Why Iran won’t let go of its proxies
Five years have passed since former US president Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Trump’s goal was to coerce the Islamic Republic into agreeing to a new deal that would permanently eliminate the threat of Iran’s nuclear program.
However, the opposite happened. Today, not only is Iran uninterested in returning to the deal, but it has also significantly advanced its nuclear program, reducing the breakout time from 12 months to just 12 days. This significant development has prompted scholars and analysts to speculate about crafting a “plan B.”
The article “The Path to a New Iran Deal” penned by Ali Vaez and Vali Nasr stands out in this context. According to Vaez and Nasr, if the West wants to prevent the Islamic Republic from becoming a nuclear-weapons state without going to war with Iran, they need a new diplomatic approach, one that entails supporting a regional order that includes Iran and other states in the region, excluding Israel.
Such an order (or agreement as they call it) “could permanently contain Iran’s nuclear program,” and “it might reduce Tehran’s support for troublesome militias in the region.”
Whether Iran’s nuclear ambitions can be permanently contained is a different question entirely. However, expecting the Islamic Republic to willingly reduce its support for regional militia proxies is overly optimistic, given the strategic importance of the proxies to the regime’s regional influence and security interests.
These proxies form an integral part of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary ideology and its “axis of resistance” against perceived enemies like the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. The regime would never willingly renounce them.
When in 1979 the Islamic Republic was established in Iran, Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini decided to export the revolution to the countries in the region to create as many Islamist states as possible. The regime started with countries which had sizable Shi’ite demographics such as Lebanon and Iraq. However, since it had few resources at its disposal, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) opted for a cost-effective strategy of using proxies to further the revolutionary goals.
THIS HIGHLY successful strategy helped the regime to make significant inroads in the Middle East. Through this strategy, the regime was able to gain strong influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States as well as in the Gaza Strip. In Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad have morphed into radical sub-state actors, which are virtually able to control their respective territories.
The Islamic Republic successfully turned Hezbollah into a hybrid sovereign. Today the terror group retains its grip on the political and economic system, holds sway over the Lebanese state and its institutions, and exercises power without responsibility. Iran provides most of Hezbollah’s weapons and funding; it sends the terror group up to $830 million per year, according to the IDF assessments.
And with its massive arsenal of 70,000 “regular” missiles and rockets (150,000 missiles according to other sources), 145,000 mortars and over 2000 UAVs, Hezbollah is the world’s second most heavily armed terror group after the IRGC, and its power serves as a deterrence against Israel’s potential attack on Iran. Furthermore, Hezbollah carries out terrorist and criminal operations around the world on behalf of the Iranian regime and on Iran’s orders and direction.
In other words, Hezbollah provides a lowcost means for the regime to extend its influence and pursue its objectives in the Levant, and it’s hard to imagine the Islamic Republic would abandon supporting the terror group.
In the Gaza Strip, Iran helped Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to morph into radical sub-state actors, which are effectively controlling the Gazan territory. The Islamic Republic provides Hamas with financial aid (reportedly, $70 million annually), weapons, and technical support to attack Israel. Supporting Hamas and the PIJ is not just to bolster their operations but also serves Iran’s other purposes, such as gathering intelligence on Israel. There are reports suggesting that Iran provides Hamas with an extra monthly financial support of $30 million in exchange for information on Israel’s missile capabilities and missile locations.
IN IRAQ, the Islamic Republic controls paramilitary groups under the umbrella of Hashd al-Sha’bi, also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). These groups are the most powerful fighting force in Iraq and use violence to maintain Iran’s influence and secure its interests in Iraq. Utilizing a technique refined in Lebanon, known as “ballot and bullet,” Iran has pushed its Shi’ite proxies in Iraq to dominate the political process as
well. Today, with around 130 seats, Iranian loyalists constitute the largest bloc in the 329-seat Iraqi parliament, effectively making them the main force in the legislative body.
Sponsorship of proxies in Iraq enables the Islamic Republic to prevent the Iraqi government from becoming hostile towards it, as was the case during Saddam Hussein’s rule. Hussein invaded Iran in 1980, leading to a protracted conflict that cost nearly one million lives on both sides.
Furthermore, by sponsoring proxies in Iraq, Iran is able to launch attacks on US troops, with the aim of driving them out of Iraq and the region at large. Equally important, supporting Iraqi Shi’ite militia provides Iran with a means to attack Kurdish opposition groups based in northern Iraq, including the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan.
In Syria, Iran’s proxy groups have helped save the Assad regime and maintain a presence in the country, allowing the Islamic Republic to expand its regional influence and protect its ideological interests. The Fatemiyoun
and Zainebiyoun brigades, comprising Afghan and Pakistani Shi’ites, are helping the regime maintain its foothold in the Levant against Israel while preserving a continuous geographical link to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Given the success of the proxy strategy, Iran has been trying to build a permanent military base in Syria as an additional front against the Jewish state.
IN YEMEN, Iran aims to counter the influence of its rival country, Saudi Arabia. Supporting Houthi rebels, who seized power in Sanaa, Yemen in 2014, help Iran achieve this goal by maintaining a friendly government in Yemen. The IRGC provides Houthis with weapons and financial support, in part through the illicit sale of commodities such as Iranian oil and drugs.
Even despite its agreement to restore diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran has not stopped supplying Houthis with weapons that fuel the Yemen war. Supporting the Houthis is a low-cost strategy for Iran to inflict significant damage on Saudi Arabia. In
other words, Iran has essentially transformed Houthis into a Yemeni equivalent of Hamas and Hezbollah, effectively serving as a counterbalance to Saudi Arabia, much like how Hezbollah and Hamas have long served as a challenge to Israel.
The Islamic Republic’s strategic reliance on these proxy militias makes it practically impossible for the regime to end its sponsorship of these groups. Beyond this, the Islamic Republic, under the leadership of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, remains committed to its revolutionary principles.
These principles necessitate opposition to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, requiring the regime to continue allocating national resources toward supporting proxy militias and external conflicts. The Islamic Republic can only cease support for these proxies by making the shift from being a revolutionary cause to a normal state. Such a shift would require sustained pressure from the United States and its allies.