Our neutrality looks dated in a new Europe
WHEN politicians go public with proposals which we know will cost them votes, it is time to sit up and pay attention.
The four current Fine Gael MEPs (FG4) have just done that by making a convincing, if probably unpopular, case for changing our defence and security policy.
Their paper, ‘Ireland and the EU, defending our Common European Home’, published last Friday, is nevertheless an important contribution to the debate, a debate that is long overdue.
It will no doubt prove controversial and draw fire from several entrenched positions. After all, it takes courage to confront the ideologues of perpetual neutrality.
I agree with the main idea of the paper in that Ireland should position itself to support the emerging European Defence Union. I do not agree with limiting, at this stage, what form such a Defence Union might take. A ‘European Army’ should not be ruled out, as this could be one useful component in any future collective defence.
I also disagree that European defence should be non-nuclear. As long as there is a potential threat of nuclear attack against Europe, Europe should have its own nuclear capability, however limited, as a deterrent.
The paper challenges two key commitments of the White Paper on Defence 2015, in calling on the Government to re-examine Ireland’s position as a neutral country, and to review the Triple Lock. The Triple Lock refers to the three (selfimposed) conditions that should be met before troops are deployed on overseas peace-support missions; a Government decision, Dáil approval, and UN authorisation.
Why now, and what has changed, since autumn 2015, that would prompt such a radical shift in our defence policy?
The first obvious consideration is the change of government. Labour’s presence in government, in 2015, ruled out changes to our neutrality policy, or changes to the Triple Lock. But Labour is no longer in government, and it remains to be seen how the Independent Alliance and independent members of government might react to the proposed changes.
Since the Government is required to produce a three-year review of the White Paper this autumn, it will have to decide fairly quickly, one way or the other, on the FG4 proposal.
If a week is a long time in politics, three years is an eon. The threats from terrorism, cyber warfare and Russia, identified in the FG4 paper, were not so clear then as they are now.
Sceptics still dismiss the threat from Russia, but the evidence against it is mounting. This includes its invasion of Georgia in 2008, military takeover of Crimea in 2014, and military support for pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine. Russian propaganda and cyber attacks against the Baltic states go largely unreported in the West but are very real.
Is war with Russia feasible? In a fictionalised account entitled, ‘War with Russia’ (published by Coronet, 2016), General Richard Shirreff, a former Nato Deputy Supreme Commander, explains very logically how it could happen.
Still, the three current threats to the EU, as identified by the FG4, however real and present, are not necessarily long-term. Terrorism could be reduced to an ‘acceptable’ level, if society is prepared to support some restrictions on civil liberties. Cyber attacks will be a greatly reduced threat once technology advances to the point where the cyber attackers can be identified in real time, thus allowing immediate, and possibly military, retaliation.
AND Russia? Who knows? Maybe post-Putin Russia might even want to join the EU. However, it is always safer to consider worst-case scenarios, and risk assessments based on considering threats in the wider and historical context would conclude in favour of a European Defence Union.
The European Parliament was, until recent times, the least likely EU institution to push for increased spending on defence, or to take initiatives in enhancing European security and defence. Some years ago, during a debate on defence issues, the then-president of the parliament Pat Cox called for a show of hands on who was in favour of increased defence spending. Only one hand went up, that of French MEP General Philippe Morillon.
Fast-forward to late 2016 and much has changed. In its November 2016 resolution on the European Defence Union, the parliament called on all member states to increase defence spending to 2pc of GDP, more than four times Ireland’s defence budget. This was not mentioned by the FG4.
The paper is also silent on the application of the deterrent principle to Irish defence. Nor does it identify what military capabilities would be necessary to achieve a credible deterrent, as a neutral country, or as a participant in a European Defence Union. As the document is aimed at public opinion, greater elaboration on defence spending options would have been useful.
Nevertheless, it is a very good political discussion paper. Moreover, its arrival signals a more open approach by the leading Government party to our security and defence policy, especially in keeping the public informed.
Bon courage, FG4!
Europe should have its own nuclear capability, however limited, as a deterrent
Colonel Dorcha Lee (retd) is a former Irish Military Advisor in Brussels, and former military representative to the WEU and the EU