Riot playbook should have catered for all scenarios

WHEN the riot occurred ten days ago, An Garda Síochána was facing many internal problems and conflicts. Paradoxically, there had been excellent results in the serious and organised crime arena.

The single biggest problem was the adequacy and preparedness of the uniform policing component.

For most citizens, the uniform force is the Garda Síochána.

The uniform service is also under grave strain with retention and recruitment problems, particularly in Dublin city centre.

Control of the public space is a key requirement for policing, and the inability to do so can have a very serious impact on public confidence and the rule of law.

I have a career-long interest in public order policing, both operationally and academically. Twenty years ago, I conducted a study relating to public order in Dublin 1 and Dublin 2. Many gardaí were interviewed for this study and I am happy to share the results.

It was evident that street trouble was coming, and Garda Commissioner Drew Harris should have been aware of that. The precise dynamic of the rioting could not have been predicted.

The study of public disorder, particularly in Britain, demonstrates that an unconnected spark could ignite a major disorder.

This is the so-called ‘Flash Points’ model. Mr Harris should have been aware of that dynamic.

The paradigm for that afternoon in Dublin was that gardaí were conducting normal policing in a very busy centre-city location.

The terrible stabbings at Parnell Square then moved the attention to the investigation of those crimes and the initial preservation of the scene. Therefore, the ability to switch to the emerging disorder was a major ask.

Ordinary uniform guards behaved heroically in the face of the mob. The commissioner has suggested that 250 gardaí were necessary to quell the disturbances.

This capacity was not available at the embryonic stage and not for a considerable time.

There was very good intelligence available relating to the prior activities of the rioters.

The example of this activity was to be found in the prolonged protests during the Dáil resumption on September 20. The protests at libraries and the general disruption and intimidation at migrant centres were examples of the new threats.

Similarly, these people’s online activity was evident and that reinforced the message of trouble.

Mr Harris informed the Oireachtas Justice Committee on Wednesday this week: ‘I first spoke about the threat of the rise of the right wing in 2019, at a Policing Authority meeting. We are not alone in this. This is happening across Europe. The events of last Thursday have been replicated in many European capital cities.

‘This starts from a place of prejudice and that prejudice then becomes discrimination and hatred. They seem to be able to gather and garner support. A lot of it is through the internet and through connections into other groups in Europe.’

He added: ‘I would point to the fact that, from September 20 – and this is the first time in my experience that it has been the situation – we have had two public order units on duty every day in Dublin. In effect, that was a recognition on our part that things were tense and there was real difficulty around that community tension.

‘We required 250 public order personnel, which is our largest deployment of public order personnel, in effect, to quell this riot.

‘In between the 50 who were on duty and the 250 who were required, it is very difficult to say what number we should have had immediately available. We would still have needed to draw on resources from elsewhere and to draw on individuals who in effect were offduty to get that number of 250.’

He further added that he had a specific public order command structure in place.

At the same time, we have our own decision-making model which is informed by a code of ethics. There are gold, silver, and bronze public order commanders. Public order units are fully au fait with the law in respect of this.

He also said Assistant Commissioner Paula Hilman is the strategic lead for public order. She was previously a Strategic Firearms Commander and Gold Public Order Commander with the PSNI. Her responses would have been of great interest to the Justice Committee but she was not in attendance.

Commissioner Harris seemed to think 250 officers would have been required to handle a major riot.

This was not a capacity that could have been easily delivered. It seems obvious that a playbook should have been devised to cater for all public order scenarios, not just situations where advance notice was available.

He did not advise the Justice Committee that such an exercise had been conducted or had been contemplated. This simply highlights the need to conduct contingency planning by simulating a major public disorder scenario. Self-evidently if this pre-emptive action is not undertaken it makes it virtually impossible to achieve coherence in a ‘live fire’ situation.

I agree that the equipment and other enhancements, announced within hours of the riot, make policing sense.

This was done, presumably, on the basis that it would provide a greater capacity for successful public order policing. Unfortunately this feels like closing the door after the horse has bolted.

An Garda Síochána has been beset by significant problems during the commissioner’s stewardship. He introduced a dysfunctional Policing/ Operating Model in 2019 and persisted with it, despite its uncertain provenance.

THE time devoted to this model caused a major disruption to normal policing patterns. Morale suffered greatly and problems of retention and recruitment were encountered. Mr Harris consistently denied that morale was poor. This stance, and his views on rostering, culminated in a vote of no confidence in him by the Garda Representative Association.

The Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors marched to Garda HQ to hand in a letter of protest and hold a public meeting.

He operated a severe suspension system for alleged offences, which resulted in members spending years out of the force, many without conclusion.

There were many complaints that he certainly wouldn’t listen and he was seemingly in denial on the

Commissioner should have been aware that street trouble was coming

One of the oddest ideas was to raise the recruitment age limit to 50

morale issue. The latest crisis arose when senior officers declined to apply for the vacant position of Deputy Commissioner.

The minister and the commissioner played mutually supportive roles, at least in public. One of the minister’s oddest recommendations was to raise the recruitment age limit to 50. Similarly, her decision to refer certain issues to the Policing Authority is mystifying, considering that body has no policing expertise and no legal remit.

Self-evidently, An Garda Síochána was not in a happy place in November 2023. Questions remain to be answered.

John O’Brien was formerly head of the International Liaison Protection section in Garda HQ and National Head of Interpol and Europol. He was previously Divisional Chief Superintendent in Louth/Meath and Laois/Offaly Divisions and a former Superintendent, Detective Inspector, Uniform Inspector, and Sergeant. He is also the holder of an MSc in Public Order Studies. He is the author of three books – A Question of Honour: Politics and Policing (2020); Securing the Irish State (2022); and The Troubles Come South (2023).