Ireland’s security will suffer if UK’s military drifts away from the EU
BRITISH Prime Minister Theresa May’s speech in Munich last month has put European security firmly on the Brexit agenda. In it, she called for a wide-ranging post-Brexit security partnership between the UK and the European Union. This call deserves our full support.
The draft EU Withdrawal Plan, issued on Wednesday, implies such a possible agreement in addressing transitional arrangements covering the EU-UK relationship in the areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy.
So far, the security and defence implications of Brexit have been largely overshadowed by political and economic issues.
Moreover, in Ireland, security concerns are still narrowly confined to the consequences of a hard Border potentially undermining the Good Friday Agreement (GFA).
In this regard, and since the GFA was a crucial element in securing peace, the fear is that its even partial unravelling would reopen a spiral of violence. At least, that is part of the argument being used by the Government – and which has been accepted by the EU Commission – in support of avoiding a hard Border between the Republic and the North.
However, the case to support this argument is more nuanced. True, the return of soft targets, such as customs posts, and any supporting security presence could provide an opportunity for the men of violence to resume their ‘war’.
Such a presence of soft targets could not be avoided entirely, even if electronic measures were extensively introduced.
But the presence of a hard Border alone is unlikely to be the catalyst for a breakdown in security.
The biggest threat to the GFA would still be the failure of power-sharing in Northern Ireland, which could happen with or without Brexit.
Nor am I ignoring Garda and military intelligence warnings of dissident subversive groups using a hard Border to escalate their attacks. But such groups were there before Brexit and will remain an ongoing problem.
The Border issue aside, Brexit has much wider implications for Irish and EU security interests.
The UK is a significant military power. Its withdrawal from the EU military institutions will be a big blow to the military capabilities of the EU, just as the EU is trying to enhance its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and widen its peacekeeping role.
It is in the EU’s and Ireland’s interests to be able to call on UK military assets after Brexit.
Hopefully, Brexit negotiations will cover continued UK participation in EU CSDP missions. If not, EU member states may have to make up the shortfall from their own resources. The UK negotiators know they have an important card to play with their military assets. Could a 27+1 solution be found? The impact of UK withdrawal from the EU’s military structures will have other implications, changing the power balance that has existed in the EU Military Committee.
France and the UK, whose joint initiatives brought about the creation of the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff, have longstanding differing views on European security.
In the past, this caused tensions in the EU’s political structure, spilling over into the Military Committee and its working group.
As a former participant, I remember endless battles between the UK and France in these forums and often wondered if anything had changed in the UK and French military mindsets since Trafalgar and Waterloo.
France may have lost both battles, but with Brexit it has won the ‘war’ in the EU. From now on, expect France and Germany to accelerate movement towards a more integrated EU.
PERHAPS the most sensitive security-related area that could be affected by Brexit will be information-sharing. The withdrawal of UK staff, police and military from EU institutions will undoubtedly have a negative effect, especially in countering terrorism and cyberwarfare.
From an Irish point of view, the strategic reality of the UK being our next-door neighbour emphasises the importance of intelligencesharing and in keeping bilateral contacts going after Brexit.
Last, but not least, are the unintended consequences of Brexit. Last year, some feared that it could lead to the break-up of the EU. That fear has largely receded and there is a new-found confidence in the Union. The EU will readjust to Brexit and move on.
But what about the UK? Brexit could, if the UK economy declines, precipitate a break-up of the UK, with Scotland leading the way. At some point, the possibility of a united Ireland, in some form, has to be considered.
It would be an understatement to say that such a development would impact on all security areas.
One defence policy for the whole island of Ireland? With North and South integrated, could the Defence Forces have – shudder the thought! – Northern Irish officers, who may not even speak Irish, serving on the staff of our most precious military institution, the Military College?
Let’s await this autumn’s three-year review of the White Paper on Defence and see how the Government takes on board the Brexit factor.
Theresa May’s enigmatic mantra of “Brexit means Brexit” could yet come back to haunt us.
Colonel Dorcha Lee (retired) is a former Irish Military Adviser in Brussels and former Irish military representative to the Western European Union and the European Union.
The biggest threat to the Good Friday Agreement would still be the failure of power-sharing