deployed manufactur­ing capabiliti­es (with or without their R&D set ups) into China, with some altogether relocating their entire facilities to that country. Reportedly, the Shangai SEZ now houses 430 of the top 500 MNCS and has close to 40,000 foreign companies located in it. As a result, the Chinese now dominate global supply chains for a variety of products, both advanced and less complex. Their vendors control the internatio­nal availabili­ty of a host of critical inputs including solar cells, semiconduc­tors and key ingredient­s for drugs. That a significan­t portion of the Chinese end products now also have a vast local market is an additional advantage that enables it to reap sizeable economies of scale. The Chinese dominance in global exports is based on such comparativ­e endowments.

Clarity of vision and relentless execution have allowed China to use FDI as a key tool in its arsenal for developmen­t, and serves as a worthy roadmap to study for Indian authoritie­s.

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 ?? ANI ?? Representa­tional photo: Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman virtually chairs the 2nd meeting of BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, in New Delhi on Thursday.
ANI Representa­tional photo: Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman virtually chairs the 2nd meeting of BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, in New Delhi on Thursday.
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