The anatomy of a chaotic appointment

For five months, Israel has attempted to battle COVID-19 without an official in charge.

Finally, on Wednesday night, Israelis went to bed confident that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was set to appoint Prof. Gabriel Barbash to the post.

Medical professionals across the spectrum praised his candidacy and the public felt comfortable with him, as Barbash had become associated with the coronavirus crisis

are trying, trying and trying,” he said. “It’s very complex.” • through his near-nightly commentaries on N12.

But on Thursday morning, the country woke up to learn that its new coronavirus commissioner was not Barbash, but his successor, the current head of Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center, Ronni Gamzu.

“Yesterday, in the late evening, the prime minister and health minister appealed to me to help with the coronavirus crisis at the national level, after the appointment of Prof. Barbash unfortunately fell through,” Gamzu wrote in a Facebook post Thursday morning. “I immediately responded in the affirmative.”

Inside sources say that although there had been informal conversations with Gamzu about the position, he accepted without knowing to whom he would report or even the scope of his formal authority.

Barbash, who Gamzu had praised as the right person for the role the day before, rejected Netanyahu’s offer following a battle over the mandate of the new post.

“This is the right man in the right place!” Gamzu wrote. “This is the best decision the government has made since the start of the crisis.”

Gamzu described Barbash as “determined,” “detail-oriented” and a person who does not take no for an answer. He said he knows how to give respect, but also how to get angry.

So, what went wrong?

It all started on July 6, when Health Minister Yuli Edelstein stoically rolled out new coronavirus directives – the first such restrictions since two months ago, when Israel thought it had defeated the virus.

Event halls, clubs, bars, gyms, public pools and cultural performances would be closed. Restaurants would limit seating to 20 patrons inside and 30 outside. And synagogues would need to limit services to 20 people.

But the new health minister sought to give the public hope. At the briefing he announced that solid management of the crisis was coming soon. He said that he would put into place an “emergency management authority,” which would be given the necessary tools to take responsibility for the pandemic and remove the oversight and implementation of testing and contact tracing from the public health services.

“In the near future, I will announce my hiring choice,” he said.

Tuesday, July 7: The next morning, head of public health Sigal Sadetsky stepped down, accusing the new administration in her resignation letter of frivolous, unsubstantiated and populist decision-making.

Sadetsky’s words were backed up by people in the know, who told The Jerusalem Post that since the new administration took over, coronavirus management has been “out of control.” At this point, the pandemic is managed by populist ministers, all advocating for their own constituents, and unwilling to take the professional recommendations of the ministry.

One official told the Post that Edelstein makes threats and nobody listens.

As Sadetsky’s letter was making waves, the Health Ministry leaked that its top pick for coronavirus commissioner was Maj.Gen. (Ret.) Roni Numa, who had been appointed in the first wave to lead Bnei Brak’s response to the pandemic.

Monday, July 13: One week later, it was understood that Numa would not be taking on the job. Israeli media reported that he turned down the offer after Health Ministry director Chezy Levy refused to grant him the authority to coordinate between the various ministries.

So, once again, the public waited for Edelstein’s hire.

Tuesday, July 14: The country did not have to wait long. On Tuesday, Netanyahu hosted the first meeting of a new coronavirus “advisory committee,” which included former Health Ministry director-general Moshe Bar Siman Tov and consultants from the fields of economics and health.

At the meeting, the group was meant to evaluate potential new directives to block the increase in infections and lay the groundwork for a long-term coronavirus strategy.

Wednesday, July 15: By the next day, rumors circulated that the prime minister had tapped the former director-general to manage the second wave of the pandemic. However, Bar Siman Tov declined the offer, likely because of the pressure he underwent managing the crisis during the first wave.

Thursday, July 16: Instead, the Health Ministry leaked that by Thursday afternoon, Maj.-Gen. Amir Abulafia was expected to have the role.

Abulafia was apparently desired because he is a talented manager and operator, traits that were demonstrated in his role as head of the IDF Planning Department. But analysts warned that he might have struggled in the role due to his lack of political experience.

Saturday, July 18: Over the weekend, the situation changed again. Netanyahu invited Barbash to his home in Caesarea to discuss the opportunity with him – and personally nominated him to be Israel’s coronavirus czar, people with knowledge of the matter told the Post.

Sunday, July 19: Barbash accepted the prime minister’s offer in principle, and on Sunday morning the Hebrew media site N12 reported that while the official letter of appointment had not yet been signed, negotiations were in their final stages.

However, it was soon revealed that there was not a consensus among top leadership on his appointment. Edelstein still wanted Abulafia; the prime minister did not agree.

“Contrary to reports, the health minister is not fighting any battle over the identity of the commissioner,” the Health Ministry said in a statement. “We understand the desire to spice up news with juicy gossip. It’s just a pity it is simply not true. Minister Edelstein is examining the most suitable candidates for the position.”

The ministry said both Barbash and Abulafia were worthy, and a decision would be made in the coming days, with both of them having an equal opportunity.

On the same day, the Hebrew daily Yediot Aharonot reported that former IDF Chief of Staff Lt.Gen. (ret.) Gadi Eisenkot had said he agreed to manage the country’s fight but decision-makers never got back to him.

“A very serious group led by Tal Russo offered it to me. They asked me: ‘If they offer it to you, will you accept it?’” Eisenkot said in the interview. “I said that I was a soldier of the state for any mission. But they did not get back to me regarding the offer.”

Monday, July 20: Yet another name was tossed around on Monday: Mossad chief Yossi Cohen. But this idea seemed to be quickly dismissed.

Tuesday, July 21: By Tuesday, Barbash was the only man left standing and it seemed likely that he would be the country’s first coronavirus commissioner.

Abulafia had informed Defense Minister Benny Gantz and the IDF chief-of-staff Aviv Kochavi that he had withdrawn his candidacy to serve as the national project manager for the treatment of the coronavirus, the Defense Ministry said.

“The general wishes Prof. Barbash complete success,” the statement read.

However, a formal announcement by the prime minister about Barbash did not come out that day either, due to “negotiations over certain aspects of his role,” Israeli media reported.

It was unclear whether Barbash would report to Edelstein or the coronavirus cabinet, meaning the prime minister. It was also being determined how the new commissioner would work with Levy, although Levy made it sound on KAN Radio Tuesday that he was eagerly awaiting for Barbash to start.

“Prof. Barbash will take on the role of commissioner and will be involved in many areas that require attention 24 hours a day,” Levy told the station Tuesday morning. “He is right now working with us, studying the subject and will get involved… An extra force like him can definitely give [the battle against coronavirus] a boost.”

Wednesday morning, July 22: The next morning, there was still no announcement about his appointment, but experts and politicians alike analyzing the choice indicated that Barbash was indeed the right man for the job.

Hadassah Medical Center head Zeev Rotstein said that Barbash has “extreme academic achievements” and left Sourasky a “modern and sophisticated” hospital.

MK Naftali Bennett, who himself wanted the role of coronavirus czar, praised the prime minister’s choice: “Gabi Barbash’s appointment is excellent. He is just the right person.”

Wednesday, 8:00 p.m.: But as the day dragged on, tensions rose until Barbash issued an ultimatum at around 8 p.m: either Netanyahu and Edelstein would come to an agreement about his mandate by late Wednesday, or he would refuse the position.

Senior insider sources said that the hold up in formalizing Barbash’s contract was infighting between Netanyahu and Edelstein over what specific authoritative powers Barbash would have and how he would work with Levy.

It does not appear that any of these questions were answered with Gamzu’s appointment.

In an interview with media that morning, Edelstein mocked the appointment of such a commissioner: “It’s like the public is waiting for a messiah and not a project manager,” he said.

According to N12, when Barbash issued his ultimatum, Edelstein picked up the phone and called Gamzu, who met with Netanyahu and Edelstein for close to two hours and then decided to accept the role.

Wednesday, 11:50 p.m.: Barbash announced that he had decided not to take the job.

Thursday, July 23: At 12:39 a.m., Netanyahu and Edelstein announced that they had appointed Gamzu, the man who developed Israel’s plan for protecting its senior living facilities from the coronavirus.

“We had excellent candidates,” Prof. Eli Waxman, former chairman of the National Security Council’s expert advisers committee concerning the coronavirus outbreak, told the Post. “They were all ready … to enter the system in the midst of the COVID crisis with no guarantee of success.”

But in the end, none of them accept the offer for one reason: “They refused to take responsibility without authority,” Waxman said.

He added that we are in a war and now the question is whether Gamzu will be given the weapons to properly fight it.

• crisis right now?

Sadly, the writing for this was on the wall from the beginning. Many people looked at this Gantz-Netanyahu unity government as what was needed to help steer us through this storm. Unfortunately, that was naïve. Gantz and Netanyahu don’t know how to work together. Period.

Everything they try to do together fails. They can barely stand being in the same room with one another. Is this repairable? According to sources close to both of them, probably not.

While the Gantz-Netanyahu relationship is to blame, at the core though is the fact that the prime minister is on trial for bribery, fraud and breach of trust.

It’s time to recognize what should have been clear months ago when the indictment against Netanyahu was submitted to court – a person who is on trial facing severe criminal charges cannot continue running this country. It doesn’t work.

It doesn’t work because that person’s decisions will always be skewed. Of course, that person will want to do what is right for the country, but always in his or her mind will be a thought of how does this work out politically? How does it impact their trial?

Israel needs leadership with a singular focus, one that is clear, articulate and understands the gravity of this situation. When we look back at history, great moments were made by great leaders who recognized and understood where they were. They knew to put their country first, not themselves.

Unfortunately, Israel cannot do that now. It is time for this to change. We need a government. Not a circus. • partners,” said the president.

“As a citizen and on behalf of us all, I say: Get a grip! Stop the talk of early elections, of that terrible option at this time, and save yourselves from it. The State of Israel is not a rag doll you drag around as you squabble. The people need you all to be focused, clear and finding solutions to this crisis. It’s in your hands.” •

Then there is the Syrian border or “Golan file” for Hezbollah, where it tries to set up a network of operatives along the Syrian border.

Lastly, Hezbollah seeks to threaten Israel with deep missile strikes, including precision-guided munitions.

It is in Mount Dov where Hezbollah knows the area and is most comfortable to carry out a type of symbolic attack.

Back in 2002, Hezbollah used mortars, Katyusha rockets and anti-tank missiles in this area.

In October 2014, Hezbollah planted bombs in the Mount Dov area and injured two soldiers. It allegedly did this because of orders from Tehran to respond to an attack on Parchin that Tehran blamed on Israel.

In March, a suspect was wounded trying to cross into Israel near the Lebanese border. This might be the Hezbollah model for a new raid into Mount Dov, either with improvised explosive devices or other methods.

In January 2015, Hezbollah fired six Kornet anti-tank missiles toward Mount Dov, killing two soldiers and wounding seven. This was in retaliation for a killing of seven Hezbollah fighters near the Golan.

However, in the past, Hezbollah has not always put itself in such a position to retaliate as it is in today. It didn’t respond to a February killing of one of its members near Khadr, and it didn’t respond to a July killing of another Hezbollah operative in Syria. But today, things are different. The January 2015 attack is the most likely model for this kind of retaliation.

An attack from Syria:

Hezbollah leader Nasrallah said last August that if Israel kills any of its members, then it will retaliate somewhere else. He has hinted that it would be from Lebanon. But Syria offers it another opportunity of plausible deniability. It has sent operatives and drone commanders there. It could use its infrastructure there to expand the front line against Israel.

This would be a new and novel approach. Although Iran fired missile salvos at Israel from Syria in 2018 and launched a drone at Israel from its T-4 base in February 2018, the Syrian front has in general been relatively quiet.

Iran was supposed to keep forces away from the ceasefire lines on the Golan. Hezbollah doesn’t want to risk the infrastructure that it has sought to build along the border as a threat, but it may find that an attack from Syria would be limited to retaliatory strikes against its operatives in Syria. That would keep it from destabilizing Lebanon.

Hezbollah knows that Lebanon is in a precarious economic situation; a French delegation has just come to Lebanon. Why would it want to attack Israel and put Lebanon’s already weak economy at risk?

Hezbollah has openly said it wants China to invest in Lebanon. China won’t invest in a country about to be at war. Hezbollah might like to sacrifice Syrians and others in Syria rather than in its homeland.

A precision strike to show off munitions: