Will the new American administration be a game changer?
Sunnis make up 85% of the Muslim world, with Shi’ite a poor second at less than 15%. Iran enjoys a definite advantage as the supreme Shi’ite religious and political authority, whereas in the Sunni world every imam can issue his own fatwas – though there is no general obligation to follow them. Even Al-Azhar University in Cairo, with its long history and immense prestige, cannot enforce its edicts.
A case in point is the inability of Sunni nations to agree on the beginning of the fast of Ramadan. Furthermore, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Sunni states have secular institutions based on a constitution, elections, a parliament and separation of powers, though Shari’a law remains the main source of legislation. While religious extremism appears poised to rip apart the Middle East, the lack of a central religious authority – let alone a common policy – severely hampers the ability of Sunni countries to counter the Iranian threat.
Beginning with Ruhollah Khomeini, Tehran has developed a powerful and aggressive army to push its agenda: forcibly “exporting” its Islamic revolution to Sunni countries in the region as a first step before attacking “the great Satan” – America and its allies. It is doing its best to minimize direct interventions and to focus on the organizations it has set up: Hezbollah, Ansar Allah (Yemenite Shi’ites better known as Houthis), the Badr Organization and a score of militias made up of veterans from Afghanistan and Iraq, presented as “popular volunteers” to disguise their terrorist nature.
They are all trained, equipped, financed and directed by Tehran, as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah openly admitted a few months ago. The driving force behind them is Maj.-Gen. Kasem Soleimani, head of the al-Quds Brigade of the Revolutionary Guard, who is usually found hard at work training his men in Iraq and in Syria.
Iran was a major driving force in the disintegration of Iraq, Syria, Yemen and the shambles that remain of Lebanon today. At some point, the Pentagon tried to work with Iran against al-Qaida in Iraq, but Tehran was not interested: a conflicted and unstable Iraq was better suited to the goal of strengthening its hold on the country through the Shi’ite government set up by America.
In Syria, Iran helped President Bashar Assad in the first critical months of the popular uprising, while Washington missed a historic opportunity to back Sunni opposition, help bring down Assad and separate Syria from Iran. Then, in 2013, Tehran had Hezbollah side with Assad to avoid the downfall of the Syrian ruler. In Yemen, the Houthi rebellion, wholly financed by Iran, aims not only to take over the country but also to increase the threat on Saudi Arabia with the aim of controlling the Bab al-Mandab strait, access to the Red Sea.
In 2008, an attempt by a Hezbollah sleeper cell to sabotage the Suez Canal and destabilize Egypt was discovered in time and the terrorists were jailed. Their leader, Sami Shehab, managed to escape during the so-called Arab Spring. Later, Iran applied greater caution in its dealings with Cairo and is now attempting a rapprochement.
Regarding Turkey, the ayatollahs are moving prudently and a dialogue of sorts is ongoing. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan believes they won’t dare attack him, but Tehran is just biding its time, convinced that the fall of Sunni regimes in the region will leave Turkey isolated. All the while the Iranians are ignoring the spirit of the nuclear deal they signed, continuing to build longrange ballistic missiles to implement the vision of Khomeini and waiting for the expiration of the agreement to continue developing their nuclear potential.
Sunni countries are well aware of what is happening, but cannot afford to abandon their own narrow interests to form a common front against Iran or ISIS. Though Kurdish forces had been at the forefront of the battle against Islamic State, Turkey is more interested in fighting them to prevent the creation of a Kurdish autonomy on its border, which would bolster the Kurds of Turkey and their party, the PKK. Therefore, Ankara is turning a blind eye to Iran’s meddling in the Syrian crisis; for a long time, it did nothing to stop ISIS due to a mistaken belief that it would chip away at the Kurds. Now, perhaps too late, it understands that Islamic State is also a threat to Turkey.
Egypt, bereft of American support, has turned to Russia – which maintains a de facto alliance with Iran to support Assad – and therefore isn’t doing anything. To round out the picture, Egypt and Turkey are no longer on speaking terms, since Ankara is still seething about the ouster of president Morsi and the regime of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Saudi Arabia is bearing the brunt of the Iranian threat, first because of its proximity, and second because of its importance to the Sunni world as the keeper of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. It is helping the rebels in Syria while trying to keep an open dialogue with Egypt and Turkey; however, as long as these two remain at odds, there can be no common front against Iran.
In the not so distant past, Egypt and Saudi Arabia jointly led such a front which included the Gulf states, Jordan and even Morocco. Israel was helping behind the scene. They had great hopes of stopping Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, by force if necessary. America was the glue that kept them together – until Obama made a deal with Iran after secret talks in Oman.
Today, the Sunni world is hopelessly divided, and not only in the Middle East. Morocco and Algiers are bickering about the fate of Western Sahara; Libya is in the throes of a multi-faceted civil war. Radical terrorist organizations, from al-Qaida to ISIS, are still bent on enforcing their own idea of a Sunni caliphate and are further destabilizing the region. In the face of clear and present danger, Sunni countries are unable to pull their act together.
What’s next? Maybe the new American administration will be a game changer. Maybe it will see, at last, that the situation constitutes a growing threat to the West. A renewed humanitarian crisis has millions of refugees seeking safety and hope in Europe and America, while radical Islamic terrorism is directed again and again at soft civilian targets. Weapons of mass destruction could be thrown into the volatile mix. Russia is not immune, as its southern border is perilously close to conflict zones and there are significant Muslim minorities on its soil. Together, Washington and Moscow could do what neither can do alone: douse the flames and bring a measure of appeasement. But for that to happen, they would have to jointly eradicate ISIS and find a way to cut Iran off from Syria, its gateway to the Middle East.
The writer, a fellow of The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, is a former ambassador to Romania, Egypt and Sweden.