HOW CHINA BUYS FOREIGN POLITICIANS: A CASE STUDY

a small buffer, required to change the Constitution. Sogavare is on record as wanting to move the next election from 2023 to 2024, something that would require a constitutional change. And who knows what else he and/or Beijing would like to “adjust”?

MALAITA PETITION

One of the banes of supporters of Beijing is Malaita. Malaita is the most populous province in the Solomon Islands. It hasn’t been pillaged of its resources, is traditionally fiercely independent, and is the centre of some of the strongest resistance to “the switch” from the Taiwan to the PRC.

Also in August, a petition was submitted raising concerns about the relationship between the PRC, the central government and Malaita Province. The content of the petition describes and distills a process seen all along the Belt and Road, and beyond. Including:

* Lack of consultation with the local population: the central “government failed to consult in any way to secure the consent of our people of Malaita regarding the diplomatic switch from the ROC to the PRC”.

* Use of the PRC doctrine of the Three Warfares (psychological, media and lawfare) to apply pressure: the “government continually harasses the [local] government of Malaita through individuals, the media and even through the abuse of legal process”.

* Deployment of “overseas Chinese” to take over all possible sectors of the economy: the “government has facilitated an influx of Chinese labour under the guide [sic.] of PRC funded projects instead to ensure jobs for Solomon Islanders. This leading to the continued loss of labour and business which are taking over all business activities in the Solomon Islands resulting in the highest unemployment rate in Solomon Islands history.”

* Seeming economic punishment for not giving in to the PRC: the “Government through its Minister of Communications and Aviation intends to bring or already had brought to Cabinet a paper seeking to withdraw all SIRAP World Bank Project from Malaita Province.” They ask that the government “Refrain from weaponing infrastructure development in Malaita and specifically keep the World Bank SIIRAP Project on Malaita province alive according to the World Bank procurement guidelines”.

The petition also brings up the 2000 Townsville Peace Agreement, signed when Sogavare was also in power, which committed the central government to give Malaita more autonomy. It states that has that yet to happen.

Rather, it seems that—partially due to pressure from Beijing—the central government is trying to exert more control over Malaita to quell anti-china dissent and gain access to its resources for Chinese companies.

This is extremely dangerous as the last Solomons civil war is still a fresh memory.

LOCAL LEVEL INTIMIDATION

Again in August, at the local level, Israel Trevor Sibia, a Pastor from Guadalcanal— another restive region— posted a video expressing his concern at the economic and social disruption in his community caused by newly arrived foreigners (one can guess from where).

The local MP lodged a complaint against him, reportedly stating that the video was racist. The police went to his home, reportedly prompting his wife to say, “oh are we a communist country now?!”

Maybe not. Yet. But the added pressures being put on the Solomons by Beijing in just two years are already turning social and economic cracks into fissures that risk bursting the country apart—potentially justifying increasingly repressive centralized control.

Of course, China probably doesn’t mind—in fact it generally benefits when countries in which it has a toe-hold in become unstable, opening the way for more authoritarianism. Democratic countries often respond by shying-away, and an increasingly isolated local government, concerned about its own survival, become even more dependent on the PRC.

The last time there was a civil war in the Solomons, it was Australia that led a peacekeeping mission. This time, if things go bad, China could generously offer to come to the rescue, perhaps with the support of those grateful 39 MPS.

The way back from the ledge requires proper engagement from partners such as the United States and Australia—and if it can, India. The Solomons wouldn’t have been so tempted by the PRC’S offer in 2019 in the first place, had those relationships (and others) been more effective.

Now, rather than appeasing Beijing’s proxies for fear of rocking the boat (a boat that is sailing towards the South China Sea), partners need to take a close look at the sort of things the Malaita petition brings up, and support citizens who want to see a stable, secure, cohesive and free Solomon Islands.

But it needs to be fast. The cracks are starting to show, other countries in the region (and beyond) are going through similar near takeovers, and many are watching to see what will happen in the Solomons.

No one wants yet another avoidable tragedy—a people dispossessed in their own land and at each other’s throats, while Beijing provides its version of security and carts off the spoils. But if those fighting for their country aren’t supported, it will happen. Again. And again.

Cleo Paskal is a The Sunday Guardian Special Correspondent as well as Nonresident Senior Fellow for the Indo-pacific at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.