Cost of Varadkar’s Brexit tactics is growing
WHILE most commentary on Brexit here focuses on how badly the British government has miscalculated aspects of that country’s departure from the EU, our own Government’s hardball tactics and strategy have come in for much less scrutiny. That is despite the costs already incurred, and the risks, which could end up causing an even more damaging Brexit than might be the case with a more subtle approach.
The Government’s top priority in the talks is that Brexit will change absolutely nothing with regards to the interaction of the two jurisdictions on this island. However desirable, it is a highly ambitious objective. It is most probably unachievable. Fighting a battle you will ultimately lose, with all the costs and none of the gains, is rarely a good idea in any context.
The highest-risk part of the Government’s game-plan is the proposal that Northern Ireland leaves the UK’s customs union and single market so that it can stay in the EU’s versions of those free market mechanisms (contrary to some suggestions, it is not possible to be in two different customs unions/single markets at the same time, so a have-your-cake-and-eat-it option for the North is not on offer).
Since it was made explicit last November that Ireland and the EU side wanted to have as a backstop the option that Northern Ireland alone would remain a de facto part of the EU, important relationships have suffered. As the Taoiseach admitted in a speech in the US last week, his government’s pushing of the backstop has come at the cost of alienating the minority tradition on this island. It has also been viewed in Britain, including among many who oppose Brexit and who are instinctively well disposed towards Ireland, as an attempt to interfere in their country’s constitutional order. The costs will rise a great deal if the Border issue causes the talks to break down and a no-deal Brexit takes place.
Of all possible Brexit outcomes, having the North remain a de facto part of the EU while the UK departs is the least likely. There are four reasons that make it so unlikely.
CONSTITUTIONAL/TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
In democratic Europe, the term “integrity” is not used much in relation to territory and constitutional status. That is because in our corner of the world borders are largely settled and most states do not feel threatened. Almost everywhere else on the planet, politicians and bureaucrats use the term much more frequently because states are more vulnerable to external and internal threat (I experienced this at first hand as a diplomat when sitting around conference tables with Europeans on one side and North Africans and Middle Eastern representatives on the other).
But when the superstructure of states is threatened, integrity issues quickly and forcefully come to the fore. This was to be seen late last year in the reaction of the Spanish government to Catalan attempts to secede unilaterally from Spain.
The British prime minister, Theresa May, has stated that no UK leader could accept the solution to the Irish question proposed by the EU last month, involving a part of the UK leaving that country’s customs union and single market. Her position should not be dismissed as the desperate utterances of someone who leads a party in profound crisis, although that is indeed the case. The position reflects the view of the broad centre of Westminster political opinion, of the apparatus of the British state and of public opinion.
It is not hard to see why that view is so widely held. Even in federalised countries – such as Switzerland and the US – where state/cantonal governments exercise all sorts of powers, the competence to regulate commerce remains with central government. That is also the case in the EU, where tariffs on non-EU countries are collectively set in Brussels and regulations affecting traded products are legislated for by the European parliament.
People who argue that devolving trade powers to Northern Ireland won’t make much of a difference because there has already been significant devolution of other powers within the UK in recent decades don’t appear to understand the binary nature of customs union and single market arrangements.
THE PRECEDENT FACTOR
Related to the constitutional integrity issue is the impact a separate arrangement for the North would have on the rest of the UK. Almost immediately after the idea became public last November, the Scottish Nationalist-led government in Edinburgh and the Labour Mayor of London raised the possibility of similar treatment.
The UK is already strained by centrifugal forces. Setting a precedent for one region to have as radically different an arrangement for commerce would only strengthen those forces.
THE POLITICS OF NORTHERN IRELAND
Even if the British government was to agree to the backstop position, it would face the immediate loss of support of the DUP, upon which it depends for its parliamentary majority, and thus lose the capacity to implement any agreement.
It is important to stress the DUP is not alone in this position. The Ulster Unionist Party, which opposed Brexit, now makes common cause with the DUP in its hostility to keeping the North in the EU’s common market if that involves removing it from the UK’s common market.
It is worth noting that while Brexit has deepened divisions between the two communities in the North, as attitudes towards it are largely split along sectarian lines,
the Government’s pushing of the option of separating the North from the rest of the UK has further deepened those divisions by uniting unionism against what is perceived as irredentism from Dublin.
THE ECONOMICS OF NORTHERN IRELAND
Northern Ireland exports four times more to Britain than its does to the Republic. Even when trade with all other EU countries is added to north-south trade, Britain remains much more important for the North’s economy. As such, a border in the Irish Sea would have a greater trade destruction effect than the same level of tariffs and checks between the two jurisdictions on this island.
The economy of Northern Ireland may not be the basket case it is sometimes portrayed as, but choosing the option that would do most damage to its already limited trading sector makes no sense economically.
Brexit is a strategic nightmare for Ireland. It will be very damaging. All efforts must be focused on limiting the damage. The Border issue is now the biggest single risk factor in the Brexit talks. If the Government’s hardball position ends up causing Britain to row back on Brexit, or seek a much softer Brexit, then it will be a diplomatic triumph. But that now looks unlikely. More likely is a breakdown of the talks and a very hard Border. If that happens, the Government’s position will have amounted to a miscalculation of historic proportions.
Brexit is a strategic nightmare for Ireland and will be damaging. All efforts must be focused on limiting the damage