LENNYOVERBOARD 20MINUTESBEFORE ALARMWASRAISED
AN INVESTIGATION into the death of fisherman Leonard (Lenny) Hughes has determined that the alarm was raised only after the skipper tried and failed to save his drowning colleague.
Last Friday, The Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) published its report into its investigation into Mr Hughes’ death off the FV Kerri Heather east of Kilmichael Point, Arklow, on November 16, 2016.
The report found that on the morning of November 16 the FV Kerri Heather left Arklow with three people including 49-year-old Lenny Hughes on board. The trio were heading to sea to lift and bait lines of pots. None of the three was wearing a personal floatation device.
At around 9 a.m. as the second line of pots was being hauled, Mr Hughes fell overboard. Despite immediate attempts to recover him, and a subsequent search by lifeboats, fishing vessels and helicopters, his body was not recovered.
Searches continued until December 2, without any body being found. On January 11, 2017, a body was recovered on the south west coast of Anglesey and was subsequently identified as Mr Hughes.
The FV Kerri Heather is a half decked wooden vessel while the fore part was decked with a steel wheelhouse and cabin in the forecastle. The vessel had a hydraulic pot hauler on the starboard side just outside the wheelhouse door. The hydraulic power was supplied by a pump driven from the main engine. There was a steel ramp on the starboard side from which the pots were stored and launched.
On the day of Mr Hughes’ death, the boat was crewed by Wayne e Walker, who had been a skipper for four months s and a fisherman for 12 2 years, Mr Hughes, who o was an experienced fish- erman, and a Polish man n who was in his early twenties and was fishing for four days.
Both Mr Walker and Mr Hughes had completed Bord Iascaigh Mhara (BIM) basic training and none of f the crew had a radio operator’s certificate.
There was a number of safety equipment on board, including three personal floatation devices with personal locator beacons, three life-jackets, two life rings and two parachute flares.
There was also two very high frequency radios, a GPS chart plotter and a Furuno radar.
The FV Kerri Heather held a Declaration of Compliance (DOC) with the Code of Practice for the Design, Construction, Equipment and Operation of Small Fishing Vessels following a survey in April 2016 and the cert stated the number of crew was two. However, Mr Walker said he had declared a skipper and two crew because he believed two crew to mean in addition to the skipper. He was of the opinion that there was sufficient safety equipment for three people when surveyed.
The MIB report found that at the time of the incident the FV Kerri Heather wasn’t compliant with the Code of Practice because it was valid only for two crew members and Mr Walker didn’t have a required radio operator’s cert. In addition one crew member didn’t have the required safety training and there was also no ‘Fishing Vessel Safety Statement’ on board.
The weather on the day of the accident was fine and clear according to Met Éireann reports.
The MIB report said that Mr Hughes fell from the deck and said he was not wearing his personal floatation device and there was unsafe working operations at play.
After a distress call was made from the FV Kerri Heather at 9.20 a.m. the Marine Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) Dublin took control of the situation.
Arklow Lifeboat and the SAR Helicopter R117 were tasked and arrived on site by 10 a.m. Searching continued with the addition of Wicklow and Rosslare Lifeboats and fishing vessels from Arklow until nightfall. Searches by Arklow Lifeboat and local fishing boats continued, weather permitting, until December. 2
Mr Walker told the board that the FV Kerri Heather needed three people on board to carry out the type of fishing it was engaged in and he wouldn’t go to sea without two crew members in addition to himself.
On the day of the incident, none of the crew were wearing personal floatation devices and there had been no vessel familiarisation or safety discussion before departure.
Mr Hughes, who was an experienced fisherman, had not sailed on the FV Kerri Heather before. On the day in question he was replacing one of the usual crew members. He had recently completed the BIM safety training course and was employed on another vessel based in Arklow Harbour on a regular basis.
The second crew member, a Polish man, had just started fishing and it was his fourth day out on the FV Kerri Heather. He had not completed any safety training.
The weather forecast was for max force seven with a small craft warning in place.
Mr Walker didn’t think the sea would be too rough to haul pots as the wind direction was from the south west and to veer westerly. As they would be working relatively close to the shore and be in the lee of the land, they would be relatively sheltered.
The crew hauled, bailed and shot the first line of pots by 9 a.m. and started to haul the second line.
Mr Walker was in the wheelhouse manoeuvring the boat, Mr Hughes was hauling the pots on the pothauler just outside the wheelhouse door and the Polish man was on the aft deck preparing the bait.
The height of the bulwark at this point was 720 mm, which is approximately mid-way between a person’s knee and hip.
The anchor for the second s line of pots had been b hauled out of the water and was placed on the ramp beside the h hauler. At this point, Mr H Hughes who was on the pothauler p fell overboard.
Mr Walker and the second man both said that the first anchor to the line of pots had been hauled h on board and was placed on the forward end of the ramp. Mr Walker was just coming out of the wheelhouse to t take over the hauling i when he heard a ‘wwhack’ and the Polish man m shouted ‘ he has gone overboard’. o
The Polish man said he saw s Mr Hughes and the anchor a go overboard at the th same time.
The rope, hauling the pots, had also come off the pothauler as the vessel was reported to have drifted with the wind and tide, and was not secured to the line of pots.
The exact order of events is not clear. Either the line came off the pothauler and then the anchor pulled Mr Hughes overboard, or he fell overboard and having let go the line, it came off the hauler and the anchor was pulled overboard behind him.
Mr Walker threw a life-jacket into the water but Mr Hughes did not reach for it. He was not responding to calls from Mr Walker or attempting to swim. Mr Walker then threw the line with the small grapple used to pick up the buoys for the pots. This landed beside Mr Hughes but he did not reach for it.
At that stage Mr Walker grabbed a life-jacket and jumped into the water. He swam to Mr Hughes and caught hold of his oilskin jacket. He was trying to don his own life-jacket at the same time and he lost his grip on Mr Hughes who slipped away and sank into the water.
There was no response from Mr Hughes during this time.
Both Mr Walker and Mr Hughes had drifted away from the FV Kerri Heather and Mr Walker shouted at the other man to operate the engine and bring the boat back over to him.
He then managed to grab a rope on the stern and haul himself back on board.
Once on board, he pressed the distress button on the VHF which was timed on receipt at 9.20 a.m. Once the distress call was received the MRCC Dublin took charge and tasked the Arklow Lifeboat and the SAR Helicopter.
The Arklow lifeboat arrived at 9.46 a.m. and found Mr Walker back on board the FV Kerri Heather dressed in jeans and a tee shirt. He was in the first stages of hypothermia.
The lifeboat crew suggested that Mr Walker be brought back to Arklow on board the lifeboat and the lifeboat crew would take the FV Kerri Heather back to port. However, Mr Walker refused the offer and the lifeboat crew gave him a jacket and a blanket.
The FV Kerri Heather was subsequently directed back to Arklow by the MRCC Dublin and Mr Walker was treated for hypothermia by an ambulance crew on arrival.
The Search and Rescue helicopter arrived at 10 a.m. while the Wicklow and Rosslare lifeboats joined in the search, as did other vessels from Arklow.
Mr Hughes body was found on the south west coast of Anglesey in north Wales on January 11 and a post mortem report concluded death was due to drowning.
The report found that the bulwark height on the FV Kerri Heather of 720mm could increase the risk of falling overboard to the person operating the pot hauler. A sudden motion of the vessel could unbalance the operator and pitch him over the side.
Additionally, the boat was hauling
(Photo: Arklow RNLI).
pots in a three-knot tide and the strong westerly wind, which would put an increased strain on the hauler. The anchor was placed on the ramp behind the operator and not secured. Loss of tension of the line on the pot hauler would cause the pot line to slip and pull the anchor back overboard, hitting the man on the hauler as it went. Loss of control could be due to one of the lines to a pot, with its knot passing over the pot hauler or due to the line slipping off the pothauler as the vessel sheered (i.e. swinging from side to side from the direct course), or a combination of both.
The report found that Mr Hughes was ‘unconscious’ saying ‘ he possibly hit his head on the pot hauler as he went overboard or the anchor hit him when he was in the water. It went on to say that given the intensive searches for Mr Hughes his recovery would have been ‘more likely’ had he been wearing his personal floatation device.
It said that the normal procedure when there is a man overboard situation is to move the boat alongside the casualty and then secure him alongside with a line or a boathook until a means of lifting on board can be rigged.
It is also recommended that an immediate Mayday call be made by radio.
Mr Walker said that in his twelve years serving on fishing vessels, he never took part in a man overboard drill or other safety drill except for a couple of fire drills.
The report found that Mr Walker ‘put his own life at risk, particularly as the vessel was drifting because of the wind and strong tidal current. The second crewman who was left on board, had no training or knowledge on how to operate the engines, steering and the safety equipment.’
According to the report the basic safety training Mr Walker obtained was not adequate for the responsibilities of a skipper of a fishing vessel, which requires the ability to assess the safety risks for all operations on the vessel.
The report found that Mr Hughes was ‘most likely concussed or unconscious, after he fell overboard, as he did not attempt to swim or stay afloat. He did not respond to the actions of the skipper nor attempt to grab on to the skipper when they were in the water together.
‘ The lack of preparation, procedure or drills for a man overboard situation resulted in a delay of 20 minutes before the alarm was raised.
‘ The response of the skipper to the emergency was not in accordance with good practice and could have