Nearly four years after Assad’s government promised to get rid of its chemical weapons, gas attacks are still commonplace. What went wrong?
THE HAGUE (Reuters) – In the spring of 2015, a Syrian major-general escorted a small team of chemical-weapons inspectors to a warehouse outside the Syrian capital Damascus. The international experts wanted to examine the site but were kept waiting outside in their car for around an hour, according to several people briefed on the visit.
When they were finally let into the building, it was empty. They found no trace of banned chemicals.
“Look, there is nothing to see,” said the general, known to the inspectors as Sharif, opening the door.
So why were the inspectors kept waiting? The Syrians said they were getting the necessary approval to let them in, but the inspectors had a different theory. They believed the Syrians were stalling while the place was cleaned out. It made no sense to the team that special approval was needed for them to enter an empty building.
The incident, which was not made public, is just one example of how Syrian authorities have hindered the work of inspectors and how the international community has failed to hold Syria to account, according to half a dozen interviews with officials, diplomats and investigators involved in eliminating Syria’s weapons of mass destruction.
A promise by Syria in 2013 to surrender its chemical weapons averted US air strikes. Many diplomats and weapons inspectors now believe the promise was a ruse.
They suspect that President Bashar Assad’s regime, while appearing to cooperate with international inspectors, secretly maintained or developed a new chemical-weapons capability. They say Syria hampered inspectors, gave them incomplete or misleading information and turned to using chlorine bombs when its supplies of other chemicals dwindled.
There have been dozens of chlorine attacks and at least one major sarin attack since 2013, causing more than 200 deaths and hundreds of injuries. International inspectors say there have been more than 100 reported incidents of chemical weapons being used in the past two years alone.
“The cooperation was reluctant in many aspects, and that’s a polite way of describing it,” Angela Kane, who was the United Nations high representative for disarmament until June 2015, told Reuters.
“Were they happily collaborating? No,” she said. “What has really been shown is that there is no counter-measure, that basically the international community is just powerless.”
That frustration was echoed by UN war crimes investigator Carla del Ponte, who announced on August 6 that she was quitting a UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria.
“I have no power as long as the Security Council does nothing,” del Ponte said. “We are powerless; there is no justice for Syria.”
The extent of Syria’s reluctance to abandon chemical weapons has not previously been made public for fear of damaging international inspectors’ relationship with Assad’s administration and its backer, Russia, which is giving military support to the Syrian leader. Now investigators and diplomatic sources have provided telling details to Reuters:
• Syria’s declarations about the types and quantities of chemicals it possessed do not match evidence on the ground uncovered by inspectors. Its disclosures, for example, A CIVIL DEFENSE worker is shown in May 2015 carrying a damaged cannister from what residents said had been a chlorine-gas attack on villages in the Idlib region of Syria. In the photo to the right, people are shown being treated in the Syrian village of Khan Sheikhoun this April after what is believed to have been a poison-gas attack. make no mention of sarin, yet there is strong evidence that sarin has been used in Syria, including this year. Other chemicals found by inspectors but not reported by Syria include traces of the nerve agent VX, the poison ricin and a chemical called hexamine, which is used to stabilize sarin.
• Syria told inspectors in 2014-2015 that it had used 15 tons of nerve gas and 70 tons of sulfur mustard for research. Reuters has learned that inspectors believe those amounts are not “scientifically credible.” Only a fraction would be needed for research, two sources involved in inspections in Syria said.
• At least 2,000 chemical bomb shells, which Syria said it had converted to conventional weapons and either used or destroyed, are unaccounted for, suggesting that they might still be in the hands of Syria’s military.
• In Damascus, witnesses with knowledge of the chemical-weapons program were instructed by Syrian military officials to alter their statements midway through interviews with inspectors, three sources with direct knowledge of the matter told Reuters.
The head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international agency overseeing the removal and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, concedes that serious questions remain about the completeness and accuracy of Syria’s disclosures.
“There are certainly some gaps, uncertainties, discrepancies,” OPCW director-general Ahmet Uzumcu, a Turkish diplomat, told Reuters.
But he rejected criticism of his leadership by Kane and other diplomats. Kane told Reuters that Uzumcu should have turned up the pressure on Syria over the gaps in its reporting and done more to support his inspectors. Uzumcu countered that it was not his job “to ensure the full compliance” of treaties on chemical weapons, saying the OPCW was mandated to confirm the use of chemical weapons but not assign blame.
Syria’s deputy foreign minister, Faisal Meqdad, insisted that Syria was completely free of chemical weapons and defended the country’s cooperation with international inspectors.
“I assure you that what was called the Syrian chemical-weapons program has ended, and has ended with no return. There are no more chemical weapons in Syria,” he told Reuters in an interview.
Sharif, the inspector, did not respond to requests for comment about the incident at the warehouse.
On August 21, 2013, hundreds of people died in a sarin gas attack in Ghouta, a district on the outskirts of Damascus. The colorless, odorless nerve agent causes people to suffocate within minutes if inhaled even in small amounts. Assad’s forces were blamed by western governments. He has repeatedly denied using chemical weapons and blames insurgents for the attack.
In the wake of the atrocity, the United States and Russia brokered a deal under which Assad’s government agreed to eradicate its chemical-weapons program. As part of the deal, Syria joined the OPCW, based in the Hague, promising to open its borders to inspectors and disclose its entire program – after previously denying it had any chemical weapons.
Syria declared that it had 1,300 tons of chemical weapons or industrial chemical stocks, precisely the amount that outside experts had estimated. In an OPCW-led operation costing hundreds of millions of dollars, that stockpile was shipped overseas for destruction with the help of 30 countries, notably the US.
But there were two significant problems. First, inspections did not go smoothly. Days after the Ghouta sarin attack, OPCW inspectors heading for the area came under sniper fire. They made it through to Ghouta eventually and were given just two hours by Syrian authorities to interview witnesses and take samples. The team confirmed that sarin had been used.
And in May 2014, a joint UN-OPCW convoy was hit by explosives and AK-47 fire while attempting to get to the site of another chemical attack in the northern town of Kafr Zita. That mission was aborted. On the return journey, some members of the team were detained for 90 minutes by unidentified gunmen. Syria’s foreign ministry issued a statement blaming terrorists for attacking the convoy.
Reuters was unable to determine exactly how many times the work of inspectors has been hampered, but Syrian tactics have included withholding visas, submitting large volumes of documents multiple times to bog down the process, last-minute restrictions on site inspections and coercing certain witnesses to change their stories during interviews, four diplomats and inspectors involved in the process told Reuters.
The OPCW team has carried out 18 site visits since 2013 but has now effectively given up because Syria has failed to provide sufficient or accurate information, these sources said.
The second problem was a switch of tactics by Assad’s forces. While the UN and OPCW focused on ridding Syria of the stockpile it admitted having, Assad’s forces began using new, crude chlorine bombs instead, according to two inspectors. As many as 100 chlorine barrel bombs have been dropped from helicopters since 2014, they said. Syria has denied using chlorine.
Although less poisonous than nerve gas and widely available, chlorine’s use as a weapon is banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention that Syria signed when it joined the OPCW, an intergovernmental agency that works with the UN to implement the convention. If inhaled, chlorine gas turns into hydrochloric acid in the lungs and can kill by drowning victims in their body fluids.
OPCW head Uzumcu denied there had been a reluctance to investigate reports of chlorine attacks, pointing out that in 2014, he set up a fact-finding mission to look into them. This mission was not tasked with assigning blame, however. It concluded that the use of chlorine was systematic and widespread.
Kane, the former UN high representative for disarmament, told Reuters that Uzumcu should have tackled Syria over its lapses in reporting to the OPCW, including undeclared chemicals and a failure to report the government’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, which was, in effect, the program’s headquarters.
“Why, my God, three-and-a half years later, has more progress not been made in clearing up the inconsistencies? If I was the head of an organization like that... I would go to Damascus and I would confront these people,” Kane said.
Uzumcu said the OPCW was constrained by its founding treaty, the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW has no obligation to act when one of its members violates the convention, he said. Determining blame for the use of chemical weapons is the task of a separate UN-OPCW mission in Syria, the Joint Investigative Mechanism, established in 2015. A spokesman for the Joint Investigative Mechanism referred questions to the OPCW.
Uzumcu said his office was still seeking answers from the Assad administration about undeclared chemicals, aerial bombs and the Scientific Studies and Research Center, which has overseen Syria’s chemical weapons since the 1970s.
The Syrian crisis has had a profound effect on the way the OPCW operates. For two decades, the organization had reached consensus on most decisions, calling on the 41-member executive council to vote only on a handful of occasions. Syria marked a clear divide on the council.
Former UN chief weapons inspector Ake Sellstrom, who is now chief scientist for the UN-OPCW mission, said it was critical that perpetrators of chemical attacks be put on trial to deter future use of weapons of mass destruction. His team should be reporting back to the UN by mid-October, he said.
A key unsolved question is what happened to the 2,000 aerial bombs that Syria said it had converted to conventional weapons, a process that would be costly and time-consuming.
“To my knowledge, the Syrian government never furnished any details of where, when and how they changed the bombs’ payload,” said a UN-OPCW source who took part in investigations in 2015-2016. He said there clearly was “a real, high-level, command structure behind this.”
Syrian officials did not respond to requests for comment about the bombs.
The team is also examining the deaths of almost 100 people on April 4 when a gas attack hit Khan Sheikhoun, a town in the rebel-held province of Idlib near the Turkish border. Samples taken from people exposed to the chemicals and tested by the OPCW confirmed sarin use. Meqdad, Syria’s deputy foreign minister, said in the interview that Syrian forces were not to blame, repeating earlier denials by Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem.
Sellstrom said the presence of sarin so long after Syria was supposed to have dismantled its chemical-weapons program posed difficult questions.
“Is there a hideout somewhere, or is there production somewhere and how much is available?” he said, adding that the reported use of aerial bombs in Khan Sheikhoun could point to the Syrian forces keeping some strategic weapons as well.
The attack means either “that someone can produce sarin today, or sarin has been hidden,” Sellstrom said.