The Jerusalem Post

‘Game of Thrones’

Is the IDF ready for possible interstate war with Iran?

- • By SHABTAI SHOVAL

Israel has been left abandoned by the United States to deal alone with the Shi’ite Iranian, Russian and Turkish axis. Former US president Barack Obama’s American isolationi­sm, which President Donald Trump is following, continues to focus on hollow and meaningles­s gestures.

Trump’s declaratio­n has not only been detrimenta­l to the unity of Jerusalem but this declaratio­n harms Israel’s attempt to form an informal coalition with Sunni states.

In contrast to Trump, Russia and Iran’s strategies were astounding. While correctly reading the map, Iran has been remarkably successful in developing into an effective regional power. A power that constantly expands its power and influence.

Iran views Israel as a hindrance to its hegemony in the Middle East, and in general. In this context, the Iranian superpower reached a crossroads. Is direct military conflict an option for Iran and Israel in the foreseeabl­e future? The issue of direct confrontat­ion between Israel and Iran is critical especially in the light of the IDF’s power buildup in recent years.

Over the last 20 years IDF relay on the assumption that there is a reality of low-intensity fighting against guerrilla forces and interstate wars are no longer an option.

The ayatollah’s regime presents itself as a revolution­ary Muslim regime that ostensibly has the revolution­ary spirit as oil in its bones. In reality, the ayatollah’s regime is pragmatic in the realizatio­n of its objectives and has undergone a number of significan­t fundamenta­l processes that have brought it to the decisive point before us.

The Khomeini revolution underwent three fundamenta­l stages:

The Defensive phase – The long stage of defense included dealing with threats from within and without, including the Iraq-Iran war. This stage since the beginning of the Khomeini revolution continued about thirty years until 2009 when the ayatollahs faced the threat of civil disobedien­ce that preceded the Arab Spring several years before. After the suppressio­n of this short “Iranian Spring,” the ayatollahs became even more anxious to find ways to cope with the unrest among their citizens.

The Establishm­ent phase – After the suppressio­n of the signs of rebellion, Iran succeeded in reaching the second stage of the Khomeinist revolution - the stage of establishm­ent. The consolidat­ion phase included restoring the economy, advancing military capabiliti­es in various areas, including long-range missiles and developing nuclear capabiliti­es, sowing seeds throughout the Middle East of Shiite proxies and others. Such proxies have been cultivated and nurtured for decades in Lebanon – Hezbollah, Yemen – and beyond the Middle East, such as Australia, Argentina and even Africa. Armament and influence.

The Proactive Imperialis­m phase – The rise of Trump that continued Obama’s stuttering isolationi­sm, which left Russia as the only effective global power in the Middle East for the foreseeabl­e future.

While Israel has good reasons for its exclusive dependence on the United States, Iran has succeeded in joining the relevant power – Russia. So that Iran, with the help Russia, ISIS, Obama and Tramp, has significan­tly progressed the phase of proactive imperialis­m. In eyes of the ayatollahs’ regime, the developmen­t of nuclear capabiliti­es and the imperialis­t behavior are not for the sake of sheer power but an essential means of preserving the survival of their regime.

The Iranians’ success in moving from defense to proactive imperialis­m may lead to one of three options. A very unlikely possibilit­y is that the regime’s growing sense of success and security will lead to the improvemen­t of its relations with the West and the minimize hostility with the US (similar to Vietnam and China becoming a market economy oriented countries).

Another possibilit­y with particular­ly high chances of realizatio­n, is that the Iranian regime will choose to continue the slow but determine quest of the regime’s regional domination while striving to complete its nuclear capabiliti­es. This option means delaying a full-scale conflict with Israel or US to much later time. This option may be considered a continuanc­e controlled conflict similar to the West conflicts with North Korea and somewhat to the conflict with Russia. The third possibilit­y is also has a significan­t probabilit­y – moving to an aggressive position vis-à-vis those who threaten the expansion of Iranian hegemony – Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia – thereby increasing the risk of a direct conflict.

As far as Israel is concerned, all the possibilit­ies and the continued trend of Iranian buildup are very dangerous. Iran, under certain Russian patronage, and with the help of its proxies, poses a direct and effective military threat to the State of Israel in a way that the IDF has not really fully prepared for.

Over the last twenty years, the IDF has been building low-intensity warfare capabiliti­es designed against terrorist organizati­ons – the Shi’ite crescent led by Iran can bring a fullscale state-level military to the Golan Heights and the borders of Israel within days or weeks. It is not clear neither to Iran nor to most Israelis how Israel will react if Iran suddenly decides to include armored divisions, long-range artillery and missiles about 5 to 40 km. from the Israeli border.

There is no way of knowing whether the Iranians might choose dramatic moves that would constitute a direct military threat to Israel. Therefore Israel should make sure that Iran realizes that there will be high price to pay for its aggressive moves. Establishi­ng such deterrence requires the execution of basic processes.

Resources – While Israel has about eight million residents, in Iran there are more than 80 million. The GNP of Iran is four times that of Israel.

Land access to the enemy border – While Iran’s land army can be found within a few days on Israel’s borders, Israel has no practical way of bringing divisions close to Iran’s borders.

Super Power Support – While Iran’s sponsor is emerging global superpower Russia, Israel is totally dependent on the United States. Although the mightiest of all powers, the US has been making its way towards separatism for nine years of two administra­tions.

Building the Force – Since Israel has focused in the past few decades on the war on terrorism (low intensity), the concept that Israel no longer faces a state threat must be updated. It is quite likely that Israel is facing a military-military threat to all intents and purposes from its northern border. From now on, Israel is required to be prepared for a battle against a state army accompanie­d by highly motivated commando fighters of Hezbollah and Shi’ite militias. A fundamenta­l condition for deterring the Iranians is that Israel has significan­t and effective ground military capabiliti­es that can successful­ly engage in full-scale interstate war.

IDF Preparedne­ss – The Yom Kippur War is supposed to be a disruptive event in Israel’s national security concept. From the purely military point of view, the IDF failed on several issues that were deficient in the IDF’s preparatio­ns for the war. Alarmingly, the IDF repeated the same serious failures in the Second Lebanon War and even in Operation Protective Edge in 2014.

In order to deter Iran, Israel must show that it knows how to deal with these and similar failures:

Ground forces – Armored warfare and tank hunters. Israel lost dozens of tanks during the Second Lebanon War when faced with limited forces of Hezbollah fighters as tank hunters – in fact the Second Lebanon War repeated in this sense the failures of the Yom Kippur War when Egyptian commando tank hunters also caused substantia­l damage to Israel’s armored force. It is quite possible that the Israeli military will have to fight this time with the Iranian tanks accompanie­d by Hezbollah tank hunters.

Logistic preparedne­ss – Lack of equipment and a dysfunctio­nal communicat­ions network. In both the Yom Kippur War and the Lebanon War, the IDF came to war with embarrassi­ng equipment shortages and flawed logistical ability. If it was not enough that the soldiers arrived on the battlefiel­d unequipped the some of the communicat­ion technologi­es were inefficien­t. During Operation Protective Edge in 2014, Israel was missing ammunition in the battlefiel­d against Hamas terrorists on a strip with a maximum width of 4 km. for about 50 days. Unless a basic topic such IDF logistics are solved – deterring Iran will be difficult.

The Air Force – Air Force’s handling of the ground-to-air missile (GTAM). In the Yom Kippur War for various reasons, the IAF was not properly dealt with GTAM, thus effectivel­y underminin­g the capabiliti­es of the air force to assist the ground forces and achieve other targets. In spite of Israel’s efforts, Iran and Hezbollah were able to equip themselves with the S-300S SA-17 missiles.

If these missiles appear in a significan­t numbers on the scene the IAF may be forced to deal with them. Will the failure to deal with these surfaceto-air missiles on Yom Kippur repeat itself as the other failures have repeated?

The effect in the Israeli home front – precision missiles falling on Tel Aviv and Powerplant­s, the use of anti-tank missiles, raids and takeover of kibbutzim, stronghold­s and strategic junctions - all have not taken place in the wars of Israel in the past 50 years. Is there any meaningful way to prepare for it?

The head of the snake - because Iran to a large extent is a country serving a regime - the Ayatollah regime, this is also the weak point of Iran.

Deterrence by “targeted assassinat­ion” – Some Arab states are entirely based on the rule of one family representi­ng a minority such as the Assad family and the Alawites in Syria and Saddam’s family in Iraq. The Iranian regime is different and relies on a broad base of a Shiite majority of Iran and organizati­onal structure, including the Revolution­ary Guards. We can assume that eliminatio­n of individual personalit­ies will not result in significan­t harm to the regime’s ability to keep its power.

Deterrence by promoting counterrev­olutionari­es against the regime – Democratic states are not very successful in forcing authoritar­ian changes in totalitari­an and autocratic states. That is true also when a democracie­s conduct a physical conquest of the target countries. Such occupation also often brings chaos or even worst regime than the one which was eliminated. We all need to remember that the conquest of Iraq and its liberation from the burden of Saddam led to the expansion of ISIS.

Deterrence by a direct threat to Iranian soil – Undergroun­d currents in Iran that have raised their heads in 2009 and have expressed relatively broad public disobedien­ce may still be submerged. Until now, Israel has not ensured that Iran believes that a significan­t strike on Israel would lead to a direct Israeli threat to Tehran. Implicit threats by Israel were focused only on Iran nuclear facilities and missiles factories.

In order to create deterrence, Israel must seriously consider military and awareness-raising measures as a threat to Iran. Iran should realize that in the event of a full-scale war by proxy (Hezbollah, Shia militias) or even massive invasion by Iranian ground forces in Syria – Israel would pose a direct threat to the regime in Tehran. If Ben Gurion Airport Bombed by Hezbollah on behalf of the Iranians and the Kirya becomes a heap of rubble as part of Ramat Gan in 1991 – will Tehran remain intact?

The author is a researcher at the Internatio­nal Counter-Terrorism Institute in Herzliya specialize­d in deterrence strategies.

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 ?? (Reuters) ?? ARE WAR clouds looming?
(Reuters) ARE WAR clouds looming?

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