Gullible Trump has finally discovered Kim isn’t
US PRESIDENT Donald Trump is desperate for a flashy, big win in foreign policy after a series of less-than-successful stunts. His pull-out from the Iran deal has been widely criticised; his advisers’ prediction that European allies would follow seems highly questionable. Moving the US embassy to Jerusalem touched off mass protests in which around 60 Palestinians were killed. His concession to China on ZTE led to bipartisan scorn. In short, he has put all his eggs in the North Korea basket.
Now, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, taking in Trump’s concession on ZTE, no doubt saw how easily Trump can be manipulated in search of a win.
Kim swiftly demonstrated how Trump’s expectations can be dashed – and how vulnerable the neophyte president is to getting played by Pyongyang.
The Brookings Institution’s Michael O’Hanlon observes that a “no more Mr Nice Guy” stance actually is “more reassuring than the love fests that were happening previously, because they seemed surreal”. There are a couple of ways to read this shift in tone. “Either Kim is now nervous about the whole detente process, given the clear US goals, and wants to shut it down entirely, in which case the summit may not happen at all,” says O’Hanlon. “Or, more likely, he is beginning the bargaining process in earnest, since the Trump administration was misinterpreting what he really meant and really was offering with all his talk of peace and denuclearisation. It’s not going to be that easy, or unilateral on his part, and most of us didn’t think it would be.”
If it is the latter, Trump may be particularly susceptible to Pyongyang’s posturing. Trump’s reliance on “chemistry” with world leaders and penchant for interpreting other countries’ moves – be it the “nice” release of three Americans held in North Korea or a red-carpet welcome in China (the biggest ever!) – in personal terms are counterproductive when dealing with a methodical, aggressive regime. Instead of winning favour, Trump’s childish rhetoric merely confirms adversaries’ belief that they can manipulate him with a few superficial moves.
Nicholas Eberstadt warned in early March: “A good North Korean negotiating team seizes immediate control of the agenda. Typically it will suddenly stop talks, or unexpectedly demand resumption, to throw the other side off its game. If Team North does not take control of the agenda, talks get shut down until Team North says it is time to start talking again.”
In short, if they did not see Pyongyang’s latest manoeuvre coming, Trump and his team are more gullible than we imagined.
Pyongyang also cleverly targeted national security adviser John Bolton, whose touting of the “Libya model” (in which its leader was deposed and then killed in rebel custody) was needlessly provocative. Most US presidents would see North Korea’s threats as
a test and would therefore neither budge from the US negotiating stance nor allow their foe to dictate who advises the president. Whether Trump will crumble (as he did in offering China an olive branch on ZTE) remains to be seen. This should nevertheless serve as a warning for US officials, and Trump specifically, to cut the happy talk and maintain a high degree of scepticism about Pyongyang’s intentions.
Trump’s insistence that “no one” has got as far as he has in negotiations with North Korea is misguided in several respects. First, the US has actually had full-blown agreements with North Korea – which North Korea did not abide by. It’s had many rounds of negotiations with North Korea over the years and even the release of imprisoned Americans. Trump on the other hand has got nothing concrete from North Korea on its denuclearisation; he has not got anything of lasting value. Second, the promise of a summit is already buying Kim some international stature and credibility while raising questions as to whether the US’s South Korean partners have been engaged in some wishful thinking regarding the prospects for denuclearisation. By offering North Korea a summit, Trump is now at risk of losing something of no strategic value – a world-class photo op – if he does not accede to North Korea’s table-setting demands for the summit. And should he ever get into a room with Kim, one can only imagine what he would give up to get his own version of “peace in our time”.