Ireland has to wake up to the reality of modern international espionage activity
PROFESSOR Christopher Clark, in his book ‘The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to War in 1914’, describes how European politicians unwittingly got themselves into a devastating world war. In the period leading up to the conflict, there was a dangerous escalation of tensions where politicians on all sides, sure of their own moral compasses, failed to call a halt and blindly walked the continent into war.
In recent years, politician have again raised tensions with a proxy war being fought in Ukraine, the Middle East – especially Syria – and the media. We live in dangerous times where control of events could easily be lost, similar to 1914. For example, last February a largescale US airstrike killed up to 200 Russian mercenaries in Syria. This week, it was revealed that US forces were again in near conflict with Russians in Syria. There should be concern that some obscure event does not lead to a clash between forces that in our interconnected world can have unintended consequences in unintended places.
The assassination attempts on the Skripals by use of a nerve agent rightly brought condemnation. The UK government determined it was “highly likely” the attack was the work of people operating on behalf of Russia, which it denies. It resulted in a co-ordinated western expulsion of Russian diplomats from embassies, including one diplomat from Ireland.
In its announcements, our Government put a lot of faith in intelligence provided by foreign intelligence services, including the UK, France and Germany.
There are always dangers attached to a blind faith in foreign intelligence agencies.
Firstly, while these services have very good reputations, they also have their own agendas, which may be contrary to our own. Intelligence professionals accept that there is no such thing as a friendly foreign intelligence service. Professionals may work together, but there is also an acceptance not to get too close.
Secondly, there is a danger that the intelligence provided may be what is termed ‘daisy-chain’ intelligence. This is where one intelligence service produces intelligence which it shares with a partner, which then passes it to another and so on until it eventually returns to the originator as original intelligence confirming their original assessment. The invasion of Iraq was a classic example.
Thirdly, there are ‘Black Ops’ where an incident is managed by one force to make it appear that someone else did it.
While the exact percentages may differ according to requirements, in the collection phase of the intelligence cycle, about 80pc of intelligence needed can be gathered from open sources (OSINT), 10pc is collected by co-operation and sharing with foreign partners, and the remaining 10pc, which can be the most difficult, is collected from own sources, both home and abroad, developed over years.
Intelligence is an art, a science and a profession that cannot be urgently created by a government to respond to the latest crisis.
The Skripal case should act as a warning to government that it can be accused of acting on behalf of foreign intelligence agencies.
If Ireland wishes to play a greater role in EU affairs, whether neutral or not, there is a greater need for an independent credible foreign and domestic intelligence capability.
Ireland has a particularly naïve attitude towards intelligence and espionage. For example, it does not deploy military attachés abroad,
Potentially, threats have the ability to destroy the economic well-being of the State
and expects all other nations to have a similar mindset. However, most embassies have someone appointed to conduct intelligence gathering, normally assigned to an embassy in under-cover residential appointments with diplomatic immunity or as illegal spies acting without immunity. There may also be people deployed under deepcover without any contact with their embassy. There are accepted limits as to what these people may do – murder, sabotage and use of nerve agents are considered far beyond the pale.
The Taoiseach, defending EU expulsion of Russian diplomats, said that it was based on solidarity with Britain. He assured us, however, that the Dublin expulsion was based on security advice from Irish intelligence services. It is, of course, a mere coincidence that it happened in concert with the EU expulsions.
IT is said that politicians use intelligence like drunks use lamp-posts, for support not enlightenment. For a number of weeks prior to the expulsions, there was an extraordinary leaking to national news media about Russian activities.
In my opinion, this was a clear breach of the Official Secrets Act. What is most extraordinary is that there was no outrage by Government ministers, opposition politicians or An Garda Síochána. There were no calls for an investigation to find the leakers. There are two possible explanations: the leaks were approved as part of a public influencing campaign or confirms poor counter-intelligence and counter-espionage awareness by those responsible to protect our intelligence.
I spent over 40 years in the Defence Forces, the vast majority spent in security and intelligence appointments. One of military intelligence (J2) functions is to provide periodical assessments on the threats to Ireland and to Irish interests emanating from foreign sources. In recent years, the threats have increased substantially and have become more complex. Potentially, they have the ability to destroy the economic well-being of this State.
During the past week, I have followed the media debate regarding our national intelligence capabilities. Public knowledge, even that of some security commentators, is frighteningly illinformed. Government reaction has not reassured me that the potential damage is being taken seriously. As a state, we need to wise up.
Michael Murphy is a security analyst and a former Lieutenant Colonel in the Defence Forces