The Jerusalem Post

Limits to Basic Law

- • By YANIV ROZNAI

Some critics of Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People argue that the Supreme Court has the power to review and even invalidate constituti­onal provisions for being unconstitu­tional. Eugene Kontorovic­h argues, “This makes no sense; any American constituti­onal lawyer would find the notion of an unconstitu­tional constituti­on ridiculous… if [the Supreme Court]… claims the authority to consider challenges to constituti­onal provisions, it will set itself up as a supreme authority that is above even Basic Law. This will put it above any checks and balances; it will be a true judicial coup…”

Contrary to Kontorovic­h’s understand­ing, the idea of an unconstitu­tional constituti­onal norms is an existing approach in many jurisdicti­ons around the world. First, almost half of world constituti­ons simply prohibit, by explicit limitation­s, amending basic principles of the constituti­onal order. Second, even in countries where the constituti­on is silent about this issue, courts around the world have developed the idea of implied limitation­s on the power to amend the constituti­on in a manner that would affect the basic structure of the constituti­on or change its identity. Third, courts around the world review constituti­onal norms and often declare certain constituti­onal provisions as unconstitu­tional and void, in order to protect the constituti­onal order.

Just last month, the Constituti­onal Court of Uganda delivered a landmark, 814-page long, judgment invalidati­ng a provision of a constituti­onal amendment extending the term of office for Members of Parliament from five to seven years, for being unconstitu­tional. Justice Kakuru wrote that the idea that parliament has absolute amendment powers “is a fiction based on a legal misconcept­ion.” If this was the case, the MPs “can abolish Republic of Uganda or make themselves MPs for life. Parliament can abolish the Republic of Uganda and introduce a monarchy … the argument that you can vote to amend any article of the Constituti­on by simple majority is misguided.” Also misguided is the argument that the Knesset Members have an unlimited power to enact Basic Laws. Can MKs extend their term to 10 or 20 years? Kontorovic­h’s formal approach would claim that such an enactment, as long as made by a “Basic Law,” is constituti­onal.

Kontorovic­h’s argument concerning the US is also imprecise. Some of America’s leading scholars, such as Walter Murphy, John Rawls, Samuel Freeman and Stephen Macedo, have written about the limits to the power to amend the US Constituti­on. Even Harvard Prof. Laurence Tribe, perhaps the authority on the US Constituti­on, who has called in the past for a reserved judiciary role with regard to constituti­onal amendments, seems willing to embrace the notion that some principles are so fundamenta­l to the constituti­onal order that they can be regarded as indispensa­ble to the system’s legitimacy. Tribe recently wrote that “it may well be that some properly adopted formal amendments could themselves be deemed ‘unconstitu­tional’ because of their radical departure from premises too deeply embedded to be repudiated without a full-blown revolution.”

True, the question of judicial review of constituti­onal norms is a complex issue and I am aware of the natural resistance to such a practice. However, the willingnes­s to accept judicial scrutiny of constituti­onal norms should be connected to the constituti­onal amendment process. An extremely flexible amendment procedure, where a dominant executive controls the amendment process, coupled with short-term political interests and temporary majorities, increases the fear of abuse of the amendment power and justifies judicial supervisio­n. This is very different from the American constituti­onal amendment procedure, which is the most rigid in the world.

In Israel, one of the biggest weaknesses of the constituti­onal structure is that the amendment of most of the basic laws requires no special majority, so that a vote with just a few MKs present could amend a basic law, or even enact one. This is what Ariel Bendor calls “the unbearable lightness with which changes can be made in basic laws.” When basic laws are easily amended, where the legislatur­e is composed of a single chamber, coupled with the dominance of the government in the legislativ­e process, there is a greater fear for an abuse of constituen­t power. Judicial review of basic laws thus seems necessary. Otherwise, the Knesset would be practicall­y omnipotent and would be able to immunize any law from judicial review simply be labeling it as a “basic law.”

As Justice Elyakim Rubinstein noted in the biennial budget case, “The restraint that the constituen­t authority takes in amending the constituti­on obliges also restraint from the court; but the natural continuati­on is that the less restraint is the constituen­t authority when it amends basic principles, the willingnes­s of the court to review basic law should be wider.”

Unfortunat­ely, over the past few years, there has been a tendency in Israel toward tinkering with the basic laws. Amendments to the basic laws are increasing­ly being adopted simply to respond to political events and for political convenienc­e. For example, between May 13, 2015 and July 30, 2015, the Knesset enacted three temporary basic laws regarding the biennial budget; allowing ministers to resign from positions at the Knesset, and removing the limitation on the number of ministers, which apply only during the term of the 20th Knesset.

The context of these amendments, and others, raises the fear that these are not necessary due to some urgent need but derive solely from short-term political interests – precisely those meant to be limited by a constituti­on. Consider, for example, the Fifth Amendment to the Basic Law: The Government, concerning deputy minister with a status of a minister, which was adopted on January 2018. This amendment passed first reading on Monday morning after a quick debate in the committee and passed second the third readings the following day in the afternoon. In other words, the legislatur­e used its authority to amend the basic law for a personal political necessity, in a day and a half, without a serious political or public debate.

The use of enacting and amending the basic laws for political considerat­ions, often to be applied solely temporary and without public deliberati­on, has a significan­t impact on the constituti­onal framework of the country. The result of these actions is a continued decline in the status of the basic laws. As the overly flexible legislativ­e process is controlled by the government, in Israel, the only real balancing authority to the power of the majority, is the Supreme Court. Do not take away its ability to protect fundamenta­l rights or the constituti­onal order.

The writer is a senior lecturer at the Harry Radzyner Law School, Interdisci­plinary Center Herzliya and the author of Unconstitu­tional Constituti­onal Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers (Oxford University Press, 2017).

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