This terrible war is shifting the balance of power in Europe away from Paris and Berlin
Putin’s fighting with even more savagery than Stalin – but ANDREW NEIL believes Western firepower will prevail, with profound consequences
AYEAR ago, Russia was on the brink of attacking Ukraine and the Western military consensus was that Kyiv would fall within three days of the invaders crossing the border.
Yet as we approach the first anniversary of the worst conflagration on European soil since the Second World War, the Ukrainian capital remains unconquered – and weapons are pouring into Ukraine as it gears up for an early spring offensive to take back the land the Russians still occupy.
It is a remarkable achievement by Ukraine, a testament to the grit, tenacity and patriotism of its people and the bravery and professionalism of its armed forces.
Of course it could not have survived without the military hardware provided by its Western allies, which continues to be supplied in ever greater quantities and lethality.
It means President Putin has lost his second great gamble in under 12 months. The first was that Ukraine would quickly crumble in the face of Russian might. He was speedily disabused of that in the forests north of Kyiv, where his forces had to retreat in the face of fierce Ukrainian resistance. His ‘three-day war’ is now, as I write, on day 337.
His second failed gamble was that, even if the war did drift on, Western unity would dissolve over time. He wasn’t alone in thinking that. Last autumn I bumped into a former defence secretary from a Labour government in Britain – a staunch supporter of Ukraine – who opined that the West’s united front would fracture as energy prices soared and public opinion soured.
He – and the many politicians and pundits who thought like him – could not have been more wrong. Far from falling out, Ukraine’s allies have today never been more united. Yes, there have been hiccups along the way, most notably German prevarication and France’s perennial desire to do its own thing.
This has sometimes delayed supplying weapons that Ukraine desperately needs.
But, overall, the pro-Ukraine alliance has not just stayed firm, it has ramped up its support, as this week’s agreement (after weeks of dithering on Germany’s part) to send a variety of Western main battle tanks has underlined.
The scale of military aid going to Ukraine now is staggering. And much more, I’m assured, than is being made public.
Germany’s belated decision to send its highly-regarded Leopard 2 tanks unlocks the ability of Poland, Spain and others to send their Leopards too. Holland is talking about buying the 18 Leopard 2s it leases from Germany and then donating them to Ukraine.
MEANWHILE, Britain has already committed to providing 14 of its Challenger tanks. America will send its M1 Abrams tanks too, on top of 200 well-armed fighting vehicles already on their way. Denmark is handing over the entire stock of its French-made Caesar howitzers.
All this and more will be crucial if Ukraine’s early spring offensive on Russian forces dug in across the east of the country is to succeed.
Even with the array of sophisticated armour and artillery now being mustered by Ukraine, it will not be easy.
Putin’s autumn mobilisation resulted in the call-up of 300,000 fresh troops. More will follow. They will not be properly trained or armed. But Putin, in his third great gamble, is betting that sheer numbers will determine the outcome.
He is resorting to the Joseph Stalin way of war. During the Second World War, Russia’s great dictator sent wave after wave of Russian troops to attack the invading Nazis, with no regard for casualties. It worked, though at a cost in lives lost measured in millions. Stalin didn’t care.
Neither does Putin. He’s even resurrected Stalin’s old war leader title – Supreme Commander-in-Chief – for himself. The Great Patriotic War, as the Kremlin describes the war against the Nazis, is now officially deemed to be the most important event in Russia’s long history.
With 60% of Russians now regarding Stalin positively – more than any other Russian, even Peter the Great – this is all designed to resonate to Putin’s advantage with Russian opinion.
He has even revived Stalin’s creation of ‘penal battalions’ made up of prisoners released to fight and promised freedom if they survive their deployment as cannon fodder.
Sometimes Putin even manages to surpass his hero’s barbarity. Stalin had deserters shot if they ran away from the frontline. In Ukraine their heads are smashed with sledgehammers.
So Ukraine will be up against a huge, formidable, if somewhat ragtag, force.
Putin’s human-wave kamikaze tactics have already resulted in the Russians taking the eastern town of Soledar, though at incredible cost in lost Russian lives.
But the discipline and battlehardened professionalism of Ukraine’s forces, coupled with the heavy modern weapons increasingly at their disposal, should allow it to prevail.
We should hope so, for this brutal and unnecessary war will not end as long as Russia occupies the huge chunks of eastern Ukraine it still does.
The Ukrainian strategy is to take back as much of the east as it can, including striking southeast to the Sea of Azov, cutting off the land-bridge between Russian-occupied Crimea and Russia proper, and retaking its eastern coastline.
All this is the minimum Kyiv requires before it will contemplate peace negotiations.
President Zelensky also talks as if the return of Crimea (which Russia occupied in 2014) and the eastern part of the Donbas (which borders Russia and was under effective Russian control before the invasion) are also prerequisites for peace. The Americans are not so sure.
Washington fears that attempts to retake Crimea by force could be a step too far for Ukraine. The US State Department, the Pentagon and the National Security Council are all hard at work devising a post-war architecture for Ukraine. Though nothing has been finally decided, the broad outlines are clear.
THE return of all Ukrainian lands seized by Russia since the invasion (regarded as non-negotiable); possible demilitarised, autonomous status within Ukraine for eastern Donbas; and a demilitarised Crimea whose political status would be deferred, perhaps pending a UN-regulated referendum allowing its people to determine if they want to be Russian or Ukrainian.
America is determined that Ukraine will never again be vulnerable to Russian invasion, so plans are being devised to create a modern, well-armed Ukrainian military, with an economic Marshall Plan, part financed by Russian reparations, to rebuild the country’s infrastructure.
Washington is also keen that Ukraine be allowed to join the EU (though not, so far, Nato). America’s public position is that the substance of any peace settlement is a matter for Ukraine. But the US has provided more military hardware to Ukraine than its 50odd other allies put together.
Ukraine would be in no position to mount any kind of spring offensive but for America. This will give the US clout in Kyiv when it comes to the contours of a peace deal.
Whether Putin could stomach any kind of arrangement acceptable to Ukraine and the Americans is another matter.
There is less concern in Washington about what he might do with his back to the wall. The US regards Moscow’s constant hints about resorting to nuclear weapons as Kremlin disinformation designed to intimidate the more fretful members of the Western alliance and move attention away from the appalling performance of Russia’s conventional forces.
Whether Putin survives or departs, its Ukrainian escapade has set Russia back for a generation. It is a fossil-fuel power in a net-zero world, with a fast declining population and an economy that generates almost no goods or services that the rest of the world wants. As Ukraine is rebuilt after the war, the contrast between the two countries will be ever more stark.
Not just Ukraine will be transformed post-war. So will the balance of power in Europe. The locus of that power is
shifting east. From the start of this war, support for Ukraine has been rallied by Poland and the Baltic States.
It is they who have driven policy, filling the vacuum left by Germany and France, two countries paralysed into inaction, agonising about how best to maintain the ties with Moscow that they had spent so long cultivating.
By contrast, Eastern Europe’s memories are dominated by its recent, protracted Soviet occupation. It had no desire to return to life under the Russian yoke.
Indeed, it wasn’t very keen to cede too much power to Brussels either. It felt vindicated in its warnings that Putin’s Russia had imperialist ambitions, that the Russian president had the makings of a dictatorial aggressor and that Germany was making a huge strategic error by becoming over-reliant on Russian gas.
For years Berlin and Paris ignored these fears or refused to take them seriously.
When countries such as Poland warned invasion was imminent, France and Germany denied it would happen.
As Poland and the Baltic states tried to muster a robust Western response to the invasion, French president Macron was still trying to appease Putin, while Germany was trying to come to terms with the fact that its foreign and energy strategies were smashed to smithereens.
Ironically, one western European country that took Eastern Europe’s warnings seriously was Britain. To his credit, former prime minister Boris Johnson shared their analysis of the Russian threat and the need to come to Ukraine’s aid.
Paris and Berlin have been in command of the EU since its inception as the Common Market but it is hard to see, post-Ukraine, their status continuing unaffected.
With neutral Sweden and Finland seeking membership of Nato, a new alliance of Nordic, Eastern European and Baltic states is emerging to which power will gravitate. In many ways London is closer in attitudes to this alliance than Paris or Berlin .
AMERICA, too, often finds Eastern Europe more on its wavelength than most west European nations. Washington is especially impressed that Poland is in the process of doubling the size of its armed forces.
The US is delighted that Sweden and Finland want to join Nato. France, not so much. When America and Nato are dominant in European affairs, France feels sidelined because it is often hostile to American power and only semi-attached to the military alliance it dominates.
President Macron’s dream of a European defence ‘autonomous’ of the American shield is in tatters. The East Europeans don’t trust the rest of Europe to defend them. They are more fully invested in Nato, which guarantees their freedom. That makes America, which dominates Nato, and Britain, the biggest Nato military power in Europe, natural allies for Europe’s new alliance of the North and East.
The war in Ukraine will redraw the map of Europe in a good way. Power will move from ‘old’ Europe to ‘new’ Europe, invigorating the continent in the process as it gradually escapes the dead hands of Paris and Berlin.
It will result in a Europe which America will feel more inclined to continue to support.
A brave new world is beckoning in ways nobody could have imagined 12 short months ago.